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ABSTRACT
My dissertation covers topics in the economics of crime and the interesction be-
tween behavioral and development economics. The first chapter provides causal
evidence that sentencing low-level offenders in the State of Michigan to prison rather
than probation lowers their future criminal behavior but only through incapacitation,
that is, during the time they spend in prison. We identify two sources of incapac-
itation: primary, from the original sentence, and secondary, from higher rates of
future imprisonment among those who were initially sentenced to prison. The sec-
ond chapter studies how economic decision making changes along the transition from
college to the labor market. By collecting panel data from students in a university
in Colombia, we are able to track changes occurring after students who are in their
last semester of college receive and accept a job offer, and after they receive a pay-
check relative to a comparison group of students who remain in college. We find
evidence that students who transition to the labor market are less present-biased,
more generous, and report having lower stress about finances and higher access to
resources after the job offer. After starting to work and receiving a paycheck, they
perform worse on cognitive tasks and report being more worried and frustrated than
students in the comparison group. This suggests that there may be greater cogni-
tive load associated with becoming more independent and earning money. We also
highlight the role of incorporating phychological measures in experimentally-elicited
preference tasks. Even though it seems that last-semester students become less risk
averse when receiving and accepting a job offer, this result vanishes when control-
ling for psychological factors. In the third chapter, we study gender differences in
beliefs regarding performance and in the updating process in the developing country
context. Students in the sample are enrolled in a test-preparation course to take a
x
high-stakes college entrance exam. They are randomized into receiving or not receiv-
ing feedback about their relative ability in the five areas covered by the exam. The
findings suggest that there are substantial biases in assessing own ability. Across all
areas of the test, between 50 and 70 percent of the students fail to correctly predict
the quartile in which their score will be. Moreover, women are more biased and more
likely to underestimate their performance in math and overestimate in text analysis
relative to men. I show evidence that feedback may help close the gender in gap in
confidence as women report being more positive about their chances of admission to
this university while the men seem less sure of this outcome.
xi
CHAPTER I
Estimating the effects of imprisonment on
recidivism: Evidence from a regression
discontinuity design
1.1 Introduction
The dramatic increase in the number of people incarcerated in the United States over
the last three decades (Western, 2006; West et al., 2010) has generated a discussion
among policy makers, criminal justice officials, researchers, and citizens about the
causes and consequences of mass incarceration and ways of reducing the size of the
nation’s prison population without compromising public safety (e.g., Raphael & Stoll,
2009; Travis, 2005; Alexander, 2012; National Research Council, 2008). One of the
central questions in this discussion is whether sentencing a convicted felon to prison -
at considerably higher cost than alternative sentences such as probation - will reduce
the likelihood that the person will reoffend in the future.1
Despite the centrality of these questions to scholarly and policy debates, studies
on the economic and social consequences of incarceration often base their inferences
on nebulous counterfactual comparisons and usually fail to adequately rule out com-
peting explanations for the putative effects of incarceration they estimate, leading
some observers to conclude that “existing research is not nearly sufficient for making
firm evidence-based conclusions for either science or public policy” (Nagin, Cullen,
& Jonson, 2009). In recent years, a new wave of studies has used quasi-experimental
designs that leverage the random assignment of judges to felony cases to estimate
1In the state of Michigan it is estimated that the annual cost of a bed in prison is about $34,000
while the cost of probation supervision is around $3,000.
1
the effects of incarceration on measures of subsequent recidivism, employment, and
earnings (Abrams, 2009; Nagin & Snodgrass, 2013; Berube & Green, 2007; Green &
Winik, 2010; Kling, 2006; Loeffler, 2013; Aizer & Doyle, 2015; Mueller-Smith, 2016).
The current paper contributes to this literature by implementing a quasi-experimental
design to estimate the effect of being sentenced to prison compared to probation on
the probability of prospectively being (a) convicted of a new felony offense, (b)
severity of the new offense, (c) imprisonment due to technical violations of parole or
probation,2 and (d) imprisonment due to new felony convictions. We use data on
a sample of convicted felony offenders in the state of Michigan sentenced between
2003 and 2006. The research design emerges from the structure of the sentencing
guidelines and capitalizes on discontinuities in the probability of being sentenced to
prison based on the formal system that is used for scoring and classifying convicted
offenders in pre-sentence investigation reports, as dictated by the Michigan Sentenc-
ing Guidelines.
Empirically, the discontinuities in the probabilities of receiving a prison sentence
can be analyzed under a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design framework. Given
the concordance between the fuzzy RD and the instrumental variables (IV) estima-
tors, we propose an IV approach to provide the causal effect of imprisonment on
recidivism. Rather than pooling all cutoffs together to construct a single cutoff as
in other RD papers, we use the individual cutoffs as multiple instruments in the IV
regression and obtain tighter standard errors as a result. Our setup is different than
other RD applications in the sense that it contains a series of complexities such as a
discrete and very rugged discrete running variable. We employ and adapt the recent
methodologies in the RD literature to overcome these challenges.
Our identification strategy allows us to conclude that, among low-level offenders
who are sentenced to prison, the recidivism rates for all post sentence periods an-
alyzed and some of the post-release periods are lower than among those sentenced
to probation. We present evidence that lower recidivism is fundamentally a conse-
2Technical violations are violations to the conditions of the original sentence by an offender
under supervision (parole or probation). Examples of technical violations include missing a curfew,
failure to report to office visits, or testing positive for alcohol or drugs.
2
quence of incapacitation. First, as previously documented in the recidivism litera-
ture, we observe incapacitation associated with the original prison sentence. Second,
there is incapacitation resulting from higher future imprisonment rates among those
originally sentenced to prison. We distinguish these two types of incapacitation as
primary and secondary, respectively. Our results from decomposing future impris-
onment into the part due to new sentences and the part due to technical violations
of parole indicate that the higher rate of re-imprisonment among those sentenced
to prison is primarily explained by technical violations. Furthermore, our results
suggest that rehabilitation is not a channel explaining lower recidivism rates among
those sentenced to prison. When analyzing the type of felonies of those who are
convicted of a new felony, we find that those who were initially sentenced to prison
are more likely to engage in high-severity crime.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to causally show that re-imprisonment
is a causal effect of imprisonment itself. We call this effect “secondary” incapacita-
tion to distinguish it from the standard (“primary”) incapacitation effect reported
extensively in the literature. We also identify that the mechanism for this secondary
incapacitation effect is violations of parole conditions rather than engaging in crimi-
nal activity that leads to new sentences. In addition, this is one of the first papers in
the recidivism literature to use a natural experiment leading to a regression discon-
tinuity design as an identification strategy. Finally, from a methodological point of
view we extend the widespread analysis of pooling multiple cutoffs together to using
the individual variation of each cutoff, which increases the precision of our estimates.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 provides a brief theoretical motivation
and discussion of previous studies, section 1.3 presents the details of the Michigan
Sentencing Guidelines on which our research design in based, and section 1.4 discusses
the data sources and presents descriptive statistics for our analytical sample. Section
1.6 presents the results. The last two sections discuss robustness checks and conclude.
1.2 Theoretical motivation and prior research
Contemporary criminological accounts emphasize three general mechanisms through
which incarceration can reduce the likelihood that a person will reoffend in the fu-
3
ture: (1) incapacitation, (2) rehabilitation, and (3) specific deterrence. Although
being incarcerated has a clear mechanical effect on suppressing crime for the dura-
tion of one’s custodial sentence, the effectiveness and efficiency of incapacitation as a
crime-control strategy are open to question. One limitation on its effectiveness is that
by removing offenders from the community, incarceration may create criminal oppor-
tunities for new offenders through so-called “replacement” effects (Miles & Ludwig,
2007). Incapacitation is also a financially costly way to control crime, with a bed in
a state prison or local jail costing an average of roughly $26,000 per year, compared
to average expenditures of $2,800 per parolee and $1,300 per probationer (Schmitt
et al., 2010). Moreover, it is very difficult to disentangle the incapacitative effects of
prison from its behavioral effects, which could operate through rehabilitation, spe-
cific deterrence, or other mechanisms. Finally, the magnitude of any incapacitation
effects depends on the criminal behavior of the comparison group, those who are not
sentenced to prison but rather remain in the community.
After the decline in the support for rehabilitation as the guiding philosophy of
the American penitentiary system (Bushway & Paternoster, 2009; Cullen & Jon-
son, 2011), there has been a resurgence of interest in and support for rehabilitation
in recent decades brought about by new research on corrections programs (Cullen,
2005; Cullen & Jonson, 2011). A general conclusion of this research is that there
are successful programs that curb recidivism, but their effectiveness hinges on the
way they are matched to the needs of individual offenders and the extent to which
they maintain program integrity (Bushway & Paternoster, 2009; Cullen & Jonson,
2011). Some scholars also argue that exposure to programs and interventions that
are inappropriately matched to an offender’s needs - especially those that violate the
“risk principle” by exposing low-risk offenders to excessive interventions – can have
criminogenic effects (Nagin et al., 2009).
Specific deterrence is another theoretical framework used to motivate studies of
the effects of incarceration on reoffending. It refers to the possibility that an of-
fender will be less likely to engage in future criminal activity after being punished
for a previous crime (Bushway & Paternoster, 2009; Nagin et al., 2009). Its focus on
deterring people who have already been punished for previous crimes distinguishes
it from the notion of general deterrence, which refers to the broader deterrent effects
4
that punishments may have on members of society, regardless of their prior experi-
ence with crime and punishment.
Despite the emphasis placed on the three crime-suppressive mechanisms outlined
above, other theoretical perspectives suggest that incarceration may increase crim-
inal behavior, in part through the potential effects of incarceration on employment
(Western, 2006) and the subsequent effects of employment on crime (e.g., Sampson
& Laub, 1995). First, prisons and jails can have “labeling” effects that can operate
through stigma (and social reaction to the label) or through transformation of one’s
identity (the internalization of the label), and both of these can be reinforced through
interactions inside and outside of prison (Nagin et al., 2009). Labeling is often evoked
as one of the main reasons that former prisoners have trouble finding jobs (Pager,
2008). Also, insufficient opportunities for education and job training in prisons, along
with the atrophy of job skills one brings to prison and lost job experience can all
be viewed from a human capital perspective as reasons why returning prisoners may
have more difficulty (re)connecting with the labor market than probationers (Kling,
2006; Loeffler, 2013; Tyler, Kling, et al., 2007). Prisons and jails are viewed by
social learning theorists as “schools of crime” where pro-criminal attitudes, values,
skills, and roles can be transmitted through informal interactions (Jaman, Dickover,
& Bennett, 1972). To the extent that prisoners acquire pro-criminal skills and expe-
rience human capital deficits that make it harder for them to find jobs in the formal
labor market, they may face more strain and differential opportunities that make
crime more accessible and profitable than legal forms of work. Finally, incarceration
- especially imprisonment - can deplete the social capital that one can access after
prison (Loeffler, 2013). The combination of time and distance away from home can
make it difficult to stay connected to relatives and friends, especially “weak ties”
that can be especially useful for finding jobs (Rees, 1966; Granovetter, 1973).
It may also be the case that imprisonment increases the probability of future in-
carceration without increasing criminal behavior by subjecting the offender to greater
surveillance and monitoring. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, nation-
wide nearly 80 percent of released prisoners are released onto parole supervision
(Hughes & Wilson, 2003). These individuals can be re-incarcerated for technical
violations of parole that are not crimes, such as curfew violations, failure to report,
5
or consuming alcohol, or that are minor crimes that would not ordinarily result in
imprisonment, such as drug use, petty theft, or fighting. Although individuals sen-
tenced to probation also face surveillance and monitoring, it is generally less intensive
than parole supervision, involving larger caseloads and fewer restrictions (Petersilia,
2011). Criminologists have long argued that greater surveillance will lead to greater
detection of technical violations (e.g., Austin & Krisberg, 1981; Palumbo, Clifford, &
Snyder-Joy, 1992), which account for almost 30 percent of all prison admissions na-
tionwide (Carson & Golinelli, 2013). Of course, imprisonment for technical violations
may prevent crime through incapacitation. Our analysis differentiates between vari-
ous forms of recidivism, including differentiating between new felony convictions from
imprisonment, between more and less serious new felony convictions, and between
imprisonment for new convictions and technical violations of parole or probation.
In terms of prior research, a small set of studies have utilized quasi-experimental
or experimental designs to study the effects of incarceration on recidivism and em-
ployment. A pair of studies using data from the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia (Berube & Green, 2007; Green & Winik, 2010) use randomly assigned
judges as instruments and find no statistically significant relationship between in-
carceration and reoffending among drug offenders. Abrams (2009) also uses an
instrumental variables design in a comparison of recidivism among prisoners and
probationers in Clark County, Nevada, but in his case, the instruments come from
the random assignment of public defenders and his treatment is sentence length
(rather than sentence type). He finds that there is a relationship between sentence
length and recidivism but it is complex and non-monotonic - negative for both the
shortest/weakest and longest sentences, and positive for mid-range sentences. Nagin
and Snodgrass (2013) use the random assignment of judges to felony defendants in
Pennsylvania who were sentenced during 1999 to estimate the effects of incarcera-
tion (compared to non-custodial sanctions) on recidivism. Aizer and Doyle (2015)
use the random assignment of judges to defendants in a juvenile court in Chicago,
Illinois between 1991 and 2006 to study the effects of juvenile incarceration on high
school completion and incarceration in adult facilities later in life. Finally, Mueller-
Smith (2016) uses the random assignment of “courtrooms” (combinations of judges
and prosecutors) to misdemeanor and felony defendants sentenced in Harris County,
Texas between 1980 and 2009, to estimate the effects of sentence type and length on
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recidivism, employment, wages, take-up of food stamps, marriage, and divorce.
In a study of sentences in Washington juvenile courts, Hjalmarsson (2009) used a
regression discontinuity design that capitalizes on large discrepancies between neigh-
boring cells of the sentencing grid in the probability of being incarcerated in a state
detention facility (for 15-36 weeks) vs. a “local sanction” (which could include com-
binations of time served at a local detention center, community supervision, and
community service) and found that incarceration reduced future offending by 35
percent. Although similar in spirit to our regression discontinuity design, this study
had a very different substantive focus - the juvenile justice system where the treat-
ments are qualitatively different.
Kuziemko (2013) also uses a regression discontinuity framework, but focuses on
the effects of time served on recidivism among individuals serving around two years
in prison. Given the endogeneity of time served, she exploits the sentencing guide-
lines in the state of Georgia as an exogenous source of variation in the number of
months served. Her findings indicate that an additional month in prison reduces the
3-year recidivism rate by about 1.3 percentage points. Mueller-Smith and Schnepel
(2016) take advantage of discontinuities in conviction status and type of sentence
generated by the transitions between harsh to lenient regimes at two points in time
in Harris County, Texas. They find that first-time drug offenders on the lenient side
of the cutoff are less likely to reoffend compared to those in the harsh side of the
cutoff.
As a whole, this small group of studies using quasi-experimental designs to ana-
lyze the impacts of incarceration on employment and recidivism yield several general
conclusions. First, most of the quasi-experimental studies of the adult criminal jus-
tice system found no significant effects of either sentence type (e.g., incarceration
vs. a non-custodial sanction) or length on recidivism outcomes. The only excep-
tion was the Mueller-Smith (2016) study, one of the few to separate the effects of
incapacitation (comparing individuals currently in prison or jail to those who re-
ceived non-custodial sanctions) from the longer-run effects of incarceration after the
incarcerated group has been released back to the community. This study found that
(a) incarceration was negatively associated with recidivism when currently incarcer-
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ated individuals were compared to those released to the community on non-custodial
sanctions (i.e., an incapacitation effect), but (b) incarceration was positively associ-
ated with recidivism when both groups were compared post-release. The two studies
of the juvenile justice system produced discrepant results. Using the identification
strategy based on random judge assignment, Aizer and Doyle (2015) found that
juvenile incarceration increased the likelihood of recidivism, defined as future incar-
ceration as an adult. Hjalmarsson (2009), however, found that juvenile incarceration
was associated with lower probability of future incarceration as a juvenile.
1.3 Michigan Sentencing Guidelines
The sentencing guidelines manual contains recommendations for the type of sen-
tence and the sentence length that judges impose. With the exception of offenses
for which there is no sentencing discretion,3 the sentencing guidelines describe in
detail the recommended sentences and sentence lengths for an offender based on the
current offense, prior criminal history, and type of crime. 4
The guidelines are indeterminate in that they (a) provide a range of minimum
sentences within each cell from which judges choose, and (b) present recommended
rather than mandatory minimum sentences (Deming, 2000).5 Because the sentencing
guidelines are only recommendations, judges are free to “depart” from the recom-
mended range,6 but departures are relatively rare, occurring in less than 2 percent
of the cases analyzed in this sample.
The guidelines divide offenses into nine classes based on their severity as defined
by the maximum term of imprisonment set by statute for the offense (classes A-H,
3Examples of felonies excluded from the guidelines are first degree murder, which carries a
mandatory life sentence, or felony firearm, which carries a mandatory two-year “flat” sentence
(sentence to prison for a minimum of 2 years and maximum of 2 years).
4The version of the Michigan sentencing guidelines for our sample applies to felonies com-
mitted on or after January 1, 1999. The current version of the guidelines can be found online:
https://mjieducation.mi.gov/documents/sgm-files/94-sgm/file. The links to all prior manuals can
be found here: https://mjieducation.mi.gov/felony-sentencing-online-resources.
5Maximum sentences are set by statute in Michigan.
6Judges must justify any departure in writing and are precluded from basing departures on any
information already taken into account in the guidelines or on race, gender, ethnicity, nationality,
religion, employment, or similar factors.
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with A being the most severe, H the least severe, and class M reserved for second-
degree murder). Each class has its own sentencing grid, with cells divided according
to scores on two measures, the offender prior record (PR) and offense severity (OS),
which are each computed as sums of scores on component measures. There are seven
components to the PR score and 20 components to the OS score.7 The total PR
scores are divided into seven intervals to generate the prior record variable (PRV)
level. The PRV cut-points are the same for all grids. The OS scores are also divided
in intervals which determine the offense severity variable (OV) level. The number
of OV levels and the cut points defining them are not the same across grids. Each
cell defined by the intersection of PRV and OV levels contains a range of possible
minimum sentences in months. In the example grid (see Appendix 1.9.1) the low-
est minimum sentence (in months) is the large number on the left of the cell while
the four numbers on the right of the cell are the highest minimum sentence lengths
in months. These four subdivisions correspond to the offender’s “habitual” status
for offenders with prior felony records (Michigan Judicial Institute, 2016), and their
function is basically to increase the upper limit of the minimum sentence of the ap-
propriate cell by a fixed percentage.
Judges are responsible for guideline score calculations, but in practice this work
is done as part of the pre-sentence investigation and sentencing information report
that is provided to the judge by the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
and typically prepared by an MDOC probation officer.8 The officer relies on police
reports, interviews with victims, and criminal history searches to calculate the prior
record (PR) and offense severity (OS) scores and to determine the offender’s habitual
status. The probation officer is also the person who typically places the offender in a
cell on the relevant grid based on the calculated guidelines scores. Our conversations
with probation officers suggest that judges rarely request that scores be recalculated.
For our purposes, a key aspect of the sentencing guidelines is that cells on most
7Our understanding is that many other states have a more discrete sentencing guidelines system
for classifying offenders based on prior record. Our use of the regression discontinuity design in this
study depends on the fairly continuous nature of the prior record variables in Michigan.
8Michigan is somewhat unique compared to other states in that the Department of Corrections
handles probation supervision of all offenders sentenced to felony probation. Offenders sentenced
to jail or jail followed by probation for a felony also appear in MDOC records because MDOC
conducts all pre-sentence investigations for all circuit courts throughout the state.
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grids (classes B-G) are divided into three categories based on the types of sentences
recommended: (1) “Intermediate” cells, including jail, probation and other (rarely
used) sentences like fines, drug treatment, or house arrest; (2) “straddle” cells, in
which any type of sentence is possible, and (3) “prison” only cells.9 In the example
grid in the appendix, intermediate cells are marked with asterisks, straddle cells are
shaded, and prison cells are unmarked. As we will explain in section 1.5, our research
design exploits the discontinuous jump in the probability of going to prison when
crossing from an intermediate cell to a straddle cell. While four sentence types are
possible in the ranges of the prior record score we study (prison, probation, jail,
and jail with probation), we focus on the comparison between prison and probation.
These two sentences constitute the two most extreme sentence types for offenders
who are near the cutoffs and presumably have similar baseline characteristics.
1.3.1 Manipulation
There is the possibility of manipulation in assigning points to the components of
the scores, but we consider this far more likely for offense severity scores than for
prior record scores. Offense severity scores include potentially subjective aspects of
the crime, such as whether there was psychological injury to a victim or a victim’s
family member or whether a firearm was discharged in the direction of a victim,
whereas prior record scores include objective characteristics of the offender’s prior
criminal history, such as whether the offender was on parole or probation at the
time of the offense and how many prior misdemeanors, low severity felonies, or high
severity felonies the offender had been convicted of in the past (with severity defined
by the exact crime of the prior conviction). For this reason, we focus on variation in
sentence type generated by prior record scores, as described below.
Another potential source of manipulation is the plea bargaining process, as prose-
cutors and defense attorneys are well aware of the details of the sentencing guidelines
9Grids M and A contain only prison cells. Grid H contains intermediate and straddle cells
but no prison cells. Intermediate cells have ranges in which the upper recommended limit for the
minimum sentence is 18 months or less. When offenders in intermediate cells are sentenced to jail,
their jail term can be 0-12 months (or zero to the statutory maximum if the statutory maximum
is less than 12 months). Straddle cells have ranges in which the lower limit of the range of the
minimum sentence is 5 to 12 months and the upper limit is at least 19 months. When offenders in
straddle cells are sentenced to jail, their jail terms can be 0-12 months.
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system. In our analytic sample, 97 percent of convictions occurred through a plea
bargain (as opposed to a bench or jury trial). If a prosecutor were to base plea
agreements on the exact grid cell that the individual would be placed in and on her
expectations of the probability of recidivism from the likely sentence in that cell,
then such manipulation would be a threat to the validity of our regression discon-
tinuity design. However, our conversation with the probation officers who prepare
pre-sentence investigations and sentencing information reports for judges lead us to
doubt that such extreme and intentional manipulation is occurring. First, the cases
in our analytical sample are typical cases that are processed very quickly, leaving
little time and attention for such careful calculation or concern. Second, we believe
that most plea bargaining occurs over the exact crime the offender will plead guilty
to, and therefore which crime severity grid will govern his or her sentencing. Our
analysis only makes comparisons within sentencing grids.
1.4 Data
We draw primarily on administrative data from the Michigan Department of Correc-
tions (MDOC), which provided information on all individuals convicted of a felony
between 2003 and 2006. The pre-sentence investigation records, called the “Basic
Information Report” (BIR), contain the individual sentencing guidelines scores and
components, identifiers for the sentencing grid and cell for each case, legal codes for
the offense charged and convicted, habitual offender status, type of conviction (plea,
bench trial, jury trial, etc.), offense date, conviction date, sentence date, days spent
in jail (“jail credits”), sentence(s) imposed, and IDs for judges, defense attorneys,
counties, and circuits. Additionally, the BIR records offender demographics, prior
convictions and arrests, and substance abuse history.10
The main outcome of interest we analyze in this study is recidivism. Recidi-
vism is measured in three ways: new felony convictions, severity of the new felony,
and future imprisonment due to new sentences and technical violations. Data on
10Demographic and economic characteristics used in the analysis include age, race, gender, mar-
ital status at arrest, years of schooling, and age at first arrest. A few characteristics in the PSI are
crudely measured (i.e., whether or not the offender has a history of mental illness, drug abuse, or
alcohol abuse) but were nonetheless retained in the analysis as they serve as important pre-sentence
variables.
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new felony convictions (convictions recorded after the original sentence and for of-
fenses occurring after the original sentence) are drawn from the BIR from MDOC.
Severity of the felony is coded according to the statutory maximum sentence: a con-
viction with 0 to 48 months is low severity, 49 months or more includes medium
or high severity and 73 or more months is high severity. Supervision records from
MDOC document subsequent incarceration in prison, for a technical violation or a
new sentence.11 Conviction and imprisonment records are available through 2013.
We analyze recidivism outcomes 1, 3 and 5 years after sentence and after release. In
this paper we do not analyze more minor forms of recidivism that might be captured
by misdemeanor convictions.12
An important distinction that we make concerns the start of the risk period for
the outcome. One approach taken by many previous studies is starting the risk pe-
riod at release. This means that for a probationer, the risk period starts at sentence
but for the other three sentence types it starts once the period of incarceration in
prison or jail ends.13 An alternative approach is to define the risk period as beginning
at the date of sentencing for offenders in all sentence types.
We view both approaches as having strengths and weaknesses and therefore
present estimates from both approaches. Starting the risk period at release allows
for comparisons with prior research and removes any incapacitation effects during
11Our access to data on multiple forms of recidivism and to MDOC data on the supervision
of all parolees and probationers allows us to capture moves to prison for parole and probation
violations that are not recorded in arrest records, a potentially important form of censoring that is
not addressed in many studies.
12We also do not consider arrests as an outcome. We are unable to construct a comparable arrest
measure for prisoners and probationers. Individuals on parole might be taken into custody by a
parole officer instead of being arrested so they will not appear in the arrests data. For probationers,
their “held in custody” events are not recorded in the data. Since the measurement of arrests and
held in custody events are likely not the same for prisoners and probationers, we do not use these
variables.
13For those sentenced to jail or jail followed by probation, we must estimate the date of release
from jail based on the jail credits at sentencing and the sentence length because MDOC does not run
the jails or track jail inmates who are not also under MDOC supervision or custody (e.g., parolees
or probationers serving jail time, prisoners temporarily housed in local jails for court appearances).
In an unknown number of cases these release dates are overestimates due to early release from jails,
which is at the discretion of the local jail and often due to overcrowding. Given the short length
of most jail sentences and because we are not concerned with estimating the effects of jail or jail
followed by probation sentences, we do not see this as a problem for the present analysis.
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incarceration. However, estimates under this approach may confound the effects of in-
carceration with period and aging effects. We overcome this problem by residualizing
the after-release outcomes on calendar year and age at the moment of measurement.
Moreover, starting the risk period at release has the potential to allow some endo-
geneity to creep back into our estimates, as release dates are potentially a function of
behavior in prison. In addition, those sentenced to particularly long minimum sen-
tences will not have post-release outcomes, especially for time periods furthest from
release, creating potential for sample selection bias. Measuring outcomes starting
at sentence avoids these problems, but produces estimates that may be dominated
by incapacitation effects. Starting the risk period at sentence may also have more
policy relevance because legislators and judges surely consider incapacitation effects
in making decisions or policies related to sentencing or release from prison. In what
follows, we report results from both approaches.
The analytic sample excludes re-sentences, “flat” or mandatory sentences (in-
cluding life sentences), community service and fines sentences, as well as records
from specialty courts (e.g., drug and family courts).14 We retained only the “car-
rying offense” (the offense that determines the type of sentence, usually the most
serious offense) and associated sentencing outcome when the offender was convicted
of multiple offenses (around 77 percent of all cases). We perform all analyses using
records for non-habitual offenders only as this category contains the vast majority
of observations. The analytic sample for the RD analysis consists of around 18,000
individual records from 83 counties in Michigan whose PRV score (the running vari-
able) is within 16 points of the relevant cutoff.15
Table 1.1 shows basic descriptive statistics by sentence type around a narrow
window from the cutoff. Among all offenders in the sample, about 30 percent are
14“Flat” sentences are those for which the minimum and maximum are the same and the mini-
mum sentence is also set by statute. In Michigan, these are primarily sentences for “felony firearms”
offenses, in which a firearm is used in the process of committing another crime, either a felony or
misdemeanor. Re-sentences refer to individuals previously sentenced to probation who are sen-
tenced again due to technical violations of the terms of probation. In Michigan, probation violators
must be sentenced again by a judge. The re-sentences can be for prison, jail, or longer probation.
We note that re-sentences are not included in the initial selection into the analytic sample, but
probationers resentenced to prison who are already in the sample are included in our measure of
imprisonment for a technical violation as a recidivism outcome.
15Iin section 1.5 we explain how we choose the bandwidth of 16 points.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of offenders sentenced to prison or probation
Sentence type
Probation Prison
% of observations in sample 0.30 0.10
% of women 0.19 0.09
Age at sentence 31.00 32.99
% white 0.48 0.58
% married 0.14 0.13
% with less than high school 0.45 0.43
Age at first arrest 20.44 19.47
On parole at sentence 0.01 0.15
Total number of arrests before sentence 6.40 9.89
% with mental illness 0.18 0.20
% with drug addiction 0.49 0.53
% with alcohol addiction 0.32 0.49
Months employed within a year before sentence 4.20 3.60
Months employed within 2 years before sentence 8.64 7.92
Minimum sentence length (months) 26.87 17.54
Time served (months in prison) 22.13
Notes: All figures correspond to means of the variables within 16 points from the cutoff.
Less than high school does not include GED.
sentenced to probation and 10 percent to prison. The rest is sentenced to either jail
or jail with probation (see Appendix Table 1.9 for descriptive statistics of all sen-
tence types). The table shows means of the baseline covariates and average sentence
length and time served in prison. The sample of offenders is primarily male, white,
and non-married. Irrespective of sentence type, almost half of the individuals have
very low education, 20 percent have a mental illness, and around 50 percent have an
addiction to drugs and alcohol. On average, at the time of sentence the offenders
were in their early thirties, and were first arrested when they were 20 years old.
Finally, employment was very low, with the average offender working in the formal
labor market only about a third of the time before sentence.16 The average minimum
16Pre-sentence employment data come from matched records from the Michigan unemployment
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sentence length is 27 months for a probationer and 18 months for a prisoner. The ac-
tual average time served in prison is 22 months on average for offenders in this sample.
Descriptive statistics for the outcomes are presented in Table 1.2 (and for all
sentence types in Appendix Table 1.10). As mentioned above, we analyze both after
sentence and after release risk periods for individuals within a small window around
the cutoff. Panel A shows average felony recidivism for prisoners and probationers.
Within 1 year after sentence, the incidence of new felonies is below 10 percent for all
offenders (this reflects in part the fact that we measure new felonies at the conviction
date, not the offense date, because offense dates were more frequently missing and in
some cases unreliable). It increases monotonically with time for both sentence types,
even though the levels are always higher for probation sentences. An incapacitation
effect seems to be present for offenders sentenced to prison particularly in years 1
and 3 after sentence in which recidivism rates are substantially below those of of-
fenders sentenced to probation. Five years after sentence around 25 percent of those
originally sentenced to prison and 32 percent of those in probation have committed
a new felony.
The incidence of recidivism is also low within 1 year after release for both groups.
However, in contrast to the after sentence statistics, the increase in the recidivism
rate is similar in both sentence types, reaching around 25 percent and 33 percent
on average within 3 and 5 years after release, respectively. For prison sentences,
recidivism rates start slightly smaller 1 year after release and end up slightly higher
5 years after release when compared to probation.
Panel B of Table 1.2 describes the severity of the new felony. The upper part of
Panel B shows the medium- or high-severity crime rates of those originally sentenced
to probation or prison. In this table and hereafter, a value of one is given when the
offender commited a medium or high severity felony and zero if the new felony is
low-severity or there is no new felony. Similarly, the dummy for high severity (lower
part of Panel B) takes the value of one when the new felony is high severity and zero
if there was no felony or the new felony is classified as low- or medium-severity. After
sentence, there is a higher proportion of probationers engaging in medium and high
insurance system, which records only formal employment.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics of outcomes of interest
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. Any new felony
Probation 0.07 0.23 0.32 0.07 0.23 0.32
Prison 0.00 0.12 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.36
Panel B. Severity of new felony
Medium and high severity
Probation 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.19
Prison 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.04 0.15 0.22
High severity
Probation 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.09
Prison 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.10
Panel B. Future imprisonment
Overall
Probation 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.03 0.11 0.16
Prison 0.01 0.16 0.28 0.11 0.28 0.34
Due to new sentence
Probation 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.12
Prison 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.19
Due to technical violation
Probation 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.05
Prison 0.01 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.17 0.21
Notes: Robust standard errors. The outcomes are defined as the variables in italics in the time frame
specified in the headings of columns 2 to 7 (e.g. any new felony within 1 year after sentence). The figures
represent the means for probationers and prisoners for each outcome.
severity crime and the average rates are fairly similar between the two sentence types
after release. In the case of high-severity felonies only, we see that the averages for
prisoners and probationers are virtually the same after release and slightly smaller
for prisoners in the after-sentence period.
Panel C of Table 1.2 describes the rates at which offenders sentenced to each
sentence type are imprisoned 1, 3 and 5 years after the original sentence and after
release. In all periods after release and 3 and 5 years after sentence overall impris-
onment rates of offenders originally sentenced to prison are higher than the rates of
those sentenced to probation. One year after sentence, only 31.5 percent of prisoners
have been released to the community which makes the future imprisonment figure
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smaller for prisoners than for probationers.17 Decomposing future incarceration into
the parts due to a new sentence and due to technical violations of parole or probation
we see that the average of prisoners and probationers charged with a new sentence
is similar in the after sentence outcomes but substantially higher for prisoners when
we look at technical violations. After release, the averages in Panel B are higher for
those originally receiving a prison sentence but the difference between prisoners and
probationers is substantially larger in the case of technical violations relative to new
sentences.
1.5 Empirics and first stages
A simple OLS analysis in this setting is likely to confound potentially omitted vari-
ables with sentence type assignment. For example, factors unobserved by the re-
searchers but observed by the judges may lead them to assign prison sentences to
individuals who are more likely to recidivate. Hence, a regression of the recidivism
outcomes on a treatment indicator for prison does not represent the causal effect of
receiving a prison sentence on recidivism but rather a combination of causal effects
and omitted factors. For this reason, we exploit the quasi-random variation provided
by the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines.
Our analysis exploits the exogenous change in the probability of being sentenced
to prison arising from the marginal increase in prior record (PRV) scores that moves
an offender from an intermediate cell (where the presumptive sentence is something
other than prison) to a straddle cell (where recommended sentence types include
prison). In other words, offenders with similar PRV scores face different probabili-
ties of going to prison depending on whether their PRV score lies to the left or right
of a cutoff that determines the boundary between an intermediate and a straddle cell.
This setting naturally leads to a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD) because
the increase in the probability of going to prison from crossing the boundary between
an intermediate and a straddle cell is less than one (see Figure 1.3 in subsection 1.5.3).
Figure 1.1 shows a simplified version of the exogenous variation from the sentenc-
17The proportion of prisoners released 1, 3, and 5 years after sentence is 31.5, 83.4, and 94.4
percent respectively.
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ing guidelines used in our identification strategy. The grid shows the cells created by
the interesection of PRV and OV scores and within each cell the recommended mini-
mum sentence length for the judge to choose from. Intermediate, straddle and prison
cells are in yellow, blue and white, respectively. As the arrow in the figure shows,
crossing the cutoffs between intermediate and straddle cells increases the probability
of receiving a prison sentence. The full version of the grid is in Appendix 1.9.1.
Figure 1.1: Simplified version of SGL grid - basis for identification strategy
For a single cutoff, the fuzzy RD can be described by the following two-equation
system:
yi = β0 + τDi + β1(PRVi − ci) + β2(PRVi − ci) ·Di +Xγ + εi (1.1)
Di = α0 + ηTi + α1(PRVi − ci) + α2(PRVi − ci) · Ti +Xθ + νi (1.2)
Where (1.2) is the first stage equation relating the treatment dummy (Di) with
an indicator for crossing the cutoff (Ti), and (1.1) is the structural equation relating
the outcome yi with the treatment dummy. The parameter of interest is τ , the effect
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of being sentenced to prison on the outcome. The running variable (PRV score) is
centered at zero by subtracting the value of the cutoff relevant to each individual
(ci) so that equation (1.1) estimates the treatment effect at the cutoff. The ma-
trix X includes the treatment dummies that are not being instrumented as well as
controls for age and predetermined covariates.18 The outcomes we consider are vari-
ous measures of recidivism over different time frames as described in the data section.
We also conduct a reduced-form analysis that estimates the effects of crossing
the cutoffs on the outcomes. From the equations above, the reduced-form equation
is obtained by substituting equation (1.2) on equation (1.1) as follows:
yi = γ0 + τRTi + γ1(PRVi − ci) + γ2(PRVi − ci) · Ti +Xλ+ εi (1.3)
In this case, the coefficient τR is the intent-to-treat effect, that is, the effect of
being eligible for a prison sentence (by crossing the boundary between an interme-
diate and a straddle cell).
The fuzzy RD estimation is mathematically equivalent to instrumental variables
(IV) estimation. In this sense, the indicator for crossing the cutoff (Ti) can be used
as an instrument for the treatment dummy (Di), and the two equations above can
be estimated by 2SLS. This method provides the causal effect of the treatment on
the outcomes of interest for those who are affected by the instrument (crossing the
cutoff) provided that the instrument only affects the outcome through its effect on
the probability of going to prison (the exclusion restriction), and that crossing the
cutoff only makes offenders more likely to go to prison (monotonicity).19
18Age is mechanically correlated with the running variable, a composite of the offender’s prior
record. Older offenders will on average have higher prior record scores since they have had more
time to commit and be apprehended for crimes. As a result, we understand the RD design to be
valid in this setting only once we have conditioned on age.
19One possible threat to the exclusion restriction is that crossing the cutoff could affect the
outcome through changes in sentence lengths as well as sentence types. However, even though we
do find some variation in prison length for those sentenced to prison to the right of the cutoff, we do




One estimation method for RD designs involves choosing a high polynomial order to
estimate flexible parametric regressions of the running variable on either side of the
cutoff using all available observations. We avoid this approach because it produces
biased point-estimates and standard errors if done incorrectly.20 In general, in RD
it is generally recommended to choose a narrow bandwidth close to the cutoff and
perform the estimation using only observations within that bandwidth. The basic
trade-off in bandwidth selection in RD is between bias and variance. A very small
window around the cutoff will have low bias but high variance due to the small num-
ber of observations. Alternatively, a bigger bandwidth will give estimates with higher
bias but low variance. There are procedures like those of Calonico, Cattaneo, and
Titiunik (2014) or Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) and cross-validation (Ludwig
and Miller, 2007) that compute the optimal bandwidth. These procedures are based
on continuity of the running variable which we do not have in this application.
All estimates in the next section are obtained using observations within a band-
width of 16 points from the cutoff. To arrive at this window around the cutoff we
do not perform McCrary-type tests (McCrary, 2008) due to the nature of the PRV
scores (running variable). As discussed in section 1.3, the PRV scores are constructed
from 7 different prior record variables. The majority of these variables are coded in
multiples of 5. While values of 1 and 2 are also possible, they are far less common
than the multiples of 5. Hence, it is impossible or very unlikely to observe certain
values of the score (see Figure 1.2). In this sense, the running variable is not only
not continuous but very rugged, which makes the McCrary test and the version of
this test for discrete variables (Frandsen, 2014) non-informative, as the tests will
appear to detect evidence of manipulation where there are merely mathematically
impossible values of the running variable. Hence, we rely on balance tests of the
20As we explored the possibility of a strategy involving polynomial functional forms for the run-
ning variable and all observations, we conducted AIC tests to obtain the optimal polynomial order
for each outcome / cutoff combination when using the whole range of observations in Grids D, E
and F. The optimal orders varied considerably across cutoffs, so to avoid imposing the same func-
tional form for all cutoffs, we opted for an alternative approach in which the linear approximation
is valid for all outcomes / cutoffs once we restrict the observations to a narrow window around each
cutoff. The global polynomial approach is also not recommended on the basis of the high weight
that observations far from the cutoff receive, the sensitivity of the estimates to different polynomial
fits, and the narrow confidence intervals this method estimates (Gelman & Imbens, 2014).
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covariates to establish the validity of our RD design.












-16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
PRT scores centered at zero
The approach we take in this paper is based on balance tests of predetermined
covariates, similar to Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik (2015) who propose random-
ization inference for RD designs. We choose a bandwidth in which the joint test of
the hypothesis that the covariates in Table 1.1 are balanced is not rejected. Simulta-
neously, we require that the candidate bandwidth is not too far from the cutoff so a
linear fit of the running variable is appropriate. We implement this test by running
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) where the outcome of each regression is a
covariate in a specification like the one given in equation (2). From this approach,
we conclude that an appropriate window for the analysis is within 16 points from
the cutoff because we do not reject the null hypothesis that the covariates are jointly
balanced at the cutoff.21 See Appendix 1.9.2 for the results from the SUR tests for
different bandwidths. Graphs of the covariates and of covariates residualized by age
are in Appendix 1.9.3.
21As mentioned earlier, in the SUR regressions we control for a quadratic on age at sentence
because age is mechanically correlated with the running variable.
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1.5.2 Empirical considerations
One complexity of our setting is that our treatment, sentence type, is not dichoto-
mous but rather has four categories. The sentence types contemplated in the Michi-
gan sentencing guidelines can be many as discussed in section 1.3. In particular,
the vast majority of offenders in our sample are sentenced to prison, jail, jail with
probation, or probation only. We do not consider other possible sentences such as
fines or community service because we believe individuals who receive such sentences
have zero probability of receiving a prison sentence and are therefore not appro-
priate comparisons for those sentenced to prison. Our main theoretical question
relates to the prison vs. probation comparison but since other sentence types are
possible in intermediate and straddle cells, we must incorporate them in the analysis.
We construct indicator variables for sentence type in which the reference category
is probation. The sentence type variables are defined as prison vs. everything else,
jail vs. everything else, and jail with probation vs. everything else. However, our
treatment of interest is sentence to prison as compared to sentence to probation. To
make this comparison explicit in the regression we include the indicators for jail and
jail with probation as controls in the regression without giving a causal interpretation
to their coefficients as this will require additional exogenous variation.22
Another complexity in our application of fuzzy RD is that the Michigan sentenc-
ing guidelines contain many potential discontinuities. Depending on the grid and OV
level where an offender is placed, the offender will be affected by a different cutoff.
For example, in the grid shown in the appendix, an offender in OV level I would be
affected by the PRV score cutoff of 50 points while the relevant cutoff for an offender
in OV level II is 25 points. Therefore, only one cutoff is relevant for each individual.
This differs from the setup in other RD designs with multiple discontinuities in which
the same individual is affected by all the cutoffs (see for example Van der Klaauw,
2002).23
22See the section on robustness checks for further discussion.
23A common strategy to analyze the data from multiple cutoffs in a regression discontinuity
setup is to normalize all cutoffs to zero and run a pooled regression on all observations to obtain the
treatment effect based on a single-cutoff estimator. Cattaneo et al. (2016) show that normalization
of the cutoffs estimates an average of local average treatment effects that is weighted by the relative
density of observations around each cutoff.
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The multiple discontinuities in our setting provides a richer framework to analyze
the data relative to a setting in which all cutoffs are pooled together. First, we can
account for heterogeneity in the first stage across multiple cutoffs in our data by
reformulating the IV setup so that we can use the 11 cutoffs as 11 separate instru-
mental variables. This relaxes an assumption implicit in an analysis that pools all
cutoffs together, that the effect of crossing each cutoff on treatment assignment is
the same for all cutoffs. Such an assumption may be unreasonable here because the
various cutoffs are for different crime classes (severities), for offenders with different
criminal histories, and for offenses with different characteristics. Second, we expect
that sampling variability will be lower when using all discontinuities as separate IVs
than when pooling because the first stages more accurately capture the change in
treatment probability that comes from crossing each cutoff, leading to a stronger
first stage. In 2SLS, a stronger first stage leads to smaller standard errors for the
treatment effect coefficient(s) (Wooldridge, 2010).
Empirically, we construct 11 instrumental variables in the form of 11 indicator
variables equal to one when the PRV score is greater than or equal to each individual
cutoff value. We also include an interaction between the treatment dummy and the
running variable to allow for different slopes in either side of the cutoffs, which is
instrumented by interactions between each of the IVs and the PRV scores. We make
sure that we compare only observations affected by the relevant cutoff by including
cutoff indicators and their interactions with the running variable. We center the
running variable at zero for each cutoff, and include controls for the non-relevant
sentence types, age and baseline covariates, and estimate the model by 2SLS.
In terms of interpretation of the parameters of interest, we estimate an efficient
linear combination of the instrument-specific LATEs with weights given by the rel-
ative strength of each instrument in the first stage. In the words of Angrist and
Pischke (2008), “2SLS is a weighted average of causal effects for instrument-specific
compliant subpopulations.”
One futher consideration in our setting is the discreteness of the running vari-
able. In the case of a discrete running variable, the confidence intervals based on
23
Eicker-Huber-White standard errors do not have good coverage because with few
values of the running variable the bandwidth has to be too large. This means that
the asymptotic bias of the polynomial approximation may not be negligible as un-
dersmoothing requires (Kolesár & Rothe, 2016). Lee and Card (2008) recommend
using standard errors clustered at the value of the running variable level when it
is discrete. However, Kolesár and Rothe (2016) show that clustering with a small
number of support points biases the standard errors downward and is sensitive to
misspecification. This issue is analogous to the small number of clusters problem in
other settings. In response to this conundrum and because there are no validated
methods to solve either problem, we resort to Eicker-Huber-White standard errors,
which seem to perform better than clustered errors in simulations by Kolesar and
Rothe (2016).24
1.5.3 First stages
Figure 1.3 shows the basic relationship between the probability of going to prison
and the dummy for crossing the cutoff when all cutoffs are pooled together and cen-
tered at zero. The y-axis shows the probability of going to prison relative to the
other three types of sentences, and the x axis shows the PRV score. Scores greater
or equal to zero indicate that the individual’s PRV score is at or to the right of the
cutoff relevant for that individual. Each dot represents the average probability of
going to prison for each value of the PRV scores, and the lines are the fitted values
from a regression of the prison indicator on a dummy for crossing the cutoff, the
running variable and an interaction between the two.25
There is a clear discontinuity in the probability of being sentenced to prison for
individuals with PRV scores at and to the right of the cutoff, i.e., offenders whose
PRV score places them in a straddle cell. Visually, the jump in the probability of
prison at the cutoff is around 10 percentage points.
24These authors propose two new estimators to correct the small number of clusters problem.
As of now it is not possible to implement either of the two estimators because the paper is not yet
published and the authors do not provide any code to make implementation feasible.
25Note that although all dots are drawn the same size, they may represent very different numbers
of observations. For example, the first dot to the left of the cutoff contains 34 observations while
the dot at the cutoff contains 2,234. This is the case with all graphs we present in this paper.
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The first stage graph in Figure 1.3 illustrates the raw discontinuity, that is, with-
out controlling for age, baseline covariates and cutoff fixed effects. Table 1.3 presents
the first stage regressions for the pooled sample and each cutoff individually. In the
pooled case, the regression controls for a quadratic on age, baseline covariates, cutoff
fixed effects and their interactions with the running variable. Crossing the cutoff
increases the probability of receiving a prison sentence by 7.8 percentage points.
We estimate the first stage for each of the cutoffs in Grids D, E and F. The
magnitude of the first stage oscillates between 1.2 percentage points in Grid E, OV
III to 36.6 percentage points in Grid F, OV IV. There is variation in the size of
the jump across cutoffs, as well as in the sample sizes. The small sample sizes in
each cutoff suggest that estimating separate models for each cutoff would lead to
extremely underpowered estimates.26
26The cutoffs that seem to provide stronger first stages in terms of the size of the jump and the
statistical significance are those in Grid D. This makes sense based on the classification of the crime
classes provided by the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines; high severity crimes are in grids letters
closer to A. Offenders in Grid D have committed more serious crimes, and are therefore more likely
to be sentenced to prison if their scores place them in a straddle cell. One of the cutoffs (Grid F,
OV I) is not statistically significant.
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Table 1.3: First stages: pooled and by cutoff
1{PRVi ≥ cutoff} S.E. Observations R-squared
All cutoffs pooled 0.078*** 0.008 18,479 0.147
Grid D
OV I 0.123* 0.053 895 0.172
OV II 0.087** 0.034 1,530 0.148
OV III 0.257*** 0.045 553 0.129
Grid E
OV I 0.037** 0.012 5,065 0.122
OV II 0.088*** 0.015 5,257 0.145
OV III 0.120** 0.043 887 0.198
OV IV 0.093* 0.047 698 0.129
Grid F
OV I 0.022 0.043 716 0.078
OV II 0.038* 0.018 2,130 0.078
OV III 0.135** 0.050 558 0.111
OV IV 0.362*** 0.097 190 0.174
Notes: Robust standard errors. All models regress the prison dummy on a dummy for
crossing the cutoff, the PRV scores, the interaction between the two, cutoff fixed effects,
their interaction with the PRV scores and a quadratic on age at sentence.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.6 Results
This section provides evidence that offenders sentenced to prison are less likely to
recidivate than probationers. This result is mainly driven by incapacitation of two
types: primary incapacitation (from the original sentence) and secondary incapac-
itation (due to higher rates of future imprisonment). We present results for the
new-felony recidivism, severity of new felony and future incarceration outcomes. All
reduced-form and IV models are estimated parametrically with a linear functional
form of the running variable allowing for a different slope on either side of the cut-
off. Consistent with current best practice in RD designs (see for example Lee &
Lemieux, 2010), we use local linear regressions (LLR) around each cutoff using only




We first analyze the intent-to-treat effect, that is, the change in the outcomes when
a prison sentence is more likely as a result of crossing the cutoff. The basic specifi-
cation in these regressions is in equation (1.3).
The analysis of reduced forms is directly relevant for policy because moving cut-
offs slightly to the right or to the left of the current cutoffs will possibly translate
into changes in offenders’ recidivism outcomes. The thought experiment consists
in marginally shifting the cutoffs in either direction and inferring how recidivism
outcomes would change. As an example, policy makers could marginally move the
cutoffs to the left, that is, offenders with slighly lower PRV scores relative to the
current cutoffs have a higher chance or facing a prison sentence. We are interested
in inferring what would happen to the recidivism of those offenders in such scenario.
Overall, we find that offenders to the right of the cutoff are incapacitated 1 and
3 years after sentence but there is no statistical difference in new-felony recidivism
rates 5 years after sentence and in all post-release periods. Furthermore, offenders to
the right of the cutoffs have higher rates of future imprisonment 1 and 3 years after
release than offenders to the left. Those who are to the right are much more likely
to be imprisoned in the future as a result of a technical violation of their parole or
probation conditions.
Table 1.4 presents the results from the pooled reduced-form regressions for all
outcomes. The coefficients in the table are the point estimates of the indicator for
crossing the cutoff. The outcomes are defined by two components: the variable of
interest (column 1 in the table) and the time frame in which it is measured (within
1 year, 3 years, and 5 years after sentence and after release in subsequent columns).
The after-sentence estimates include any incapacitation effect due to offenders still
being in prison at the time the outcome is measured. Recall from section 3.3 that, in
this sample, about 30 and 85 percent of prisoners have been released to the commu-
nity 1 and 3 years after sentence, respectively. We also report, for each regression,
the mean of the outcome for individuals below the cutoff, i.e. offenders with a prior
record score between -16 and 0, not inclusive.
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Table 1.4: Reduced-form regressions (pooled cutoffs)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. Any new felony
Any new felony -0.018** -0.029* -0.012 -0.012 -0.015 -0.007
(0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
Mean below cutoff 0.048 0.165 0.234 0.073 0.215 0.296
Observations 18479 18479 18479 18383 18348 18233
Panel B. Severity of new felony
Medium and high severity of new felony -0.007 -0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
Mean below cutoff 0.029 0.095 0.133 0.046 0.130 0.177
High severity of new felony -0.002 0.012 0.005 0.003 0.014 0.003
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009)
Mean below cutoff 0.013 0.047 0.065 0.020 0.057 0.076
Observations 18479 18479 18479 18383 18348 18233
Panel B. Future Imprisonment
Overall 0.011 0.019 0.020 0.021** 0.022* 0.017
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
Mean below cutoff 0.017 0.071 0.102 0.041 0.118 0.157
Due to new sentence -0.003 -0.010 -0.012 -0.002 -0.012 -0.013
(0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
Mean below cutoff 0.009 0.045 0.071 0.019 0.070 0.105
Due to techical violation 0.013** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.023*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Mean below cutoff 0.008 0.029 0.038 0.022 0.052 0.066
Observations 18440 18440 18440 18383 18365 18306
Notes: Robust standard errors. The outcomes are defined as the variables in italics in the time frame specified in the headings
of columns 2 to 7 (e.g. any new felony within 1 year after sentence). All models regress the outcome on a dummy for crossing
the cutoff, the PRV scores, the interaction between the two, cutoff fixed effects, their interaction with the PRV scores and a
quadratic on age at sentence. The coefficients in the table are the point estimates of the dummy for crossing the cutoff. Means
of after release variables are from the non-residualized variables.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We first present evidence of incapacitation effects for offenders whose prior record
score is located at or to the right of the cutoff. Panel A of Table 1.4 shows that,
after sentence, offenders with PRV scores at or above the cutoff are less likely to be
convicted of a new felony than offenders with scores below the cutoff. The difference
in the average probability of committing a new felony varies between -1.2 and -2.9
percentage points between somebody at or to the right of the cutoff and somebody
to the left 1 and 3 years after sentence, respectively. We do not find statistically
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significant differences between those above and below the cutoff five years after sen-
tence or for any of the felony outcomes after release.
Furthermore, the mean new-felony recidivism rates of those below the cutoff in-
creases over time for both risk periods. Within one year after sentence, only 5 percent
of individuals to the left of the cutoff commit a new felony. Within five years of sen-
tence, this mean is up to 23.4 percent. The means are slightly higher for the after
release outcomes but the patterns remain the same.
Individuals at or to the right of the cutoff are more likely to commit a high sever-
ity felony in all post-release periods except within one year of release (Panel B of
Table 1.4). Even though the effects are not statistically significant, we will see in the
next section that the IV analysis finds a significant increase in high severity felonies
for those sentenced to prison relative to probationers unconditional on commiting a
new felony.
Another incapacitation effect relates to future imprisonment. In this case, in-
dividuals are re-imprisoned if their original sentence was prison or imprisoned for
the first time if they initially received a sentence other than prison. We find that
offenders at or to the right of the cutoff are more likely to be imprisoned in the
future than offenders to the left of the cutoff (Panel C of Table 1.4). Overall future
imprisonment differs by one or two percentage points between individuals above and
below the cutoff. What differs substantially is the mean of those below the cutoff.
Average imprisonment rates are very low (below 2 percent) one year after sentence
and increase up to 10 percent within 5 years of the original sentence for those below
the cutoff. After release, we find that offenders above the cutoff are 2 percentage
points more likely to be imprisoned within 1 and 3 years after release. Notice, in
addition, that the mean of those below the cutoff increases from 4 to 12 percent
between years 1 and 3 after release, respectively. Within 5 years of release the future
imprisonment rates of both groups are statistically equal at about 16 percent.
We separate future imprisonment into imprisonment for a new sentence and im-
prisonment for a technical violation. The reduced-form analysis points out that the
higher rate of future imprisonment does not seem to be a result of new sentences
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but rather of technical violations. Recall that technical violations are violations
of the conditions of sentence during parole or probation such as missing a curfew.
Across all risk periods after sentence and after release, offenders with a prior record
score at or to the right of the cutoff are significantly more likely to be imprisoned
as a result of a technical violation. Even though future incarceration due to techni-
cal violations rates are low (below 7 percent), individuals at or to the right of the
cutoff are incarcerated at rates that are between 1.3 and 3.7 percentage points higher.
In sum, reduced-form evidence suggests that in a counterfactual scenario where
the cutoffs were moved marginally to the left, we would expect higher incapacitation
among individuals who would now be at or to the right of the cutoffs. Incapacitation
would arise because they would be more likely to receive a prison sentence initially
and because they would be more likely to be sentenced to prison in the future than
someone to the left of the cutoff.
1.6.2 OLS and 2SLS estimates
In this section we exploit the fact that our RD is a fuzzy design because the proba-
bility of going to prison does not increase from zero to one, on average, when crossing
the cutoff. As discussed in section 1.5, the estimation strategy for a fuzzy RD design
is equivalent to an IV setup in which the first stage is given by the change in the
probability of receiving the treatment when crossing the cutoff. In this sense, 2SLS
is an appropriate estimation method to obtain a consistent estimate of the treatment
effect for observations near the cutoff and for whom crossing the cutoff changes the
treatment assignment. We implement parametric local linear regressions within a
bandwidth of 16 points around the cutoff. As we have done throughout this paper,
we differentiate between the effects after sentence and after release in the results that
follow.
The results tables show the point estimate for the treatment of interest, i.e. the
indicator for whether the individual was sentenced to prison. Each table contains
two panels indicating the estimator that was used to obtain the coefficient: OLS and
2SLS with multiple instruments. We report the coefficient associated with receiv-
ing a prison sentence. This coefficient comes from a regression of the outcome on a
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linear specification of the PRV scores, interaction of the treatment dummy with the
PRV scores, three indicators for sentence type (excluding probation) and their inter-
actions with the PRV scores, baseline covariates, and cutoff fixed effects and their
interactions with the PRV scores. Since the omitted treatment dummy is probation,
the coefficient on the dummy for prison is measuring the difference, at the cutoff,
in the outcome of interest between individuals sentenced to prison relative to those
sentenced to probation.
The results for the new felony outcome are presented in Table 1.5. Recall that
our research question seeks to find out how offenders sentenced to prison rather than
probation differ in terms of future criminal behavior. The OLS estimates show that
the probability of committing a new crime is negatively correlated with receiving a
prison sentence within 1, 3 and 5 years after sentence. For the periods after release,
there does not seem to be any difference in recidivism rates between individuals sen-
tenced to prison or probation.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of OLS estimates, Panel B shows the 2SLS
regressions using the 11 cutoffs as instrumental variables.27 The after sentence results
shows strong incapacitation effects in new-felony recidivism. After sentence, prison-
ers are less likely to recidivate than probationers by 18.9, 36.9, and 31.9 percentage
points within 1, 3, and 5 years of being sentenced, respectively. As discussed above,
these estimates are primarily capturing an incapacitation effect partially explained
by prisoners serving their original prison sentence. An interesting point is that, even
though almost 95 percent of those sentenced to prison have been released by the time
5 years after sentence have passed (column 4), we still see important incapacitation
effects. As we will discuss below, this seems to be related to a secondary incapac-
itation phenomenon in which individuals sentenced to prison are significantly more
likely to be re-imprisoned within a few years of the original sentence. After release we
find a significant negative coefficient of 24.3 percentage points 3 years after release.
This may coincide with the time in which some of the offenders sentenced to prison
are sent back to prison and hence this coefficient would be capturing the secondary
27Since this is a Wald-type estimator, we expect that the coefficients obtained with this approach
are larger in magnitude than the reduced-form coefficients because 2SLS inflates the reduced-form
estimates by the size of the first stage which is less than one in this case (fuzzy RD).
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incapacitation effect.
Table 1.5: LLR results (new felonies)
Outcome: Any new felony
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
1{Sentence = prison} -0.069*** -0.118*** -0.093*** -0.016 -0.017 -0.000
(0.005) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.014) (0.016)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
1{Sentence = prison} -0.189*** -0.369*** -0.319*** -0.025 -0.243** -0.079
(0.050) (0.087) (0.096) (0.062) (0.092) (0.103)
Observations 18479 18479 18479 18383 18348 18233
Notes: Robust standard errors. The outcomes are defined as the variables in the leftmost column on the table in the time frame
specified in the headings of columns 2 to 7 (e.g. any new felony within 1 year after sentence). OLS results are from regressions
of each outcome on three treatment dummies which indicate the sentence type: prison, jail, and jail with probation. Regressions
include a linear term on the PRV scores and the interaction between the treatment dummies and the PRV scores. In Panel B,
2SLS regressions run the same OLS regression instrumenting the dummy for prison with a dummy indicating whether the PRV
score is to the right of the pooled cutoff. In Panel B, the dummy for prison is instrumented with 11 dummies indicating whether
the PRV score is to the right of each of 11 cutoffs. All models include cutoff fixed effects and their interactions with the PRV
scores, as well as a quadratic on age at sentence. The coefficients in the table are the point estimates an indicator variable equal
to one if the offender was sentenced to prison.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Another outcome of interest is whether those sentenced to prison differ in terms
of the severity of the new felony relative to probationers. The results from medium
/ high- and high-severity felony recidivism are in Table 1.6. Within each panel we
show separate results for medium and high severity, and high severity only. The in-
dicators for severity are constructed such that the high severity indicator is a subset
of the medium and high severity indicator so it is possible to distinguish between the
effect of the prison sentence on the new felonies in these two severity levels. Recall
that the way these indicators are constructed do not condition on commiting a new
felony. A value of one in this variable indicates that the offender has commited a
felony in the severity level indicated, while zero includes felonies in all other severity
categories as well as no new felony.
For medium / high severity felonies, Table 1.6 shows that OLS coefficients are
negative post-sentence and close to zero after release. Receiving a prison sentence
is associated with lower medium / high and high severity felonies after sentence but
there is no association after release.
32
Table 1.6: LLR results (severity of new felony)
Outcome: Severity of new felony
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Medium and high severity
1{Sentence = prison} -0.042*** -0.062*** -0.049*** -0.008 -0.001 0.009
(0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014)
High severity
1{Sentence = prison} -0.019*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.006 -0.014 -0.014
(0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Medium and high severity
1{Sentence = prison} -0.112** -0.086 -0.033 0.028 0.016 0.142
(0.039) (0.072) (0.082) (0.051) (0.077) (0.090)
High severity
1{Sentence = prison} 0.023 0.154** 0.265*** 0.142*** 0.202*** 0.337***
(0.028) (0.055) (0.066) (0.039) (0.059) (0.073)
Observations 18479 18479 18479 18383 18348 18233
Notes: Robust standard errors. The outcomes are defined as the variables in the leftmost column on the table in the time frame
specified in the headings of columns 2 to 7 (e.g. comitted a high severity felony within 1 year after sentence). OLS results are
from regressions of each outcome on three treatment dummies which indicate the sentence type: prison, jail, and jail with
probation. Regressions include a linear term on the PRV scores and the interaction between the treatment dummies and the PRV
scores. In Panel B, 2SLS regressions run the same OLS regression instrumenting the dummy for prison with a dummy indicating
whether the PRV score is to the right of the pooled cutoff. In Panel B, the dummy for prison is instrumented with 11 dummies
indicating whether the PRV score is to the right of each of 11 cutoffs. All models include cutoff fixed effects and their interactions
with the PRV scores, as well as a quadratic on age at sentence. The coefficients in the table are the point estimates an indicator
variable equa to one if the offender was sentenced to prison.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The multiple IV analysis provides radically different results relative to OLS. In
Panel B of Table 1.6, most coefficients for medium / high severity felonies are close to
zero and not statistically distinguishable from zero. That is, there is no causal effect
of receiving a prison sentence vs. a probation sentence on new medium / high sever-
ity felonies. However, when we isolate high-severity felonies we see that offenders
originally sentenced to prison are much more likely to be convicted of a high-severity
felony across all after sentence and after release periods except one year after sen-
tence. This finding of positive effects of the prison sentence on high-severity crimes
goes against the idea of the rehabilitation or specific deterrence effects of prison as a
future crime suppressor. On the contrary, it suggests that being sentenced to prison
may have criminogenic effects, encouraging crimes that are more serious in nature
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than the original crime for which the offender was sentenced. These results are con-
sistent with Mueller-Smith’s (2016) finding that incarceration encourages criminal
activity to become more serious.
Based on how we defined the offense severity indicators we can conclude that
the majority of new felonies the prison sentence may have prevented during the in-
capacitation period would be classified as low- or medium-severity. This is because
we find a lower overall felony recidivism rate among offenders sentenced to prison
rather than probation in Table 1.5 but we find the opposite result when we break
new felonies into high-severity vs. everything else. Hence, the negative effect of
prison on recidivism is concentrated on low- or medium-severity recidivism which
makes sense given the characteristics of the offenders in our sample. However, from
a public safety perspective, it is worrisome that low-level offenders receiving a prison
sentence are more likely to engage in future high-severity crimes than offenders who
are very similar to them ex-ante but receive a probation sentence.
We now examine imprisonment in a future period in Table 1.7. Future impris-
onment is a rarely-studied outcome that may have policy-relevant implications. For
example, if prison sentences causally increase the likelihood of receiving a new prison
sentence in the future as we find in this paper, there is a hidden-cost multiplier of
this type of sentence that is likely ignored by criminal justice policy-makers. Fu-
ture imprisonment can be divided into imprisonment due to a new sentence or due
to a technical violation while on supervision. Hence, within each panel we present
the overall imprisonment measure and disaggregate it into imprisonment due to new
sentences and due to technical violations (see the headings in column 1 of each panel).
OLS results suggest that there is a negative correlation between being sentenced
to prison and future incarceration within 1 year after sentence. Three years af-
ter sentence there is no association, and 5 years after sentence the correlation is
positive. The negative correlation within 1 year after sentence is likely a result of
incapacitation effects, as both re-imprisonment due to new sentences and technical
violations are lower for individuals sentenced to prison and most offenders sentenced
to prison are still incarcerated within a year of their sentence. Naturally, the after-
release estimates provide a clearer picture of future imprisonment. In columns 5 to
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7, OLS reports positive correlations between receiving a prison sentence and future
imprisonment in all time frames analyzed. While the coefficients for new sentence
are positive in this case, they are close to zero. The variable driving the positive
correlation between prison and overall future imprisonment is imprisonment due to
a technical violation.
The IV results are in line with the OLS pattern except that we do not see negative
coefficients 1 year after sentence. The coefficients for overall future incarceration in
the IV strategy are positive and statistically significant across all time frames ana-
lyzed. This finding means that, on average, individuals sentenced to prison are more
likely to be imprisoned in the future than probationers across all time periods ana-
lyzed except 1 year after sentence in which there is no difference between prisoners
and probationers.
We find strong evidence of greater imprisonment among those originally sen-
tenced to prison which we call secondary incapacitation. Relative to probationers,
receiving a prison sentence increases the probability of future imprisonment by 28.9
percentage points within 3 years after sentence and by 38.2 percentage points 5 years
after sentence. These effects are mostly explained by higher imprisonment due to
technical violations, as the coefficients on imprisonment for a new sentence are in-
significant at the 5 percent level. After release, the overall effects on imprisonment
are even larger (24.6 percentage points within 1 year, 39.2 percentage points within
3 years, and 43.3 percentage points 5 years after release). Even though there is an
increase in imprisonment due to new sentences that is significant at the 10 percent
level, most of the future imprisonment is due to violations of parole conditions. Indi-
viduals originally sentenced to prison are between 16 and 31 percentage points more
likely than probationers to be imprisoned in the future due to technical violations
across all post-release periods (see header “Due to technical violation” in Panel B).
The differential rates of future imprisonment due to technical violations for parolees
(released prisoners) and probationers probably result from differences in the intensity
of supervision.28 Even though these individuals seem, in general, not to be commit-
28According to our conversations with MDOC staff, probation supervision is typically less intense
than parole supervision in Michigan. This is consistent with the research literature on probation
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Table 1.7: LLR results (Future Imprisonment)
Outcome: Imprisonment
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Overall
1{Sentence = prison} -0.038*** -0.007 0.043** 0.037*** 0.069*** 0.083***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015)
Due to new sentence
1{Sentence = prison} -0.022*** -0.026** -0.016 0.005 0.011 0.019
(0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013)
Due to technical violation
1{Sentence = prison} -0.017*** 0.020* 0.064*** 0.034*** 0.069*** 0.089***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Overall
1{Sentence = prison} 0.063 0.289*** 0.382*** 0.246*** 0.392*** 0.433***
(0.041) (0.077) (0.087) (0.057) (0.082) (0.092)
Due to new sentence
1{Sentence = prison} 0.018 0.052 0.152* 0.090* 0.131* 0.200*
(0.026) (0.059) (0.073) (0.038) (0.064) (0.078)
Due to technical violation
1{Sentence = prison} 0.047 0.263*** 0.304*** 0.163*** 0.298*** 0.314***
(0.031) (0.058) (0.065) (0.044) (0.061) (0.068)
Observations 18440 18440 18440 18383 18365 18306
Notes: Robust standard errors. The outcomes are defined as the variables in column 1 on the table in the time frame specified
in the headings of columns 2 to 7. OLS results are from regressions of each outcome on three treatment dummies which indicate
the sentence type: prison, jail, and jail with probation. Regressions include a linear term on the PRV scores and the interaction
between the treatment dummies and the PRV scores. In Panel B, 2SLS regressions run the same OLS regression instrumenting
the dummy for prison with a dummy indicating whether the PRV score is to the right of the pooled cutoff. In Panel B, the
dummy for prison is instrumented with 11 dummies indicating whether the PRV score is to the right of each of 11 cutoffs. All
models include cutoff fixed effects and their interactions with the PRV scores, as well as baseline covariates. The coefficients
in the table are the point estimates an indicator variable equal to one if the offender was sentenced to prison.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ting new crimes that lead to a new sentence, they are back in prison relatively soon
after their release from their original sentence.29 We believe we are the first to
causally identify the secondary incapacitation effect. This effect would seem to be
of high policy relevance given the high costs of a prison sentence. Due to secondary
incapacitation, costs of future re-imprisonment are added to the imprisonment costs
of the original sentence, creating a hidden-cost multiplier for prison sentences.
and parole discussed above.
29A caveat in this interpretation is that prosecutors are less likely to charge parolees with minor
crimes if they can be re-imprisoned on a technical violation. Hence, some of what we observe may
reflect prosecutor discretion rather than differences in offender behavior.
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Overall, the general pattern across all our results is consistent with primary and
secondary incapacitation effects of receiving a prison sentence. Primary incapaci-
tation arises because a significant fraction of offenders sentenced to prison are still
in prison when measuring the outcomes close to the sentence date. Conversely, at
dates farther out from the original sentence, secondary incapacitation is a result of
the higher future imprisonment rates for offenders originally sentenced to prison as
compared to probationers. Secondary incapacitation is primarily due to imprison-
ment for violations of parole rather than for new sentences although imprisonment
due to a technical violation could be an expedited way to send an offender back to
prison when he or she in fact commited a new felony. Primary and secondary inca-
pacitation lead to overall lower rates of new felony recidivism among those sentenced
to prison. The exception is for high-severity new felonies, where receiving a prison
sentence increases the probability of conviction for a high severity felony post-release.
In the next section we discuss the various robustness checks we have performed,
including those related to the possible endogeneity of other sentences types (jail and
jail with probation) and of sentence length, sensitivity to different bandwidths, and
heaping of the running variable.
1.7 Robustness checks
One possible criticism of our approach is that controlling for the jail and jail with pro-
bation sentences invalidates the instrument because these are outcomes of the same
decision process and are, hence, endogenous. We assess this possibility by examin-
ing the effects of a prison sentence compared to all intermediate sentences combined
(probation, jail, and jail with probation). In this approach we no longer need to
control for the jail and jail with probation sentences. Appendix Tables 1.11 to 1.13
show results when we do not control for other sentence types. In this case, the point
estimate shown in the tables measures the difference between a prison sentence and
other intermediate sentences (jail, jail with probation, and probation).30 Our results
30Despite the fact that jail and jail with probation sentences involve a period of incarceration,
this period is not generally long (see Table 1.1) and the conditions of the two forms of incarceration
seem substantively different.
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are qualitatively and quantitatively the same as when we control for jail and jail with
probation. Overall, as before, being sentenced to prison relative to an intermediate
sentence (including jail and jail with probation), results in primary and secondary
incapacitation where the latter is explained by a higher rate of technical violations
among prisoners. The only discernible difference relative to our main results is that
5 years after release both future incarceration coefficients, due to new sentence and
due to technical violations, are highly significant.
One of the requirements for using the IV strategy is that the exclusion restriction
holds, that is, that the instrument affects the outcome only through its effect on
the endogenous variable (the probability of being sentenced to prison in our case).
In fact, in the example grid in Figure 1.1 and Appendix 1.9.1 it is clear that the
minimum sentence ranges are higher in straddle cells (shaded) relative to interme-
diate cells (marked with an asterisk). Figure 1.4 shows the first stage for sentence
length within the 16-point bandwidth. There is a statistically significant reduction
of about one month in sentence length at the cutoff. This observation could imply a
violation to the exclusion restriction in our setting if a one month difference in time
imprisoned were to affect recidivism. Given that a single month is a small fraction
of the typical prison term in our sample, we do not expect this to be the case, but it
is nevertheless important to examine whether this is an issue.
Without an additional source of exogenous variation in sentencing, we are not
able to separately instrument sentence length. We conduct two expercises to check
the sensitivity of our results to this potential violation of the exclusion restriction.
First, we control for sentence length in Appendix Tables 1.14 to 1.16. There is no
evidence that the results change when controlling for sentence length except that
for the new felony outcome, the coefficients for 3 and 5 years after release are now
statistically significant. This could be further evidence of secondary incapacitation.
Second, we exclude individuals with offenses in the highest offense level for each
grid (level III for grid D, and level IV for grids E and F). Excluding these observa-
tions results in an insignificant first stage for sentence length while we only lose about
1,000 observations. The results are in Appendix Tables 1.17 to 1.19. The incapac-
itation effect is now significant only 1 and 3 years after sentence. While the 5-year
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coefficient is still substantial in magnitude, it is no longer significant (see Panel B of
Table 1.17). The rest of the results are very similar, with a slight increase in the point
estimates for overall future incarceration (Panel B of Table 1.19). We now observe
that 5 years after sentence and in all periods after release, offenders whose original
sentence was prison are more likely to be re-imprisoned due to a new sentence (and
not primarily due to technical violations of parole) relative to our main results. This
finding suggests that excluding the individuals with the most severe offenses in our
sample increases the importance of secondary incapacitation due to new sentences,
now on par with technical violations.
Another robustness check usually conducted in the RD literature is testing sensi-
tivity of the estimates to alternative bandwidth choices. Given the large number of
outcomes we have, we perform tests for two bandwidths near our 16-point window.
Appendix Tables 1.20 to 1.22 show results for a bandwidth of 15 points around the
cutoff and Appendix Tables 1.23 to 1.25 for a bandwidth of 18 points around the
cutoff. We do not see any unexpected behavior in the point estimates or their sta-
tistical significance.
Finally, when the running variable exhibits heaping, as is the case here, Barreca
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et al. (2016) recommend estimating the model using only observations at the heaps.
We do so using the heaps at multiples of 5 within the 16-point bandwidth. These are
the values of the running variable where most of our observations are concentrated.
Appendix Tables 1.26 to 1.28 show that the results are virtually the same as in our
main specification.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper leverages discontinuities in the probability of being sentenced to prison
arising from the structure of the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines to provide new esti-
mates of the effects of imprisonment on future recidivism. The sentencing guidelines
provide a framework in which low-level offenders (classified in low-severity crime
classes) may receive a prison sentence if their prior record score is at or above a
certain cutoff determined by the specific grid and the offense severity level. This
setup leads to a fuzzy RD design in which the running variable is the prior record
score that measures offenders’ criminal history.
To estimate the causal effect of receiving a prison sentence relative to probation,
we perform reduced-form and instrumental-variable analyses based on the logic of
instrumental variables applied to the fuzzy RD setting. We take advantage of the
fact that each individual in our setting is only affected by one cutoff. We use the
11 cutoffs in Grids D, E, and F of the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines as instru-
mental variables that take the value of one if the prior record score of the offender
is to the right of the cutoff. Our estimates provide the LATE for the population
of individuals whose sentences are affected by crossing the boundary between cells
in the guideline grid, weighted by the strength of the first stage of each of the cutoffs.
When comparing offenders sentenced to prison vs. probation, we identify signifi-
cant incapacitation effects from the original prison sentence as well as those resulting
from future imprisonment, which our results show are primarily due to technical vio-
lations of parole. We call these incapacitation effects primary and secondary, respec-
tively. While primary incapacitation is well documented in the literature, we believe
we are the first to causally identify secondary incapacitation as an effect of the orig-
inal prison sentence, that is, to estimate the causal effect of a prison sentence on
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future imprisonment. Receiving a prison sentence reduces the likelihood of commit-
ting a new felony by at least 19 percentage points within the first year after sentence
and by between 32 and 37 percentage points within 3 and 5 years after sentence, re-
spectively, relative to an offender sentenced to probation. After release, our evidence
suggests that offenders sentenced to prison are less likely to be convicted of a new
felony, particularly within 3 years after release. Importantly, among those who in
fact commit a new felony, those whose original sentence was prison are significantly
more likely to commit a high severity felony. In terms of future imprisonment, we
find that those sentenced to prison are more likely to be incarcerated in the future
relatively soon after their original sentence date. For most of our specifications, the
channel for this secondary incapacitation is re-imprisonment resulting from technical
violations of parole. Hence, our results suggest that, at the cutoff, the main effect of
sentencing offenders to prison operates through incapacitation as offenders sentenced
to prison serve time not only from their original sentence but also from returning to
prison due to technical violations. If this finding were to generalize to other states,
this would be an important for criminal justice policy, as it suggests that sentencing
offenders on the margin between prison and probation to prison primarily reduces
their average future offending during the time they spend in prison.
The specific policy implications of our findings depend on how one interprets the
effects of a prison sentence on the probability of future imprisonment in conjunction
with its effects on new felonies after release. One interpretation is that secondary
incapacitation is preventing new felony convictions among those originally sentenced
to prison. A second interpretation is that future imprisonment resulting from tech-
nical violations is due to greater surveillance of individuals on parole relative to
those on probation. The difference between the two depends on what one believes
re-imprisoned parolees would have done had they not been re-imprisoned on techni-
cal violations. The first interpretation suggests they would indeed have committed
felonies and been prosecuted for them, implying that secondary incapacitation is
crime preventative. The second suggests they would commit minor crimes and pa-
role violations, implying that re-imprisonment is creating significant incarceration
costs while preventing little serious crime. We cannot adjudicate between these two
different counterfactuals with our data, as we do not have an identification strategy
for estimating the causal effect of re-imprisonment for a technical violation on fu-
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ture crime. Our findings suggest that addressing this question in future research is
imperative for any cost-benefit analysis of imprisonment and for providing definitive
policy recommendations.
Finally, we note several limitations of this study. First, our analysis is focused
on offenders whose sentence type is affected by a marginal increase in their prior
record score. In that sense, our results are local to narrow window around the cut-
offs determining sentence type. An additional limitation is that we can only assess
re-offending based on offending known to law enforcement. Furthermore, our analy-
sis is limited to a single state, and social and economic conditions as well as criminal
justice policies vary considerably from state to state. In terms of criminal justice
policies and practices, we note that Michigan’s rates of incarceration and parole are
close to the national averages. Michigan also accounts for a nontrivial share of the
nation’s prisoner population. However, our findings may be sensitive to state-specific
resources and policies related to prison administration, and probation or parole su-
pervision and revocation. Future work should examine whether results generalize to
other contexts and other identification strategies.
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1.9 Appendices
1.9.1 SGL grid example
Figure 1.5: Grid D from Michigan Sentencing Guidelines
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1.9.2 Joint test of covariates at the cutoff (SUR tests)
Table 1.8: Joint test of covariates at the cutoff (SUR tests)
Bandwidth F(12,∼12·N) p-value N Bandwidth F(12,∼12·N) p-value N
+/- 1 1.355 0.180 1,793 +/- 13 3.628 0.000 13,431
+/- 2 1.355 0.180 1,793 +/- 14 3.628 0.000 13,431
+/- 3 0.767 0.686 2,779 +/- 15 1.171 0.298 17,471
+/- 4 0.767 0.686 2,779 +/- 16 1.197 0.278 18,479
+/- 5 4.518 0.000 5,301 +/- 17 1.197 0.278 18,479
+/- 6 3.457 0.000 6,674 +/- 18 1.168 0.300 20,358
+/- 7 3.457 0.000 6,674 +/- 19 1.168 0.300 20,358
+/- 8 1.638 0.074 7,910 +/- 20 1.714 0.057 23,713
+/- 9 1.638 0.074 7,910 +/- 21 1.772 0.047 24,580
+/- 10 4.176 0.000 11,024 +/- 22 1.772 0.047 24,580
+/- 11 3.864 0.000 12,201 +/- 23 1.937 0.026 28,017
+/- 12 3.864 0.000 12,201 +/- 24 1.937 0.026 28,017
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1.9.3 Graphs of covariates
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1.9.4 Descriptive statistics of all sentence types
Table 1.9: Descriptive statistics - all sentence types
Sentence type
Probation Prison Jail Jail withprobation
% of observations in sample 0.30 0.10 0.08 0.52
% of women 0.19 0.09 0.12 0.15
Age at sentence 31.00 32.99 32.87 31.99
% white 0.48 0.58 0.58 0.69
% married 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14
% with less than high school 0.45 0.43 0.47 0.42
Age at first arrest 20.44 19.47 19.67 20.44
On parole at sentence 0.01 0.15 0.06 0.01
Total number of arrests before sentence 6.40 9.89 8.23 7.51
% with mental illness 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21
% with drug addiction 0.49 0.53 0.52 0.50
% with alcohol addiction 0.32 0.49 0.42 0.52
Months employed within a year before sentence 4.20 3.60 3.24 4.56
Months employed within 2 years before sentence 8.64 7.92 6.96 9.36
Average sentence length (months) 26.87 17.54 6.77 30.35
Time served (months in prison) 22.13
Notes: All figures correspond to means of the variables within 16 points from the cutoff. Less than high
school does not include GED.
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Table 1.10: Descriptive statistics of outcomes of interest - all sentence types
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. Any new felony
Probation 0.07 0.23 0.32 0.07 0.23 0.32
Prison 0.00 0.12 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.36
Jail 0.06 0.24 0.32 0.10 0.26 0.33
Jail with probation 0.05 0.21 0.30 0.08 0.23 0.31
Panel B. Medium and high severity felonies
Probation 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.19
Prison 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.04 0.15 0.22
Jail 0.04 0.14 0.18 0.06 0.15 0.19
Jail with probation 0.03 0.13 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.19
Panel B. High severity felonies
Probation 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.09
Prison 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.10
Jail 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.10
Jail with probation 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.08
Panel D. Future incarceration
Probation 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.03 0.11 0.16
Prison 0.01 0.16 0.28 0.11 0.28 0.34
Jail 0.03 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.13 0.18
Jail with probation 0.04 0.15 0.20 0.07 0.16 0.20
Panel E. Future incarceration due to new sentences
Probation 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.12
Prison 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.19
Jail 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.14
Jail with probation 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.12
Panel F. Future incarceration due to technical violations
Probation 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.05
Prison 0.01 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.17 0.21
Jail 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05
Jail with probation 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.11
Notes: All figures correspond to observations within 16 points from the cutoff. Sample sizes are around
18,000 observations depending on the variable.
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1.9.5 Robustness checks
Table 1.11: Robustness check: Prison vs. intermediate sentences (Any new felony)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Dummy prison -0.058*** -0.115*** -0.094*** -0.028*** -0.025* -0.009
(0.003) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Dummy prison -0.166** -0.325*** -0.258** 0.012 -0.168 0.012
(0.051) (0.089) (0.098) (0.065) (0.095) (0.109)
Observations 18479 18479 18479 18383 18348 18233
Notes: Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.12: Robustness check: Prison vs. intermediate sentences (Severity of new
felony)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Medium and high severity
Dummy prison -0.035*** -0.065*** -0.053*** -0.016* -0.011 0.001
(0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013)
High severity
Dummy prison -0.015*** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.010* -0.020** -0.019*
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Medium and high severity
Dummy prison -0.113** -0.088 -0.057 0.044 0.028 0.149
(0.040) (0.074) (0.085) (0.054) (0.080) (0.096)
High severity
Dummy prison 0.031 0.180** 0.311*** 0.172*** 0.250*** 0.411***
(0.029) (0.059) (0.072) (0.044) (0.065) (0.083)
Observations 18479 18479 18479 18383 18348 18233
Notes: Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.13: Robustness check: Prison vs. intermediate sentences (Future incarcera-
tion)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Overall
Dummy prison -0.039*** -0.027* 0.019 0.016 0.044*** 0.057***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014)
Due to new sentence
Dummy prison -0.017*** -0.027*** -0.016 0.001 0.007 0.015
(0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
Due to technical violation
Dummy prison -0.022*** 0.001 0.039*** 0.016* 0.046*** 0.064***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Overall
Dummy prison 0.078 0.299*** 0.412*** 0.281*** 0.423*** 0.479***
(0.043) (0.081) (0.093) (0.062) (0.088) (0.100)
Due to new sentence
Dummy prison 0.021 0.056 0.177* 0.106* 0.161* 0.243**
(0.029) (0.061) (0.077) (0.042) (0.068) (0.084)
Due to technical violation
Dummy prison 0.058 0.267*** 0.318*** 0.178*** 0.302*** 0.327***
(0.033) (0.061) (0.069) (0.046) (0.065) (0.073)
Observations 18440 18440 18440 18383 18365 18306
Notes: Robust standard errors. The outcomes are defined as the variables in the leftmost column on the table in the time frame
specified in the headings of columns 2 to 7 (e.g. returned to prison within 1 year after sentence). OLS results are from regressions
of each outcome on three treatment dummies which indicate the sentence type: prison, jail, and jail with probation. Regressions
include a linear term on the PRV scores and the interaction between the treatment dummies and the PRV scores. In Panel B,
2SLS regressions run the same OLS regression instrumenting the dummy for prison with a dummy indicating whether the PRV
score is to the right of the pooled cutoff. In Panel B, the dummy for prison is instrumented with 11 dummies indicating whether
the PRV score is to the right of each of 11 cutoffs. All models include cutoff fixed effects and their interactions with the PRV
scores, as well as a quadratic on age at sentence. The coefficients in the table are the point estimates an indicator variable equal
to one if the offender was sentenced to prison.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.14: Robustness check: Controlling for sentence length (Any new felony)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Dummy prison -0.076*** -0.132*** -0.106*** -0.025** -0.028 -0.012
(0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Dummy prison -0.200*** -0.416*** -0.403*** -0.060 -0.315*** -0.200*
(0.047) (0.081) (0.089) (0.058) (0.086) (0.097)
Observations 18479 18479 18479 18383 18348 18233
Notes: Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.15: Robustness check: Controlling for sentence length (Severity of new
felony)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Medium and high severity
Dummy prison -0.046*** -0.071*** -0.056*** -0.012 -0.008 0.004
(0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.015)
High severity
Dummy prison -0.019*** -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.007 -0.017* -0.018
(0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Medium and high severity
Dummy prison -0.135*** -0.158* -0.143 -0.017 -0.077 0.003
(0.037) (0.067) (0.077) (0.048) (0.072) (0.084)
High severity
Dummy prison 0.010 0.115* 0.208*** 0.113** 0.156** 0.277***
(0.025) (0.051) (0.060) (0.035) (0.055) (0.067)
Observations 18479 18479 18479 18383 18348 18233
Notes: Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.16: Robustness check: Controlling for sentence length (Future incarceration)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Overall
Dummy prison -0.032*** 0.004 0.060*** 0.047*** 0.082*** 0.103***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016)
Due to new sentence
Dummy prison -0.025*** -0.036*** -0.027* 0.001 0.000 0.010
(0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013)
Due to technical violation
Dummy prison -0.007 0.041*** 0.091*** 0.047*** 0.091*** 0.118***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Overall
Dummy prison 0.042 0.221** 0.286*** 0.208*** 0.309*** 0.325***
(0.037) (0.070) (0.079) (0.052) (0.075) (0.084)
Due to new sentence
Dummy prison 0.008 0.014 0.086 0.067 0.075 0.122
(0.024) (0.054) (0.067) (0.035) (0.059) (0.071)
Due to technical violation
Dummy prison 0.036 0.230*** 0.261*** 0.147*** 0.265*** 0.272***
(0.029) (0.052) (0.059) (0.040) (0.056) (0.062)
Observations 18440 18440 18440 18383 18365 18306
Notes: Robust standard errors. The outcomes are defined as the variables in the leftmost column on the table in the time frame
specified in the headings of columns 2 to 7 (e.g. returned to prison within 1 year after sentence). OLS results are from regressions
of each outcome on three treatment dummies which indicate the sentence type: prison, jail, and jail with probation. Regressions
include a linear term on the PRV scores and the interaction between the treatment dummies and the PRV scores. In Panel B,
2SLS regressions run the same OLS regression instrumenting the dummy for prison with a dummy indicating whether the PRV
score is to the right of the pooled cutoff. In Panel B, the dummy for prison is instrumented with 11 dummies indicating whether
the PRV score is to the right of each of 11 cutoffs. All models include cutoff fixed effects and their interactions with the PRV
scores, as well as a quadratic on age at sentence. The coefficients in the table are the point estimates an indicator variable equal
to one if the offender was sentenced to prison.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.17: Robustness check: Excluding highest OV level (Any new felony)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Dummy prison -0.074*** -0.128*** -0.100*** -0.017 -0.023 -0.006
(0.006) (0.013) (0.016) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Dummy prison -0.166** -0.299*** -0.187 0.024 -0.158 -0.006
(0.052) (0.090) (0.099) (0.066) (0.095) (0.105)
Observations 17038 17038 17038 16953 16927 16842
Notes: Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.18: Robustness check: Excluding highest OV level (Severity of new felony)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Medium and high severity
Dummy prison -0.046*** -0.068*** -0.054*** -0.010 -0.007 0.003
(0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015)
High severity
Dummy prison -0.020*** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.008 -0.016 -0.017
(0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Medium and high severity
Dummy prison -0.092* -0.019 0.072 0.067 0.092 0.200*
(0.041) (0.075) (0.087) (0.054) (0.080) (0.092)
High severity
Dummy prison 0.029 0.180** 0.312*** 0.156*** 0.232*** 0.359***
(0.029) (0.058) (0.070) (0.041) (0.063) (0.075)
Observations 17038 17038 17038 16953 16927 16842
Notes: Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.19: Robustness check: Excluding highest OV level (Future incarceration)
Outcome: Returned to prison
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Overall
Dummy prison -0.042*** -0.009 0.045** 0.041*** 0.074*** 0.087***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
Due to new sentence
Dummy prison -0.024*** -0.029** -0.017 0.006 0.012 0.019
(0.003) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014)
Due to technical violation
Dummy prison -0.018*** 0.021* 0.068*** 0.035*** 0.074*** 0.095***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Overall
Dummy prison 0.068 0.354*** 0.471*** 0.276*** 0.469*** 0.515***
(0.043) (0.082) (0.093) (0.061) (0.087) (0.097)
Due to new sentence
Dummy prison 0.027 0.105 0.231** 0.113** 0.191** 0.269**
(0.028) (0.062) (0.078) (0.041) (0.068) (0.082)
Due to technical violation
Dummy prison 0.045 0.277*** 0.330*** 0.170*** 0.322*** 0.342***
(0.033) (0.061) (0.069) (0.046) (0.065) (0.071)
Observations 17001 17001 17001 16953 16941 16896
Notes: Robust standard errors. The outcomes are defined as the variables in the leftmost column on the table in the time frame
specified in the headings of columns 2 to 7 (e.g. returned to prison within 1 year after sentence). OLS results are from regressions
of each outcome on three treatment dummies which indicate the sentence type: prison, jail, and jail with probation. Regressions
include a linear term on the PRV scores and the interaction between the treatment dummies and the PRV scores. In Panel B,
2SLS regressions run the same OLS regression instrumenting the dummy for prison with a dummy indicating whether the PRV
score is to the right of the pooled cutoff. In Panel B, the dummy for prison is instrumented with 11 dummies indicating whether
the PRV score is to the right of each of 11 cutoffs. All models include cutoff fixed effects and their interactions with the PRV
scores, as well as a quadratic on age at sentence. The coefficients in the table are the point estimates an indicator variable equal
to one if the offender was sentenced to prison.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.20: Robustness check: Bandwidth=+/-15 (Any new felony)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Dummy prison -0.070*** -0.120*** -0.099*** -0.016 -0.022 -0.007
(0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Dummy prison -0.178*** -0.322*** -0.255** -0.015 -0.192* -0.044
(0.049) (0.086) (0.095) (0.062) (0.091) (0.103)
Observations 17471 17471 17471 17392 17363 17264
Notes: Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.21: Robustness check: Bandwidth=+/-15 (Severity of new felony)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Medium and high severity
Dummy prison -0.043*** -0.063*** -0.052*** -0.009 -0.003 0.006
(0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015)
High severity
Dummy prison -0.020*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.007 -0.016 -0.018
(0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Medium and high severity
Dummy prison -0.118** -0.081 -0.028 0.023 0.017 0.125
(0.038) (0.072) (0.082) (0.051) (0.077) (0.090)
High severity
Dummy prison 0.014 0.162** 0.255*** 0.128*** 0.195** 0.329***
(0.027) (0.056) (0.066) (0.039) (0.060) (0.073)
Observations 17471 17471 17471 17392 17363 17264
Notes: Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.22: Robustness check: Bandwidth=+/-15 (Future incarceration)
Outcome: Returned to prison
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Overall
Dummy prison -0.041*** -0.011 0.038* 0.030** 0.063*** 0.077***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016)
Due to new sentence
Dummy prison -0.023*** -0.027** -0.020 0.004 0.008 0.015
(0.003) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013)
Due to technical violation
Dummy prison -0.018*** 0.017 0.059*** 0.028*** 0.063*** 0.085***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Overall
Dummy prison 0.054 0.317*** 0.393*** 0.282*** 0.381*** 0.434***
(0.040) (0.078) (0.088) (0.057) (0.083) (0.093)
Due to new sentence
Dummy prison 0.013 0.049 0.171* 0.081* 0.119 0.219**
(0.026) (0.059) (0.073) (0.038) (0.064) (0.078)
Due to technical violation
Dummy prison 0.043 0.291*** 0.322*** 0.210*** 0.306*** 0.326***
(0.030) (0.058) (0.066) (0.043) (0.062) (0.069)
Observations 17439 17439 17439 17392 17378 17325
Notes: Robust standard errors. The outcomes are defined as the variables in the leftmost column on the table in the time frame
specified in the headings of columns 2 to 7 (e.g. returned to prison within 1 year after sentence). OLS results are from regressions
of each outcome on three treatment dummies which indicate the sentence type: prison, jail, and jail with probation. Regressions
include a linear term on the PRV scores and the interaction between the treatment dummies and the PRV scores. In Panel B,
2SLS regressions run the same OLS regression instrumenting the dummy for prison with a dummy indicating whether the PRV
score is to the right of the pooled cutoff. In Panel B, the dummy for prison is instrumented with 11 dummies indicating whether
the PRV score is to the right of each of 11 cutoffs. All models include cutoff fixed effects and their interactions with the PRV
scores, as well as a quadratic on age at sentence. The coefficients in the table are the point estimates an indicator variable equal
to one if the offender was sentenced to prison.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.23: Robustness check: Bandwidth=+/-18 (Any new felony)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Dummy prison -0.071*** -0.124*** -0.100*** -0.018* -0.024 -0.008
(0.005) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.016)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Dummy prison -0.174*** -0.331*** -0.271** -0.013 -0.212* -0.020
(0.048) (0.084) (0.093) (0.061) (0.090) (0.101)
Observations 20358 20358 20358 20254 20216 20089
Notes: Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.24: Robustness check: Bandwidth=+/-18 (Severity of new felony)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Medium and high severity
Dummy prison -0.044*** -0.066*** -0.055*** -0.009 -0.006 0.003
(0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014)
High severity
Dummy prison -0.021*** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.008 -0.015 -0.016
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Medium and high severity
Dummy prison -0.102** -0.053 0.005 0.033 0.046 0.191*
(0.038) (0.070) (0.081) (0.050) (0.076) (0.090)
High severity
Dummy prison 0.038 0.170** 0.286*** 0.159*** 0.222*** 0.377***
(0.027) (0.055) (0.065) (0.039) (0.060) (0.074)
Observations 20358 20358 20358 20254 20216 20089
Notes: Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.25: Robustness check: Bandwidth=+/-18 (Future incarceration)
Outcome: Returned to prison
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Overall
Dummy prison -0.039*** -0.009 0.038** 0.038*** 0.066*** 0.079***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015)
Due to new sentence
Dummy prison -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.020 0.004 0.007 0.014
(0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012)
Due to technical violation
Dummy prison -0.017*** 0.021* 0.063*** 0.034*** 0.068*** 0.089***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Overall
Dummy prison 0.062 0.302*** 0.389*** 0.236*** 0.403*** 0.469***
(0.039) (0.076) (0.086) (0.056) (0.081) (0.091)
Due to new sentence
Dummy prison 0.020 0.074 0.173* 0.079* 0.147* 0.235**
(0.025) (0.058) (0.072) (0.037) (0.064) (0.077)
Due to technical violation
Dummy prison 0.044 0.249*** 0.296*** 0.163*** 0.289*** 0.325***
(0.030) (0.057) (0.064) (0.043) (0.061) (0.068)
Observations 20316 20316 20316 20254 20235 20169
Notes: Robust standard errors. The outcomes are defined as the variables in the leftmost column on the table in the time frame
specified in the headings of columns 2 to 7 (e.g. returned to prison within 1 year after sentence). OLS results are from regressions
of each outcome on three treatment dummies which indicate the sentence type: prison, jail, and jail with probation. Regressions
include a linear term on the PRV scores and the interaction between the treatment dummies and the PRV scores. In Panel B,
2SLS regressions run the same OLS regression instrumenting the dummy for prison with a dummy indicating whether the PRV
score is to the right of the pooled cutoff. In Panel B, the dummy for prison is instrumented with 11 dummies indicating whether
the PRV score is to the right of each of 11 cutoffs. All models include cutoff fixed effects and their interactions with the PRV
scores, as well as a quadratic on age at sentence. The coefficients in the table are the point estimates an indicator variable equal
to one if the offender was sentenced to prison.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.26: Robustness check: Heaping (Any new felony)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Dummy prison -0.068*** -0.116*** -0.091*** -0.019* -0.017 -0.000
(0.006) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.018)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Dummy prison -0.193*** -0.429*** -0.441*** -0.056 -0.346** -0.228
(0.056) (0.099) (0.110) (0.070) (0.105) (0.120)
Observations 14741 14741 14741 14663 14633 14546
Notes: Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.27: Robustness check: Heaping (Severity of new felony)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Medium and high severity
Dummy prison -0.040*** -0.055*** -0.038** -0.006 0.008 0.019
(0.005) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.016)
High severity
Dummy prison -0.016*** -0.025*** -0.021* -0.003 -0.007 -0.006
(0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Medium and high severity
Dummy prison -0.107* -0.115 -0.089 0.030 -0.047 0.080
(0.044) (0.081) (0.092) (0.058) (0.086) (0.103)
High severity
Dummy prison 0.019 0.087 0.186** 0.126** 0.112 0.239**
(0.031) (0.060) (0.071) (0.043) (0.064) (0.080)
Observations 14741 14741 14741 14663 14633 14546
Notes: Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.28: Robustness check: Heaping (Future incarceration)
After sentence After release
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A. OLS
Overall
Dummy prison -0.040*** -0.003 0.054*** 0.034** 0.071*** 0.086***
(0.006) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017)
Due to new sentence
Dummy prison -0.023*** -0.025** -0.010 0.005 0.010 0.017
(0.003) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014)
Due to technical violation
Dummy prison -0.018*** 0.023* 0.067*** 0.030*** 0.071*** 0.086***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015)
Panel B. 2SLS - Multiple cutoffs
Overall
Dummy prison 0.089 0.293*** 0.355*** 0.259*** 0.355*** 0.418***
(0.047) (0.086) (0.097) (0.065) (0.091) (0.103)
Due to new sentence
Dummy prison 0.025 0.073 0.116 0.105* 0.109 0.162
(0.030) (0.066) (0.081) (0.045) (0.072) (0.087)
Due to technical violation
Dummy prison 0.067 0.254*** 0.295*** 0.160** 0.283*** 0.317***
(0.036) (0.064) (0.073) (0.049) (0.068) (0.076)
Observations 14708 14708 14708 14663 14647 14602
Notes: Robust standard errors. The outcomes are defined as the variables in the leftmost column on the table in the time frame
specified in the headings of columns 2 to 7 (e.g. returned to prison within 1 year after sentence). OLS results are from regressions
of each outcome on three treatment dummies which indicate the sentence type: prison, jail, and jail with probation. Regressions
include a linear term on the PRV scores and the interaction between the treatment dummies and the PRV scores. In Panel B,
2SLS regressions run the same OLS regression instrumenting the dummy for prison with a dummy indicating whether the PRV
score is to the right of the pooled cutoff. In Panel B, the dummy for prison is instrumented with 11 dummies indicating whether
the PRV score is to the right of each of 11 cutoffs. All models include cutoff fixed effects and their interactions with the PRV
scores, as well as a quadratic on age at sentence. The coefficients in the table are the point estimates an indicator variable equal
to one if the offender was sentenced to prison.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER II
Economic decision making along the college to
labor market transition
2.1 Introduction
Tracking changes in economic decision-making along the life cycle is an important
area of interest in economics. If individuals make decisions differently along the dif-
ferent phases of the life cycle, and in particular, if they engage in counterproductive
decision-making in some of those phases, there may be room for policies to help them
avoid costly mistakes. This motivates the literature studying how risk, time and so-
cial preferences measured through experimental games and survey measures change
over time or in response to macroeconomic or idiosyncratic shocks (see Chuang &
Schechter, 2015, for a survey). Even though economic models take preferences as
given, there may be variation associated with age, cognitive ability and other indi-
vidual characteristics (Benjamin et al., 2013), or with changes in the environment
people face (Malmendier & Nagel, 2011; Nguyen, 2011; Beauchamp et al., 2012;
Krupka & Stephens, 2013).
This paper studies the transition from being a student to working full-time and
how decision-making, performance in cognitive tests, and self-reported feelings about
financial situation and phychological measures change along this transition. Even
though this is an important transition in the lives of many people, the changes it
involves have not been sufficiently studied in the economics literature.1 Economic
theory predicts that students’ behavior should not change when transitioning from
1One exception is Gustman and Stafford (1972) who study consumption changes among grad-
uate students
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being a student to a working person because they should incorporate all future in-
come streams into their decisions before graduating and are, therefore, expected to
dissave in order to smooth their life-time consumption. Empirical tests of the per-
manent income hypothesis (PIH), however, show that it fails when analyzing income
shocks from tax refunds (Shapiro & Slemrod, 1995) and from receipt of normal in-
come (Stephens, 2003). Even though we are not directly testing the PIH in this
paper, these findings provide evidence that people do not completely smooth con-
sumption and may also change behavior in settings like ours. In fact, the uncertainty
around the specifics of a job, rather than whether they will get one or not are im-
portant enough to affect decision making, but this remains an understudied aspect
of uncertainty.
A unique feature of our study is that, while in college, students cannot completely
smooth their consumption in the presence of liquidity constraints, and they also face
uncertainty about what kind of job they will get and their starting salary. In our
sample, at baseline, only 6 percent of students have a credit card with a limit larger
than US$1,000, and 10 percent have loans of US$5,000 or more. Hence, in this con-
text, it may not be surprising that we observe changes in decision making along the
transition from college to the labor market.
To measure changes in decision making, we compare experimentally-measured
economic decision-making tasks across three main stages: job search (baseline), re-
ceiving and accepting a job offer, and receiving the first paycheck. We compare
the second and third stages to the first to provide evidence on changes in decision
making along these two important stages of the transition to the labor market. Our
experimental measures include risk aversion (Eckel & Grossman, 2002; T. Tanaka,
Camerer, & Nguyen, 2010), time preferences (Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012), ambigu-
ity aversion (Y. Tanaka et al., 2014), cognitive measures (IQ test, cognitive reflection
test, numerical Stroop task, Flanker task), and social preferences (dictator and ulti-
matum games). We also measure perceived financial situation and emotions through
survey questions.
Our sample consists of students in a prestigious university in Colombia who are
very likely to experience the college-to-labor-market transition, as their chances of
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finding a job soon after graduation are high. Specifically, we compare students in
their last semester in college (i.e. those who are searching for jobs) to similar stu-
dents in previous semesters (i.e. those who are involved in day-to-day college life).
We pick comparison students to closely match the gender, major-choice and economic
background of last-semester students to most accurately mimic what would have hap-
pened to last-semester students had they not finished college. With this comparison
group, we perform a difference-in-differences (DID) analyses of risk, time and social
preferences, performance in cognitive tests, perceived financial situation, and psy-
chological factors. We also provide evidence of the stability of these outcomes across
time from within-person analyses.
We find significant effects on decision making both in the after-offer and after-
paycheck stages among last-semester students who transition to the labor market.
What is striking is the strong series of effects observed when these students merely
receive a job offer - they become less present-biased, perceive less hardship in raising
funds for emergencies, become more altruistic and scale up both their spending in
rent and groceries and their savings. This demonstrates how important resolving
uncertainty around the details of an otherwise almost guaranteed event can be in
affecting decision making.
This study also highlights how crucial self-reported emotion measurements can
be. Students report feeling less tired, frustrated, depressed and worried when they
receive their job offers. In fact, not controlling for these phychological factors can
lead to erroneous conclusions about some of their economic decision making behav-
ior. For instance, last-semester students appear to become less risk averse when they
get a job offer, but this effect disappears after controlling for these psychological
factors. The results on time preferences, on the other hand remain quite robust to
controlling for these variables.
The fact that we observe these results demonstrates how the behavior of these
students while in university, where they live quite frugally, is not only constrained
by liquidity and credit constraints. This is evidence that uncertainty about the fu-
ture is important in determining behavior. Once these students receive a paycheck,
their behavior further changes. They perform worse on cognitive tasks relative to
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students in the comparison group. After being paid, these students might have to
undertake greater responsibilities and may have more variables to consider, causing
a greater cognitive load (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013). Indeed, the share of their
monthly income spent on groceries and savings goes up as early as the job offer stage
lending credence to their added responsibilities. The feelings of less worry, tiredness,
depression and frustration as well as the observed changes in preferences dissipate
by the time they start getting paid.
We contribute to the literature studying changes in decision making along the
life cycle and to the literature studying the stability of preferences by highlighting
the implications of uncertainty and psychological factors in experimentally-elicited
preferences. Experimental measures of risk, time and social preferences are used ex-
tensively in experimental economics and are increasingly being added to large-scale
national surveys. Hence, it is important to understand how factors, internal and ex-
ternal to individuals, can affect their behavior in these tasks. Moreover, if measures
of preferences elicited in the lab relate to behavior in real life, our findings suggest
that when people resolve uncertainty about big life-cycle events, they are in a better
position to make important decisions given that they would care more about the
future, are more generous and are in a better psychological state. In the particular
context that we study, after receiving a job offer is usually when people choose health
and pension plans. A policy implication of this study is that major decisions such
as the details of such plans may be best dealt with right after receiving a job offer.
This is the period we identify as when people are most forward thinking, report less
worry and tiredness and are most altruistic.
Our study compares favorably to other papers in the literature in terms of sam-
ple size, breadth of measures analyzed, and low attrition that is not systematically
correlated with covariates or outcomes at baseline. Furthermore, the characteristics
of our sample guarantee a large degree of homogeneity in terms of baseline cognition
and education level. Because in this study we try to have individuals as similar as
possible at baseline, this element constitutes an advantage over other studies because
it is less likely that results are driven by correlation between cognitive ability and
choices in the tasks (Benjamin, Brown, & Shapiro, 2013; Choi, Kariv, Müller, &
Silverman, 2014).
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the back-
ground of our setting and the research design. Section 2.3 presents details about
data collection and the experimental measures we use. Section 2.4 discusses the
difference-in-differences results and section 2.5 presents the stability of preferences
results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background and research design
We study one of the most important transitions in life, i.e. from college to the labor
market and how economic decision making changes along this period. Our setting
involves students at a large public university in Colombia recruited primarily from
the Engineering Deparment. In general, students from this university and engineer-
ing students specifically have very good prospects in the Colombian labor market
given the academic quality and prestige of the university they attend.
A unique feature of this university is that admissions are solely determined by an
admissions exam. About 40,000 to 60,000 applicants take the entrance exam every
semester for admission to the Bogota Campus. The number of slots varies every
semester but is usually around 2,000. Hence, the university admits the students
who are at the very top of the admission score distribution. The admissions process
guarantees that we will have students with similar cognitive ability so, our results
will presumably not be affected by big differences in cognition or level of education.
Indeed, this assumption bears out in the data where we observe parallel trends in the
cognitive performance of last-semester students and their counterparts in lower years.
We use the fact that students in their last semester of college will experience a
series of changes in their transition from college to the labor market. First, they will
receive job offers that, once accepted, will resolve the uncertainty they may have re-
garding when and what kind of job they will secure and how much they will be paid.
Second, once they start in the new job, they will receive a salary which will help them
them ease their liquidity constraint. To construct an appropriate comparison group
to have a benchmark to analyze the changes observed for students transitioning to
the labor market, we use the fact that students in earlier semesters are very similar to
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last-semester students. Besides age and variables that are naturally different when
one is farther along in college, we expect that students about to graduate and in
other semesters are similar in most observable and unobservable characteristics. Our
group of comparison students is selected to closely match the last-semester students
on gender, major and economic background. In section 2.3 we provide evidence of
similarities in characteristics we collected. Hence, we divide students in two groups:
those who are about to graduate and will experience the transition within the next
semester, and those who will remain in college for the duration of the study. We
differentiate between the two groups by calling them “last-semester students” and
“comparison”, respectively and find balance across the groups on all of the relevant
characteristics.
A particular feature of this context is that, in general, students cannot perfectly
smooth consumption by taking loans that will help them keep their standard of living
constant before and after graduating from college. In our sample, only 6 percent of
students have credit cards with a credit limit above $1,000 (the equivalent of about
1.5 times the expected salary in their first job after graduation) and about 10 percent
have loans over $5,000 at baseline.
The different stages in the research design are summarized in Table 2.1. By ob-
serving behavior from the second and third stages relative to the first we provide
evidence on how our outcomes of interest change across these important stages of
the college to labor-market transition. Even though stage 2 is associated with the
resolution of uncertainty, and stage 3 with easing of the liquidity constraint on eco-
nomic decision-making, there may be other changes as students gradually become
more independent.
The relevant timeline for our design is as follows. The two semesters in the
academic year go from February to May and August to November. Graduation
ceremonies take place in March and August. About half of our participants are in
their last semester of college in the February to May semester and hence graduate in
August. Students in their last semester of college typically work on a thesis, do an
internship which may turn into a contract job after graduation or already have a job
in an area related to their major. If they have already secured a job, the expectation
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Table 2.1: Summary of research design
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3










Timeline April - May, 2016 October, 2016 December, 2016
is that their salary will increase when they graduate. Simultaneaously, they may
look for other college-graduate jobs.
2.3 Data and experimental tasks
We collected data from five waves of surveys taking place at the recruitment stage and
at three points in time according to Table 2.1: (i) Sign-up survey; (ii) Two surveys at
baseline (during the last semester before graduation of last-semester students); (ii)
One survey approximately after receiving and accepting a job offer2; (iii) One survey
approximately after starting in the new job and receiving at least one paycheck.
Participants responded to all surveys online on roughly the same dates between
April, and December, 2016. All surveys except the sign-up questionnaire contained
the same tasks, although in cognitive tests we varied the questions or worded them
differently every time to reduce the role of memory in answering these questions. For
other tasks, remembering would be harder because each task involved many choices.
2.3.1 Recruitment
The Engineering College at this university agreed to send an email inviting engi-
neering students to participate in a research study about economic decision making.
2Notice that the timing of this survey does not coincide with graduation in August. Because all
surveys were conducted either well before or well after graduation, we do not think that our results
are driven by the excitement associated with graduation.
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Students signed up in April, 2016 using an online form with questions about de-
mographics, major, current semester in the major, GPA, tuition, socio-economic
measures at the household level, whether they work, and perceived probability of
finding a job between April and October, 2016 for those who plan to graduate in
August. Students in undergraduate as well as master’s programs were allowed to
sign up.
Among students in their last semester and in other semesters, 767 signed up to
participate in the study. Since we wanted similar numbers of last-semester students
and students in other semesters to maximize power, we selected students in lower
semesters to equal the number of students in their last semester who signed up. We
did so by stratifying on gender, major, and tuition above or below the median.3 Our
number of observations at baseline is 363 of which 178 (or 49.1 percent of) students
were in their last semester of college.
2.3.2 Tasks and incentives
Our online surveys contained of three types of questions: economic decision mak-
ing tasks, cognitive tests, social preferences, and questionnaires about socioeconomic
situation, consumption of durable goods, debt, stress, and salary expectations. In
addition, we ask last-semester students about job offer and paycheck dates.
We measure economic decision making in terms of risk aversion, time preferences,
ambiguity aversion, and inconsistencies in risk lotteries and time preference choices.
We elicit risk aversion using the Eckel and Grossman (2002) measure (see example
in Appendix 2.7.1). This method consists of presenting six different gambles varying
the expected return, the standard deviation, and the implied CRRA range. Subjects
are instructed to select one of the gambles to play. Each gamble has a 50 percent
probability of receiving a low payoff and 50 percent probability of receiving a high
payoff, except the first one in which both payoffs are the same. If this task is se-
lected for payment at the end of the survey, the gamble they choose will actually
be played. The expected payoff in gambles 1 to 5 increases linearly with risk. For
gambles 5 and 6, the expected payoff is the same but the risk is bigger in gamble 6
3The median tuition per semester in our sample is COP 600,000 which is equivalent to around
US$200.
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as reflected by the higher standard deviation. Risk-averse subjects are expected to
choose gambles with a lower standard deviation, while risk neutral subjects should
choose the gamble with higher expected return (gamble 5) and risk-seeking subjects
should choose gamble 6 (Charness, Gneezy, & Imas, 2013).
To analyze risk choices we use the risk lotteries from T. Tanaka et al. (2010).
This method is intended to capture Prospect Theory parameters through a series of
three lotteries which are much more complex than the Eckel and Grossman (2002)
measure.4 The lotteries consist of a given number of rows and two columns desig-
nated A and B. In each row, columns A and B contain two values each that represent
payoffs and their probabilities appear at the top of the table. For each row subjects
have to choose whether they prefer column A or B. They are explained that if this
task is randomly chosen for payment at the end of the survey, one of the rows will
be chosen at random, and the amount they will win will depend on the probability
stated at the top of the column. The lotteries are designed such that, a risk neutral
person will choose column A up to row 6 and column B starting in row 7 (see ap-
pendix 2.7.2). This is because the expected payoff of choosing column A is higher
for rows 1 to 6 and higher for column B in rows 7 to 14. Ideally, subjects will switch
columns only once but it has been found that if monotonic switching is not enforced,
subjects often switch multiple times especially in populations with low education
(T. Tanaka et al., 2010). Hence, most papers using this method only ask for the
row in which the subject would switch. Because we want to study inconsistencies in
choices, we do not enforce monotonic switching but rather ask for choices in every
row. We are interested in seeing whether making mistakes (switching back and forth
from Column A to Column B) changes across the three stages differentially for those
who will find jobs while we control for learning or understanding the task better with
the performance of the group of students in the comparison group.
Ambiguity aversion, the preference for known risks relative to unknown risks
(Ellsberg, 1961; Camerer & Weber, 1992), is another measure of economic deci-
sion making that we analyze. To implement this measure we use a task based on
4The lotteries elicit the three Prospect Theory parameters: risk aversion, loss aversion, and non-
linear probability weighting. Prospect Theory provides a different and more general characterization
of risk preferences than Expected Utility Theory.
70
Y. Tanaka et al. (2014) in which subjects must choose between a gamble whose out-
come objective probabilities are known relative to one in which they are unknown.
In practice, participants are presented with a series of comparisons as in appendix
2.7.3. In each of 9 choices, they see two urns filled with 24 blue and red balls and
are instructed that they will receive the monetary reward associated to the urn the
choose to play if a red ball is drawn from that urn. In urn A (left-hand side), there are
always 12 red and 12 blue balls completely visible to participants and the payment
in case of drawing a red ball from that urn is 20,000 pesos (about US$7) in each of
the 9 choices. Urn B (right-hand side) is partially covered so that it is impossible to
know the mix of red and blue balls, hence urn B is the ambiguous urn. The occluder
covers 1/4, 1/2 and 3/4 of the urn depending on the choice. In the first three choices,
the value of urn A and B is the same (20,000 pesos) but in subsequent choices, the
value of urn B increases to 30,000 (in choices 4-6) and to 40,000 pesos (in choices 7-9)
if a red ball is randomly selected. To analyze ambiguity aversion we create a variable
counting the number of times the students choose the ambiguous urn from a total of 9.
Time preferences is an important dimension of economic decision making that
we measure in this study by adapting the elicitation task presented in (Andreoni
& Sprenger, 2012). The idea of the task is that subjects are given a pre-specified
monetary amount and are required to allocate it between two dates: earlier and later
(see appendix 2.7.4). A difference between our implementation of the task relative
to (Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012) is that the allocations are not continuous but dis-
cretized to increase in 1,000 pesos (about 33 dollar cents) intervals. Participants
are instructed to allocate 50,000 pesos (about US$17) between two dates separated
between each other by 4 or 9 weeks. The earliest payment they could receive is one
week from the date they respond the survey because participants were responding the
surveys online and that made it impossible to pay them the same day they finished
it. The trade-offs they face are between weeks 1 and 5, 1 and 9, 5 and 9, and 5 and
13. For each of these trade-offs, they made 4 decisions with varying interest rates
if money is allocated to the later date (1, 10, 50, and 100 percent interest rates).
When they choose a value in the earlier date, the amount to be received in the later
date was automatically calculated in the “later” column including interest. In total,
in each round they made 16 choices allocating money to earlier and later dates. We
analyze the monetary values assigned to early dates in each of the four time compar-
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isons. The first decision we study is the number of non-monotonic decisions made by
a student. Non-monotonocity in this case refers to allocating an increasing amount
of money to an earlier period as the interest rate for the later period payout goes up.
We also examine the “impatience” of students by examining how many times out of
the 16 choices students allocate the entire 50,000 pesos to the sooner period. We
also study a measure of present-biasedness by examining at each of the four interest
rate levels, what the probability is of assigning a greater amount of money to week
1 vs. week 5 for a delay of 4 weeks and 8 weeks respectively. These probabilities are
then weighted proportional to the interest rates in order to derive a percentage of
“present-biasedness”.
In terms of cognition, the bandwidth theory proposed by Mullainathan, Shafir
and coauthors implies that scarcity (of time or resources) affects cognitive function-
ing which may compromise decision making (Shah et al., 2012; Mani et al., 2013;
Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013). To measure different dimensions of cognition we use
tasks such as a Raven’s matrices-type IQ test, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT),
the Flanker’s test, and the numerical Stroop test.
The IQ test is a version of the Raven’s test in which a pattern must be completed
by the participant by choosing one of the choices given. This test provides a non-
verbal measure of fluid intelligence which, as discussed in Mani et al. (2013), proxies
the capacity to solve problems without prior knowledge. There were 9 questions in to-
tal and a time limit of 3 minutes to solve them. The test is difficult enough that very
few people are able to correctly answer all questions in 3 minutes. Upon completion
of the 3 minutes, participants were automatically directed to the next task. The same
questions were given in Baseline 1 and after the job offer, and in Baseline 2 and after
their first paycheck so the participants did not see the questions in at least 5 months.
The Numerical Stroop Test requires the subject to enter the number of digits
displayed to them without getting distracted by the digit itself. For example if they
see “3 3” they must respond “2” which is the number of objects displayed and not
“3” which is the number that may come first to mind. This test has been used
by Mani et al. (2013) and Carvalho et al. (2016) as a measure of cognitive control
which is related to inhibitting innapropriate responses and selecting the appropri-
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ate information for processing. Because our surveys are taken online, our version of
the Numerical Stroop Task involves using the keyboard to select the correct number
of objects displayed out of 45 in total in 30 seconds. Participants receive 1,000 pe-
sos for each correct answer if this task is selected for payment at the end of the survey.
In the Flanker Test subjects see a sequence of five arrows pointing to the left or
to the right. They have to press the arrow in the keyboard that corresponds to the
direction that the middle arrow in the sequence is poining to. This test measures the
ability to ignore distracting information and supress inappropiriate responses. Again
they have 30 seconds to correctly respond as many questions as possible.
The last cognitive measure we study is the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). This
test measures the ability to supress incorrect intuitive and spontaneous answers to
give the reflective correct answer (Frederick, 2005). The test usually consists of 3
questions (see appendix 2.7.5) but we add three more from Sinayev and Peters (2015)
or change the wording of the original three questions so that it is harder for partici-
pants to recognize them from previous rounds.
Finally, for social preferences we use the dictator and ultimatum games. By intro-
ducing these games, we were interested in seeing whether altruistic behavior changes
across the different stages. In the dictator game, participants were told that they
will receive 20,000 pesos for sure. Then, they had to choose whether to give part of
their allocation to another randomly chosen student participating in the study. If
this task would be chosen for payment, the allocation chosen by the student would be
implemented. A second question of this game changes the recipient of the gift from
a randomly chosen student to a foundation that helps kids in need in Bogota. In
the ultimatum game, the setup is the same except that now the subject proposes an
allocation to the recipient student which can be rejected or accepted by the recipient.5
The order in which tasks appeared to participants was random although they
always came before the questionnaire about psychological and stress measures, ex-
5The response from the recipient in this game was actually not implemented because participants
were not responding the survey simultaneously. In practice, whatever amount the participant
donated was assigned to a randomly chosen student.
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penditures, salary expectations, and relevant dates of job offer and paycheck. No
feedback about performance after each survey was given to participants. At the end
of the survey, one of the tasks was selected for payment. The computer followed the
instructions that participants read in the instructions in order to select the amount
of the prize. In each survey excluding the recruitment survey, prizes ranged from the
equivalent of US$7 to US$57. The mean prize across all three rounds of surveys was
$30.
2.3.3 Summary statistics
As mentioned previously, at baseline, we expect that last-semester students do not
differ substantially from students who will not experience the changes along the tran-
sition to the labor market except in variables such as age and degree of independence.
Table 2.2 presents the means of variables collected at sign-up and the p-values of the
differences between the two groups. We see that last-semester students are older,
more likely to be employed at the time of the survey (during their last semester
of college), to have accumulated more experience from part- and full-time jobs and
internships, and less likely that their parents pay for most of their expenses. Impor-
tantly, they do not differ from comparison group students across other demographic
or academic characteristics.
To construct our difference-in-differences, we collected information from students
over a total three rounds. From the two surveys in the baseline period (round 1),
we are able to establish parallel trends for most of our outcome variables. In the
section showing the difference-in-differences results we include the two rounds of data
collection to check for parellel trends. We only see one variable (inconsistencies in
risk aversion) to have an interaction coefficient in the diff-in-diff regression in the
baseline periods that is statistically significant. Hence, given that virtually all vari-
ables exhibit parallel trends in the period before the changes associated with the
transition to the labor market take place, the difference-in-differences analysis is a
valid method to analyze our data.
Round 2 and Round 3 were timed in such a way as to capture as many students
as possible who met the criteria for these rounds, namely to have received a job offer
74
Table 2.2: Differences in baseline characteristics
Variable Comparison Last-sem.students Obs
p-value
difference
Poor (tuition<median) 0.54 0.59 363 0.29
Female 0.26 0.25 363 0.79
Age 22.98 25.07 352 0.00
Tuition 6.71 6.26 363 0.42
Undergraduate 0.87 0.88 363 0.73
Semester 6.20 10.42 355 0.00
GPA 3.80 3.81 356 0.70
Poor (SISBEN=1,2,3) 0.36 0.38 363 0.70
Residential stratum 2.85 2.93 362 0.34
Employed 0.43 0.65 363 0.00
Expected first salary (pesos) 2,046,757 1,957,584 363 0.33
Expected salary in 5 years (pesos) 4,508,649 4,819,663 363 0.19
No. semesters working full time 0.32 0.52 363 0.07
No. semesters working part time 1.97 2.84 363 0.00
No. semesters internship 0.09 0.53 363 0.00
How hard to find job after graduation 2.83 2.57 363 0.01
Parents in different hh 0.05 0.07 363 0.33
Parents pay most expenses 0.72 0.57 363 0.00
by Round 2, and to have started working by Round 3. However, there is no uniform
way in which all students get jobs at the same time, and so while a majority of the
last-semester students fulfilled the criteria, not all of them did. In order to interpret
our results using a difference-in-differences strategy in which to compare their Round
2 or Round 3 behavior to baseline, we made various modifications to the observations
in Round 2 and Round 3.
By Round 2, all of the last-semester students had job offers, but some of them
had also started working. This increases the probability that they had already been
paid, and therefore, if we wanted to quantify the effect of resolving their uncertainty
with a job offer, before they had been paid, the students who had already started
working may bias the results. For instance, we had 142 last-semester students in
Round 2 originally and they all reported having received a job offer. Out of these,
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46 students report having started working and thefore, get transferred to Round 3.
Then in Round 3, we check if every student reports having received at least one
paycheck, if they have not yet received one, they are moved from Round 3 to Round
2 - in this case, 12 students from Round 3 were moved to Round 2. Therefore, the
students who remained in Round 2 were those who explicitly reported having a job
offer and not working, or working and not having received a paycheck. The students
who remained in Round 3 were those who reported at least one paycheck in the
previous few months. By making this adjustment, we can now interpret the effect of
Round 2 as being the effect of having a job, and therefore having one’s uncertainty
about the job being resolved. The effect of Round 3 would be capturing the easing
of the liquidity constraint because these students would now be paid a salary, among
other changes associated with starting a new job. Further details of the effect of
these adjustments can be found in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Adjustments reflecting after offer and after paycheck stages
No. of
Students Original Observations Observations after Adjustment
Round 1
Round 2 Round 3
Round 1








Total 365 363 304 285 365 363 258 273
Last
semester 179 178 142 128 179 178 96 116
Job offer - - 142 - - - 96 -
Working - - - 128 - - - 116
2.3.4 Attrition
Any longitudinal study involves some degree of attrition. In this section we assess
the extent of attrition across different rounds and whether it can be predicted from
baseline covariates, baseline outcomes, or the stability in the outcomes measured
at two points in the baseline. If attrition happened differentially for students with
certain characteristics, some of our results in the next section could be driven by
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selection into staying in the sample.
For the baseline, surveys 1 and 2, we collected data from 363 participants. The
aggregate attrition rate after receiving a job offer is 16.7 percent and after receiving
the first paycheck, it is 21.5 percent. Effective attrition, after making the adjustments
in the definition of stages discussed in the previous section, is 28.9 percent for the
after offer period (Round 2) and 24.8 percent for the after paycheck period (Round
3). We consider these rates to be exceptionally low among longitudinal studies. For
the econometric analyses we use the sample that contains students who answered all
surveys. In total, 64 percent of the students we observe at baseline responded to all
surveys in the study.
As expected, attrition is higher among last-semester students who eventally grad-
uate and find jobs (regression results not shown). Besides being correlated with this
characteristic, students who stay in the sample are more likely to be undergraduates
although the statistical significance of this variable dissapears when adjusting for
multiple inference testing. The only other variable that is correlated with attrition
is whether the student receives a salary at baseline. However, the coefficient of this
variable is 0.000 so there seems to be no bias. Except for being a last-semester stu-
dent, there is no indication that attrition is related to other baseline covariates.
Because comparison group students are more likely to respond to all surveys, we
examine whether outcomes measured at baseline, and the stability of those outcomes,
are related to staying in the sample for the comparison and last-semester students
separately. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the attrition test results. The dependent variable
in the two tables is an indicator equal to one if the student responds all surveys. We
regress that indicator on each of the variables in the rows. Given the large num-
ber of regressors, we split these regressions in two tables. Table 2.4 shows the risk,
time and social preferences outcomes at baseline. Similarly, table 2.5 shows cognitive
tests, perceptions on personal finances and emotion measures. The six columns of
results correspond to one of three samples (all, comparison group, and last-semester
students) and two types of dependent variables. The first three columns look at the
baseline outcomes in levels. Columns 4 to 6 look at the changes in the outcomes from
baseline 1 to baseline 2, thus giving a measure of stability at baseline. For statisti-
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cal significance, we report the usual tests without adjusting for multiple hypothesis
testing (stars) and the tests adjusting for the Benjamini-Hochberg method within
column (daggers).
Column 1 of Table 2.4 shows that students who remain in the sample are more
likely to make non-monotonic switches in the risk lottery and less likely to be present-
biased that students who leave the sample. Only the result for the significant cor-
relation in inconsistencies in risk choices survives the multiple testing adjustment.
Moreover, it is clear that this significant relationship is driven by last-semester stu-
dents as can be seen in column 3. In Table 2.5 we do not see any significant differences
between those who stay and those who attrit in the baseline outcomes measured in
levels (Columns 1 to 3).
We also look at correlation between stability of the baseline outcomes and attri-
tion in columns 4 to 6 of Tables 2.4 and 2.5. In this case, the variables in the rows
are defined as the change in level from baseline 1 to baseline 2. Notice that this
analysis could not have been be performed by other studies dealing with stability
because they do not have two measurements for the full sample like we do.
We see in column 4 of Table 2.4 that even though stability of present-biasedness
is negatively related with who stays in the sample, it does not pass the multiple
hypothesis test.6 The same is true for the change in the IQ test performance and the
change in the variable enjoying myself. Column 5 shows the relationships between
attrition and stability for comparison group students. We report that larger instabil-
ity in the fraction of the endowment donated to a foundation in the dictator game is
associated with being less likely to stay in the sample (significant after adjusting for
multiple testing). Besides this variable, we do not see large correlations between stay-
ers and stability of outcomes at baseline other than what we already saw in column 4.
There are more regressors related to who stays in the sample in the case of last-
semester students (column 6). Even though they do not pass the strict multiple
6Each of the regressions shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 include 26 regressors whose point estimates
are split in the two tables for ease of display. The multipe hypothesis tests are performed within
regression in which case 26 hypotheses are tested simultaneously.
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Table 2.4: Tests for sample attrition (Part 1)
Levels in Baseline 2 Change from Baseline 1 to 2
All Comparison Last-sem.Students All Comparison
Last-sem.
Students
Risk averse 0.095 0.049 -0.005 0.006 -0.042 -0.242**
(0.086) (0.094) (0.131) (0.075) (0.088) (0.110)
CRRA -0.033 -0.021 -0.020 -0.015 -0.028 0.007
(0.024) (0.026) (0.038) (0.020) (0.021) (0.030)
Inconsistent risk 0.205***††† -0.001 0.388***†† 0.017 -0.069 0.092
lottery (0.065) (0.085) (0.109) (0.066) (0.059) (0.103)
Ambiguity averse 0.030 0.075 0.033 -0.031 0.023 -0.023
(0.052) (0.057) (0.087) (0.051) (0.052) (0.081)
Present biased -0.002** -0.002 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Impatient -0.003 -0.002 0.006 -0.005 -0.011 0.003
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012)
Non-monotonic 0.022** 0.008 0.026 0.014 0.001 0.005
choices (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013)
Fraction to student -0.027 0.049 0.131 -0.056 0.186 -0.077
- dictator (0.134) (0.158) (0.181) (0.142) (0.201) (0.204)
Fraction to foundation -0.110 -0.128 -0.192 -0.097 -0.422***†† 0.159
- dictator (0.097) (0.120) (0.136) (0.129) (0.137) (0.173)
Fraction to student 0.090 0.157 -0.046 0.144 0.359 -0.052
- ultimatum (0.175) (0.253) (0.235) (0.169) (0.247) (0.242)
Constant 0.651***†† 0.812*** 0.533 0.583***†† 0.827***†† 0.306***††
(0.198) (0.251) (0.337) (0.047) (0.062) (0.071)
N 352 178 171 317 157 157
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple testing: ††† p<0.01, †† p<0.05, † p<0.1
hypothesis test, it seems that last-semester students with larger changes in risk aver-
sion, and enjoying myself are more likely to stay in the sample. Similarly, larger
changes in IQ tests performance and happiness are positively associated with stay-
ing in the sample. To have an idea of when these variables would be significant, they
would pass the multiple hypothesis test if we were testing 6 hypothesis only.
Overall, we find that last-semester students are more likely to attrit. Students
who remain in the sample are more likely to make inconsistent choices in the risk
lottery and, to some extent, to be less present biased. Analyzing changes in the
outcomes across the two baselines brings up more significant relationships between
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Table 2.5: Tests for sample attrition (Part 2)
Levels in Baseline 2 Change from Baseline 1 to 2
All Comparison Last-sem.Students All Comparison
Last-sem.
Students
IQ test (Raven’s) 0.012 0.001 0.026 0.035*** 0.020 0.052**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021)
CRT test 0.008 -0.024 -0.017 -0.023 -0.005 0.008
(0.041) (0.045) (0.059) (0.031) (0.034) (0.053)
Stroop test -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.011**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Flanker test -0.003 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 -0.000 -0.008**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Hard to come up -0.008 -0.018 -0.117 0.022 -0.039 0.025
with money (0.056) (0.066) (0.085) (0.065) (0.069) (0.108)
Hard to cover -0.020 0.064 0.027 -0.040 0.089 -0.097
expenses (0.074) (0.085) (0.108) (0.064) (0.072) (0.103)
Insatisfied HH -0.026 0.002 0.001 -0.035 0.040 -0.050
finances (0.066) (0.068) (0.097) (0.058) (0.059) (0.089)
Stressed personal -0.033 0.047 -0.071 0.025 0.002 -0.035
finances (0.064) (0.079) (0.095) (0.059) (0.049) (0.090)
Inconsistent in the -0.031 -0.031 -0.048 -0.007 -0.039 -0.089
value of money (0.055) (0.065) (0.096) (0.060) (0.066) (0.102)
Happy 0.117* 0.087 0.131 0.094 0.042 0.229***
(0.071) (0.092) (0.101) (0.058) (0.067) (0.086)
Frustrated 0.028 -0.054 0.035 0.017 -0.023 0.089
(0.070) (0.073) (0.133) (0.054) (0.057) (0.085)
Depressed -0.032 -0.063 0.015 -0.041 -0.110* -0.044
(0.074) (0.082) (0.144) (0.057) (0.058) (0.097)
Worried 0.005 -0.039 -0.021 -0.011 0.023 -0.086
(0.061) (0.071) (0.088) (0.050) (0.055) (0.075)
Enjoying myself -0.109* -0.022 -0.215** -0.126** -0.013 -0.182**
(0.066) (0.084) (0.089) (0.052) (0.068) (0.076)
Tired 0.017 -0.001 -0.013 -0.029 0.024 -0.071
(0.058) (0.066) (0.084) (0.050) (0.052) (0.074)
Constant 0.651***†† 0.812***†† 0.533 0.583***†† 0.827***†† 0.306***††
(0.198) (0.251) (0.337) (0.047) (0.062) (0.071)
N 352 178 171 317 157 157
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple testing: ††† p<0.01, †† p<0.05, † p<0.1
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staying in the sample and baseline outcomes in particular for the group of last-
semester students. A joint test of the hypothesis that the outcomes in changes
predict who stays in the sample is significant at the 5 percent level in the case of
last-semester students but not for comparison group students.
2.4 Difference-in-Differences Results
In order to examine whether the economic and social preferences, cognitive per-
formance and survey responses of these students change along the transition from
college to the labor market, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) strategy.
The two main periods of interest are Round 2, when last-semester students receive
a job offer, and Round 3, when they finally start working and receive at least one
paycheck. An important contribution of this paper is to separate these two periods in
order to understand whether there are any changes in behavior along the transtition
and whether the changes in decision making accompany a mere resolution of uncer-
tainty after getting a job offer or whether there needs to be a real increase in their
incomes. In order to tease out these various changes, we run the following regression
specification:
yit = α1Baseline 1+α2Baseline 2+α3After offer+α4After paycheck+β1Baseline 1×Last sem.
+ β2Baseline 2× Last sem. + β3After offer× Last sem. + β4After paycheck× Last sem.
(2.1)
In the above specification, the dependent variables include risk-aversion, time
preferences, social preferences, cognitive performance, personal finances and emo-
tions. We collect four measurements of these variables so the index t goes from 1 to
4. On the right hand side, the first four independent variables represent the indica-
tor variables for the 4 periods under study here: the two baseline rounds, after offer
and after paycheck as described above. The last four terms represent the interaction
terms between the last-semester dummy, in this case a dummy for whether a stu-
dent is in his or her final semester, and these four periods. Note that this regression
specification does not include a constant and therefore the first four coefficients (α1,
α2, α3, α4) may be interpreted as the average values of the outcomes in each of the
rounds for lower year students (the comparison group). The coefficients β1, β2, β3
and β4 similarly represent the differential effect of being a last-semester student. The
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average value of an outcome for a last semester student in the after offer stage, for
instance, may then be interpreted as (α3 + β3). The standard errors are clustered at
individual level.
Our main hypothesis was that even though these students attend one of the most
pretigious universities in Colombia, they still have considerable uncertainty about
when and where they will get their jobs. This uncertainty may be enough to affect
their decision making behavior, in addition to when they receive their first paycheck
and resolve a potential liquidity constraint.
We measure risk aversion using the Eckel and Grossman (2002) task. Extreme
risk aversion is defined as an indicator variable for when the student picks the first
three gambles. The ambiguity aversion variable counts the number of times the
ambiguous urn is chosen out of nine possible choices between the visible and the am-
biguous urn. For details on the tasks ot the definition of the variables see Section 2.3.
Table 2.6 demonstrates that when uncertainty regarding the labor market is re-
solved and students who previously were in their final semester receive a job offer,
there is a decrease in extreme risk-aversion (first column) among all students, but
significantly more so for students who receive a job offer. Therefore students who
have their job uncertainty resolved appear to have a higher propensity to pick riskier
gambles than lower year students by about 12.2 percentage points. It is worth point-
ing out that the majority of students were risk averse at baseline with about 70
percent of students choosing one of the three least risky gambles to play. There is a
significant reduction in risk aversion among all students by job offer stage in which
the proportion of risk-averse subjects is reduced to about 50 percent and 38 percent
among comparison group and last-semester students, respectively.
However, in column 2, we run the same regression but with controls for psycholog-
ical measures, specifically: self-reported measures of how tired, frustrated, worried,
depressed and happy the students were, and how much enjoyment they took in life.
With the controls in place, the after-offer result for last-semester students being
differentially less risk averse than their counterparts in lower years vanishes. Ad-
ditionally, extreme risk aversion falls by a far greater magnitude from baseline to
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Table 2.6: DID results: Risk and ambiguity preferences















Baseline 1 * Comparison 0.696*** 0.778*** 3.793*** 3.533***
(0.0341) (0.0674) (0.142) (0.310)
Baseline 2 * Comparison 0.707*** 0.846*** 3.740*** 3.438***
(0.0337) (0.0674) (0.150) (0.307)
After offer * Comparison 0.500*** 0.201*** 4.226*** 3.704***
(0.0370) (0.0528) (0.152) (0.323)
After paycheck *
Comparison
0.424*** 0.261*** 4.377*** 4.552***
(0.0366) (0.0579) (0.154) (0.414)
Baseline 1 * Last sem. -0.0103 -0.0143 0.138 0.181
(0.0488) (0.0489) (0.203) (0.202)
Baseline 2 * Last sem. -0.0548 -0.0690 0.0516 0.0236
(0.0492) (0.0492) (0.226) (0.225)
After offer * Last sem. -0.122**† -0.0287 -0.0634 -0.00240
(0.0545) (0.0552) (0.264) (0.269)
After paycheck * Last sem. 0.0457 0.0155 -0.147 -0.168
(0.0593) (0.0624) (0.247) (0.249)
Observations 1,355 1,355 1,232 1,232
R-squared 0.600 0.626 0.801 0.807
Emotion controls NO YES NO YES
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple Inference: † † † pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
the after offer stage and the after paycheck stage for all students, ranging from 78
percent in the first baseline to 26 percent after receiving a paycheck. This underlines
the importance of sujective measures of wellbeing and emotions in economic decision
making. Therefore controlling for such measures is crucial to understanding how
economic decision making changes over time, and not including them gives rise to
the risk of errors in measuring trends in such decisions.
The ambiguity aversion results show that at baseline students chose the ambigu-
83
ous urn very few times (less than 4 times on average) independent of their last-
semester or comparison group status. These preferences remain remarkably stable
over time, with there being a slight trend towards less ambiguity aversion with every
period. We observe no differential impact of being a last-semester student in any
period. Controlling for emotional measurements does not change these results.
Because we are analyzing multiple outcomes simultaneously, we conduct a mul-
tiple inference test to study the effects of the resolution of job uncertainty, and of
receiving a paycheck on the risk and ambiguity outcomes jointly (separately for each
regression specification), following the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to determine
the false discovery rates. This procedure recalculates the p-values of coefficients of
interest, and the new significance levels are denoted by the † symbol. We find that
the risk aversion result in column 1 holds up to this multiple inference test at 10%
significant level. However, in column 2, with the emotion controls, we do not find
any differential effect of receiving a job offer on the last-semester students. We may
conclude that these self-reported emotional measurements do affect experimentally-
elicited risk decisions. We also examine inconsistencies in risk choice, calculated by
counting the number of times subjects switch between option A and B (see descrip-
tion in Section 2.3). However, we do not consider these results because we do not
observe parallel trends in the baseline measures and attritions seems to be correlated
with this variable, and therefore cannot make conclusions about subsequent results
(Table 2.16 in the Appendix).
In terms of time preferences, we look at three main measures calculated from a
task following a similar format to Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). In this task, we
ask subjects to allocate money (50,000 pesos or $17) between two periods. These
include between week 1 and 5, week 1 and 9, week 5 and 9 and week 5 and 13. If
they allocate money to the later date, they receive interest of 1%, 10%, 50% and
100% for each of the above four intertemporal decisions, totalling 16 intertemporal
choices to be made in each round.
From Table 2.7, out of a possible 12 non-monotonic decisions, on average, at the
first baseline students just make 2.26 of these inconsistent decisions and there is no
differential effect of being a last-semester student. In the second baseline round,
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Table 2.7: DID results: Time preferences































Baseline 1 * Comparison 2.258*** 2.577*** 2.577*** 2.188*** 30.07*** 36.91***
(0.239) (0.528) (0.247) (0.522) (2.889) (6.150)
Baseline 2 * Comparison 2.088*** 2.069*** 3.434*** 3.617*** 28.81*** 32.38***
(0.241) (0.457) (0.281) (0.596) (2.688) (5.558)
After offer * Comparison 1.515*** 1.659*** 4.571*** 4.748*** 34.18*** 33.07***
(0.225) (0.482) (0.315) (0.698) (3.074) (6.611)
After paycheck *
Comparison
1.344*** 1.216*** 4.487*** 6.284*** 29.10*** 41.48***
(0.224) (0.405) (0.330) (0.732) (3.061) (7.253)
Baseline 1 * Last sem. 0.0468 0.0320 0.254 0.272 -1.274 -1.820
(0.359) (0.368) (0.356) (0.359) (4.064) (4.110)
Baseline 2 * Last sem. -0.622* -0.678** 0.623 0.516 0.502 -0.0710
(0.317) (0.319) (0.410) (0.413) (3.805) (3.779)
After offer * Last sem. -0.452 -0.518 -0.549 -0.560 -10.07**† -12.38**†
(0.328) (0.363) (0.509) (0.514) (4.610) (4.787)
After paycheck * Last sem. -0.414 -0.478 0.320 0.249 5.229 3.994
(0.302) (0.325) (0.495) (0.493) (4.806) (4.774)
Observations 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243
R-squared 0.264 0.272 0.508 0.520 0.480 0.492
Emotion controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple Inference: ††† pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
however, there appears to be a differential effect on making non-monotonic choices
for last-semester students, violating the parallel trends assumption (at the 10 percent
level) in this case.
Our measure of “impatience”, which counts the number of times a student allo-
cates the full endowment to the earlier period does not demonstrate any additional
effect for last-semester students, On average, all students appear to become slightly
more impatient over time, with them making around 2.6 “impatient” choices in the
first baseline and going up to almost 5 out of 16 by Round 3 (when last-semester stu-
dents receive their first paycheck). On controlling for emotional measurement, this
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range widens, but once again, there is no additional effect of being a last-semester
student. Finally, we also examine a measure of present-biasedness, where we enu-
merate the instances where a subject allocated a greater amount to the sooner period
when the sooner period was a week from now versus 5 weeks from now for the same
delay length until the later period, i.e., week 1 vs. week 5 and week 5 vs. week 9.
This is then weighted by the interest rate for the later period payoff in each row
of the price list to end up with a percentage of present bias. Here, we find that
last-semester students are differentially less present biased that their counterparts
after receiving a job offer in Round 2, by about 10 percentage points. In fact, this
result becomes even stronger when controlling for emotional measurements, with the
gap widening to 12 percentage points. This demonstrates that time preferences may
be less swayed by these emotions compared to risk decisions. A multiple inference
test following the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure combining all three time prefer-
ence measures reiterates that for present-biasedness, there is a definite effect from
resolving job uncertainty for last-semester students. To contextualize this result,
Carvalho et al. (2016) find that before payday, poor individuals in the US are more
present biased when making choices about monetary rewards. We observe the oppo-
site behavior when individuals have not received income yet but face less uncertainty
regarding their future income and outcome of their college education investment.
We do find significant effects of receiving a job offer on the self-reported finan-
cial health of last-semester students. In Table 2.8 we show the result of regressions
on outcomes such as whether it is hard to come up with money for an emergency,
whether it is hard to cover next week’s expenses with the money they have today
and whether they are stressed about personal finances. In the first two cases, re-
ceiving a job offer has a significant and positive effect for last-semester students. To
elaborate, they report finding it hard to come up with money or it being hard to
cover expenses less frequently than the baseline, and when compared to students in
lower years. Therefore, in terms of perception of own wealth, there appears to be a
clearly positive effect of merely receiving a job offer, without having yet been paid.
There is no significant differential effect for last-semester students after receivng a
paycheck, which is telling of the immense effect that the resolution of uncertainty
alone has on perception of one’s coping ability.
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Table 2.8: DID results: Financial status





















Baseline 1 * Comparison 0.592*** 0.602*** 0.234*** 0.184*** 0.391*** 0.371***
(0.0364) (0.0771) (0.0313) (0.0632) (0.0361) (0.0753)
Baseline 2 * Comparison 0.663*** 0.568*** 0.196*** 0.257*** 0.326*** 0.236***
(0.0350) (0.0745) (0.0294) (0.0616) (0.0347) (0.0676)
After offer * Comparison 0.571*** 0.253*** 0.245*** 0.0984** 0.337*** 0.107**
(0.0366) (0.0464) (0.0318) (0.0385) (0.0350) (0.0444)
After paycheck *
Comparison
0.543*** 0.312*** 0.212*** 0.209*** 0.337*** 0.159***
(0.0369) (0.0566) (0.0302) (0.0484) (0.0350) (0.0480)
Baseline 1 * Last sem. -0.0531 -0.0469 -0.0539 -0.0476 0.0357 0.0429
(0.0522) (0.0516) (0.0426) (0.0412) (0.0519) (0.0505)
Baseline 2 * Last sem. -0.124** -0.0993* 0.00660 0.0164 0.0672 0.0905*
(0.0513) (0.0516) (0.0421) (0.0414) (0.0505) (0.0495)
After offer * Last sem. -0.253***††† -0.139***†† -0.103**†† -0.0355 -0.0599 0.0399
(0.0531) (0.0511) (0.0429) (0.0444) (0.0509) (0.0492)
After paycheck * Last sem. -0.0913 -0.155***†† -0.0120 -0.0263 0.0804 0.0167
(0.0594) (0.0589) (0.0481) (0.0503) (0.0579) (0.0564)
Observations 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355
R-squared 0.553 0.595 0.207 0.275 0.368 0.438
Emotion controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple Inference: † † † pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
The results for the self-reported measure on it being hard to come up with money
in an emergency holds up to the regression specification with the emotional controls
- i.e. last-semester students less frequently report this in Round 2 after receiving a
job offer. Indeed, after controlling for these emotions, there is an additional effect
for last-semester students after receiving their paycheck as well. What is important
to note with this specification however, is that all students, on average, report it
being less hard to come up with money in an emergency over the 4 rounds, but we
do observe differential effects for last-semester students. This, once again, underlines
that controlling for such emotions when studying perceptions of financial status are
important because they can affect not only economic decision making measures but
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subjective assessment of financial health.
Once again, on running a multiple inference test for these three financial health
measures, the differential effect for last-semester students after their job offer persists
at 1 and 5 percent significance levels in their perception of it being hard to come
up with money in an emergency and it being hard to cover expenses (only for the
regression specification without emotional measurement controls) respectively. The
significant and different effect at after paycheck stage from column 2 also persists
after the multiple inference test.
One reason that last-semester students and comparison students do not differ
in their reporting of how hard it is to cover expenses, despite last-semester stu-
dents perceiving it being less hard to come up with money in an emergency, may be
due to their increased expenditures after receiving a job offer. Table 2.9 backs up
the above pattern by demonstrating that the fraction of these job market students’
monthly income spent on rent, groceries and savings goes up significantly in Round
2 when last semester students receive a job offer. Particularly their expenditures on
groceries and savings remain differentially higher than lower year students in both
regression specifications (with and without emotion controls.) In fact, after calcu-
lating the false discovery rates for the multiple inference test of how Round 2 affects
these three expenditures, the results for groceries and savings remain highly signif-
icant. What is interesting here is that before having been paid in their jobs, these
students already scaled up their expenditures in anticipation of receiving a paycheck.
There is also a differential but smaller effect of receiving a paycheck on last-
semester students with their shares of expenditures on rent, groceries and savings
being higher in Round 3 after paycheck - but this is more expected given their rise
in income.
The controls that we include in our second regression specification quite often
strongly affect our results regarding last-semester students, particularly in the case
of risk aversion. There are some important patterns within these emotion measures
as well. Last-semester students who receive a job offer report being differentially less
tired, worried, depressed and frustrated (Figure 2.1). Further results are presented
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Table 2.9: DID results: Spending behavior



























Baseline 2 * Comparison 9.388*** 13.09*** 6.546*** 8.487*** 12.84*** 10.13***
(1.334) (2.968) (0.733) (1.713) (1.228) (2.403)
After offer * Comparison 11*** 18.70*** 7.856*** 8.916*** 11.34*** 8.049***
(1.568) (3.848) (0.879) (1.712) (1.143) (2.826)
After paycheck *
Comparison
10.46*** 9.254*** 8.168*** 10.18*** 12.14*** 14.21***
(1.545) (3.292) (0.835) (1.981) (1.147) (2.958)
Baseline 2 * Last sem. 3.324 2.602 2.928** 2.687** 1.322 1.469
(2.049) (2.023) (1.133) (1.152) (1.884) (1.879)
After offer * Last sem. 4.234*† 3.083 3.059**†† 2.715**† 6.014***†† 5.728**††
(2.495) (2.518) (1.378) (1.377) (2.195) (2.256)
After paycheck * Last sem. 4.594*† 4.474* 2.650**† 2.606** 3.030 3.552*†
(2.414) (2.497) (1.230) (1.259) (1.926) (1.880)
Observations 884 884 884 884 884 884
R-squared 0.280 0.296 0.412 0.422 0.405 0.431
Emotion controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple Inference: † † † pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
in Appendix table 2.18. What is clear is that while last-semester students report
being less worried or tired in Round 2 after resultion of job uncertainty, by Round
3 after receiving a paycheck, these effects disappear, that is there is not difference
in psychological measures between last-semester and comparison. Part of this may
be related to the additional responsibilities they have to take care of, given their
additional expenditures after resolving job uncertainty in Round 2 and after being
paid in Round 3 (Table 2.9).
Corroborating the above pattern of reports of being less tired, depressed and
worred dissipating by Round 3, we have further evidence that in Round 3, after re-
ceiving their paycheck there are increased responsibilities. We study changes in cog-
nitive performance by looking at how students perform in tasks such as the Raven’s
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Baseline 1 Baseline 2 Job offer Paycheck
Depression
Comparison students Last-semester students
Matrices and a Cognitive Reflection Test - CRT (Table 2.10); Flanker test and a
Stroop test (Table 2.19 in the Appendix). These increased responsibilities may be
contributing to an increasing cognitive load and we find that in after receiving a pay-
check, last-semester students perform differentially worse than lower year students
in the cognitive reflection tasks as well the Raven’s Matrices. In fact, these results
hold up even in the multiple inference test where we examine the hypothesis that
receiving a paycheck significantly affects the four cognitive tasks jointly.
Specifically, the performance of the lower year students stays approximately sta-
ble across time in the cognitive reflections tasks. Their performance in the Raven’s
Matrices task does improve over time and this may be attributable to learning effects.
They respond 3.5 questions (column 4 in Table 2.10) correct on average at baseline,
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and lower year students improve their score by almost 3, while last-semester students
lag slightly behind at a score of 6 in after receiving a paycheck. This is consistent
with the additional responsibilities and changes associated with starting a new job.
It is possible that these changes impose a cognitive load on last-semester students
and impairs their performance in these cognitive tasks.
Table 2.10: DID results: Cognitive performance









Baseline 1 * Comparison 1.142*** 1.130*** 4.038*** 3.503***
(0.0612) (0.135) (0.118) (0.254)
Baseline 2 * Comparison 1.317*** 1.256*** 6.408*** 6.050***
(0.0548) (0.115) (0.110) (0.242)
After offer * Comparison 1.188*** 1.273*** 5.154*** 5.020***
(0.0577) (0.134) (0.137) (0.340)
After paycheck * Comparison 1.445*** 1.324*** 6.538*** 6.447***
(0.0595) (0.134) (0.116) (0.265)
Baseline 1 * Last sem. -0.119 -0.106 0.0919 0.117
(0.0856) (0.0863) (0.171) (0.174)
Baseline 2 * Last sem. 0.0107 0.0139 -0.00988 0.00265
(0.0791) (0.0805) (0.154) (0.156)
After offer * Last sem. -0.0811 -0.0900 0.140 0.145
(0.0991) (0.101) (0.229) (0.237)
After paycheck * Last sem. -0.210**†† -0.218**†† -0.512***†† -0.515***††
(0.0937) (0.0947) (0.190) (0.188)
Observations 1,243 1,243 1,249 1,249
R-squared 0.722 0.725 0.925 0.926
Emotion controls NO YES NO YES
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple Inference: † † † pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
Another hypothesis we started out with was that at Round 2 and Round 3, when
job uncertainty is resolved and students start working at their first jobs, in dictator
and ultimatum games, they may allocate more to others. From figure 2.2, we find
that their generosity towards other individuals and charity foundation after job un-
certainty is resolved is indeed higher compared to lower year students. Furthermore,
we find that this differential pattern persists even after controlling for emotions in
the case of allocating money to another student in a dictator game and allocating
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Baseline 1 Baseline 2 Job offer Paycheck
Fraction to student - ultimatum
Comparison students Last-semester students
money to another student in an ultimatum game (columns 2 and 6 in table 2.17
in the Appendix). On average, students allocate a far higher share to a foundation
than a student in a dictator game, donating almost 61 percent of their endowment
to a foundation versus 30 percent to a student in a dictator game (specification
with emotion controls). What is puzzling under this specification is that both lower
year and last-semester students scale up their donations to other parties in all three
games. This is at odds with previous findings by Matthey and Regner (2013) that
individuals who have participated in more experiments donate less money. One can
hypothesize why last-semester students may donate more after receiving a job offer,
but it is unclear why comparison students would also scale up at Round 2 (after
last semester students receive a job offer) (columns 2, 4 and 6 in table 2.17 in the
Appendix).
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These results help us conclude that this life transition from college to working
life is quite crucial in the way it affects the choices and decisions made by these
subjects. An important takeaway from this analysis is the role played by emotions
such as worry and tiredness in making economic decisions such as risk choices. What
is interesting is that the resolution of job uncertainty alone is sufficient enough to
affect time and social preferences. Their spending behavior also changes significantly
in response to an expected wealth increase. Given that they are at a top university,
and there is a reasonable guarantee of getting a good job, these large effects are
important and provide an avenue for further research.
2.5 Stability of preferences and cognitive measures
Time and risk preferences are thought to be persistent over time for the same indi-
vidual and incorporated as parameters in economic models. The literature studying
stability spans several disciplines and the results tend to point towards stability of
risk, time and social preferences as measured by the correlation coefficient of the
preference measure in two different time periods. There is less evidence showing that
preferences are affected by individual shocks such as changes in health or income. A
recent survey of this literature can be found in Chuang and Schechter (2015).
Tests for stability of preferences are conducted by measuring the same underlying
preference with the same task or question at different points in time or using different
elicitation methods that attempt to capture the same preference at one point in time.
Hence, preferences are not observed directly and may be a combination of the true
underlying preference, the particular environment faced by the respondent, includ-
ing macroeconomic or idiosyncratic shocks, and measurement error derived mainly
from lack of understanding of the task. Given the longitudinal nature of our data,
we focus on testing stability using the same experimental tasks across the relevant
stages for our study. In particular, we are interested on whether stability changes
along the transition from college to the labor market.
Because we collect a rich set of cognitive measures and survey questions regard-
ing self-reported financial situation, we also analyze whether these measures change
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over time. We expect preferences, cognitive measures and survey questions to be
relatively stable when comparing the two baseline periods. One factor that may con-
tribute to stability is that the two baseline surveys were conducted only two weeks
apart. On the other hand, better understanding of the tasks in the second baseline
can contribute to lower stability if responses change relative to the first baseline due
to learning effects. We expect that the later measurements, taken to coincide with
the after offer and after paycheck periods for students who transition to the labor
market, exhibit less stability when compared to the baseline if more learning takes
place or if the responses students give are related to the changes they are experienc-
ing.
In what follows, we report correlation coefficients that measure how persistent
an outcome measure from a previous period is in a future period, as is standard
in the stability of preferences literature. The standard test of stability consists of
finding whether the correlation between the same outcome measured in two different
periods is statistically different from zero. A test of whether the correlation is not
statistically different from one is also possible but achieving perfect correlation is
unlikely because there is usually measurement error in how individuals make choices
in experimental tasks.7 Given that the majority of the evidence points to stability
of preferences and to low response of preference measures to individual shocks, we
expect to find that correlations are significantly different from zero in line with the
findings in the literature but that the farther apart the periods compared, the lower
the correlation will be.
In the tables below, each column specifies which two periods are being compared
in bold. For each comparison, two correlations are reported: The correlation co-
efficient is shown on the left-hand side, and the point estimate from a regression
of the first variable in the column title on the second, on the right-hand side. All
regressions control for whether the student is in the comparison group, their gen-
7Meier and Sprenger (2015) ask the question of what is a high enough correlation to conclude
that time preferences are stable. They perform a simulation analysis including aggregate estimates
of the key parameters of their model (present bias, discount rate and stochastic decision error) to
obtain this persistence measure. They conclude that their simulated correlation of 0.452 is close to
the observed correlation of 0.464 which suggests that stability of time preferences does not imply
that the correlation has to be near 1. In fact, most studies in this literature find correlations in risk
and time preferences that are below 0.5 (see literature review in Cuang and Schechter (2015).
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der, poverty status as measured by the tuition they paid at baseline, and age. For
the correlation coefficient, the standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping, and
an adjustment for multiple testing is performed for both, correlation coefficient and
regression estimates (see table notes).
Table 2.11 shows correlations between individual responses in risk and ambiguity
aversion variables across pairs of periods. The variable indicating whether an indi-
vidual is risk averse or not exhibits a correlation of about 0.4 in all periods in which
the baseline is involved. The correlation increases to about 0.5 when comparing after
paycheck and after offer periods and is lowest when comparing after paycheck with
baseline. These figures are within the range of risk preference correlations reported by
Chuang and Schechter (2015) of 0.13 to 0.55 in studies of more than 100 participants.
To our knowledge, previous studies have not analyzed persistence in inconsistent
lottery choices. This is because they must enforce monotonic switching in order to
obtain the CRRA or prospect theory parameters. In our case, however, we use a
multiple price list to deliberately allow for mistakes in risk choices. In row 2 of Table
2.11 we analyze how persistent mistakes are. We see that making mistakes in the
first baseline survey is highly correlated with making mistakes in the second baseline
survey as the corretions between 0.4 and 0.46 show. This level of correlation persists
when comparing the after offer and baseline periods but goes down to between 0.21
and 0.3 when comparing after paycheck and baseline, the two most distant periods
compared.
Finally, the most drastic changes are observed in the ambiguity aversion measure.
From a correlation of around 0.4 when comparing the two baseline periods, the cor-
relation goes down to around 0.2 in the after offer vs. baseline and after paycheck vs.
baseline. Interestingly, this measure did not show substantial changes for either of the
groups (last-semester or comparison students) in the analysis of the previous section.
Table 2.12 shows correlation coefficients for the time preferences variables. Over-
all, the correlation for present biasedness is smaller than for the impatient and non-
monotonic choices variables. This result suggests that allocating more to week 1 in
the different trade-offs involving week 1 is less persistent over time than allocating
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Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg.
Risk averse 0.387 0.394 0.391 0.412 0.226 0.254 0.499 0.505
(0.065) (0.069) (0.061) (0.066) (0.063) (0.070) (0.056) (0.058)
Inconsistent 0.459 0.399 0.403 0.370 0.3 0.214 0.49 0.419
risk lottery (0.066) (0.066) (0.078) (0.078) (0.081) (0.069) (0.085) (0.086)
Ambiguity 0.394 0.408 0.165 0.178 0.218 0.232 0.308 0.303
averse (0.06) (0.061) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.065)
Notes: Correlation coefficients are obtained from the Stata command correlate. Standard errors are in parenthesis
are bootstrapped with 10,000 replications in the case of correlation and Eicker-Huber-White in the case of regression.
The coefficients in the column Reg. are obtained from regressions of the variable on the left in the period mentioned
first in the column title on the same variable in the period mentioned second in the column title. For example, in the
Baseline 2 vs. Baseline 1 column, the coefficient displayed is from a regression of risk aversion at Baseline 2 on risk
aversion at Baseline 1. All regressions control for whether the student is in the comparison group, gender, poverty
status and age. All point estimates are significant at the 5% level after adjusting by the Benjamini-Hochberg multiple
testing method. The sample size includes students observed in all rounds of data collection (234).
the full endowment to the early period as reflected in the correlations near 0.7 in the
case of the impatience variable. Similar to the risk preferences analysis, the lowest
correlations are for the comparison of after paycheck and baseline. In the case of
present biasedness, the correlations go down to 0.13 - 0.15 and are no longer signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level after correcting for multiple hypothesis testing.
Non-monotonic choices are essentially mistakes that violate the law of demand
by allocating less to the later period when the interest rate is higher (see Giné,
Goldberg, Silverman, & Yang, 2017). This behavior is relatively persistent when
comparing the two baseline surveys and the two later periods with correlations of
around 0.6. The correlations go down slightly when comparing the after offer and
after paycheck periods with the baseline (columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.12).
We next look at stability social preferences in Table 2.13 in terms of the fraction
of the endowment of 20,000 pesos given to a student or a foundation in the dicta-
tor and ultimatum games. The comparison of the two baselines gives the highest
correlations for all three variables which are near 0.6, when allocating money to a
randomly selected student. The correlations are higher in the case of donations to
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Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg.
Present biased 0.289 0.257 0.278 0.294 0.133 0.151 0.374 0.383
(0.071) (0.067) (0.066) (0.073) (0.07) (0.079) (0.065) (0.074)
Impatient 0.708 0.802 0.651 0.698 0.61 0.660 0.709 0.730
(0.045) (0.061) (0.047) (0.055) (0.051) (0.059) (0.043) (0.050)
Non-monotonic 0.616 0.594 0.555 0.454 0.489 0.388 0.633 0.615
choices (0.067) (0.063) (0.063) (0.073) (0.074) (0.072) (0.065) (0.078)
Notes: Correlation coefficients are obtained from the Stata command correlate. Standard errors are in parenthesis
are bootstrapped with 10,000 replications in the case of correlation and Eicker-Huber-White in the case of regression.
The coefficients in the column Reg. are obtained from regressions of the variable on the left in the period mentioned
first in the column title on the same variable in the period mentioned second in the column title. For example, in the
Baseline 2 vs. Baseline 1 column, the coefficient displayed is from a regression of risk aversion at Baseline 2 on risk
aversion at Baseline 1. All regressions control for whether the student is in the comparison group, gender, poverty
status and age. After adjusting by the Benjamini-Hochberg multiple testing method, the correlation on column 3 of
the present-biased outcome is not significant at the 5% level. The sample size includes students observed in all rounds
of data collection (234).
a foundation helping children in Bogota (around 0.7). The correlation coefficients
go down substantially in the after offer and after paycheck comparisons relative to
baseline by at least 0.2. This reduction is probably related to the fact that students,
especially last-semester students, give more in subsequent rounds of the study. The
correlations go back to near their baseline levels in the after paycheck vs. after offer
comparison reflecting the fact that the difference between what they give in the last
two rounds is not as big compared to the initial rounds.
The correlations between social preferences variables we find in this study seem
stronger than what has been found in the previous literature. For example, Chuang
and Schechter (2015) find that a few of the correlations in experimental games mea-
suring social preferences are not different from zero even though there is a great deal
of persistence in social preferences measured with survey questions. The literature
on the stability of social preferences is certainly smaller than in other type of pref-
erences so we are providing new evidence with sample sizes larger than the typical
study (see Chuang & Schechter, 2015, for a review).
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Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg.
Fraction to student 0.627 0.602 0.348 0.365 0.313 0.321 0.514 0.484
- dictator (0.049) (0.055) (0.072) (0.088) (0.074) (0.081) (0.067) (0.071)
Fraction to foundation 0.729 0.702 0.539 0.580 0.511 0.577 0.717 0.746
- dictator (0.037) (0.049) (0.059) (0.073) (0.064) (0.076) (0.048) (0.053)
Fraction to student 0.585 0.616 0.314 0.391 0.3 0.418 0.543 0.582
- ultimatum (0.068) (0.080) (0.092) (0.120) (0.084) (0.114) (0.081) (0.092)
Notes: Correlation coefficients are obtained from the Stata command correlate. Standard errors are in parenthesis
are bootstrapped with 10,000 replications in the case of correlation and Eicker-Huber-White in the case of regression.
The coefficients in the column Reg. are obtained from regressions of the variable on the left in the period mentioned
first in the column title on the same variable in the period mentioned second in the column title. For example, in the
Baseline 2 vs. Baseline 1 column, the coefficient displayed is from a regression of risk aversion at Baseline 2 on risk
aversion at Baseline 1. All regressions control for whether the student is in the comparison group, gender, poverty
status and age. All point estimates are significant at the 5% level after adjusting by the Benjamini- Hochberg multiple
testing method. The sample size includes students observed in all rounds of data collection (234).
Most of the studies in the psychology literature involving cognitive measures an-
alyze how performance in these measures changes when inducing cognitive load. In
economics, this often takes the form of comparing results before and after receiv-
ing a harvest payout or a paycheck (e.g., Mani et al., 2013; Carvalho et al., 2016).
In this section we examine how persistent over time the measures of cognition are.
Importantly, for a fraction of the participants, the periods analyzed coincide with
important events in their transition from college to the labor market.
Table 2.14 shows correlation coefficients for the four cognitive measures. All are
statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level after adjusting for multiple
testing. What is striking in these results is that the correlations are not very high.
In most cases, they are between 0.2 and 0.3 with the exception of the Cognitive
Reflection Test in row 2 which reaches 0.5 in one of the pairwise comparisons. The
lowest correlations are in the numerical Stroop test. This may partly be because
participants faced some difficulties with this test because they were supposed to use
the numerical keyboard but had issues with this in the baseline surveys.
Finally, Table 2.15 shows correlation coefficients for three of the survey measures.
The individual responses to the question “How hard will it be for you to come up
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Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg.
IQ test (Raven’s) 0.269 0.220 0.346 0.388 0.388 0.339 0.32 0.222
(0.052) (0.049) (0.053) (0.073) (0.06) (0.054) (0.063) (0.050)
CRT test 0.408 0.360 0.386 0.397 0.538 0.512 0.37 0.337
(0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.063) (0.048) (0.055) (0.056) (0.060)
Stroop test 0.211 0.197 0.182 0.203 0.211 0.207 0.364 0.255
(0.08) (0.085) (0.066) (0.072) (0.066) (0.063) (0.079) (0.062)
Flanker test 0.363 0.304 0.284 0.336 0.292 0.308 0.246 0.209
(0.064) (0.058) (0.072) (0.093) (0.072) (0.081) (0.071) (0.072)
Notes: Correlation coefficients are obtained from the Stata command correlate. Standard errors are in parenthesis
are bootstrapped with 10,000 replications in the case of correlation and Eicker-Huber-White in the case of regression.
The coefficients in the column Reg. are obtained from regressions of the variable on the left in the period mentioned
first in the column title on the same variable in the period mentioned second in the column title. For example, in the
Baseline 2 vs. Baseline 1 column, the coefficient displayed is from a regression of risk aversion at Baseline 2 on risk
aversion at Baseline 1. All regressions control for whether the student is in the comparison group, gender, poverty
status and age. All point estimates are significant at the 5% level after adjusting by the Benjamini- Hochberg multiple
testing method. The sample size includes students observed in all rounds of data collection (234).
with 3 million pesos in a week for an emergency?” are highly correlated across all
periods compared. This is not the case for the question “How hard wil it be to cover
next week’s expenses with the money you have today?” which is highly correlated
among the baseline periods but the strength of the correlation drops for all other
periods. This finding is surprising because it could be suggesting that because part
of the sample transitions to the labor market may have more access to resources
and finds easier to cover expenses. However, we find no change in this variable in
the difference-in-differences analysis of the previous section (adjusted for multiple
inference testing).
In sum, we find correlations of the outcomes across time that are statistically
different form zero in virtually all cases. The results do not differ substantially from
the literature analyzing the stability of preferences in terms of the magnitude of the
persistence. In addition to what other papers have done, we provide correlations of
cognitive measures and personal finances variables. We find the highest correlations
among social preferences variables and the lowest among one of the cognitive tests.
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Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg. Corr. Reg.
Hard to come up 0.586 0.557 0.531 0.489 0.579 0.552 0.604 0.590
with money (0.053) (0.060) (0.057) (0.063) (0.054) (0.060) (0.053) (0.058)
Hard to cover 0.404 0.383 0.207 0.215 0.311 0.340 0.218 0.196
expenses (0.075) (0.079) (0.072) (0.084) (0.075) (0.082) (0.071) (0.071)
Notes: Correlation coefficients are obtained from the Stata command correlate. Standard errors are in parenthesis
are bootstrapped with 10,000 replications in the case of correlation and Eicker-Huber-White in the case of regression.
The coefficients in the column Reg. are obtained from regressions of the variable on the left in the period mentioned
first in the column title on the same variable in the period mentioned second in the column title. For example, in the
Baseline 2 vs. Baseline 1 column, the coefficient displayed is from a regression of risk aversion at Baseline 2 on risk
aversion at Baseline 1. All regressions control for whether the student is in the comparison group, gender, poverty
status and age. All point estimates are significant at the 5% level after adjusting by the Benjamini- Hochberg multiple
testing method. The sample size includes students observed in all rounds of data collection (234).
Surprisingly, the correlation among cognitive measures is not very high even though
the same instruments were used across all rounds.
Because we find that some of our outcomes do in fact change along the different
stages and that in some of them there is an evident increasing or decreasing trend,
it is surprising that stability does not change more than we observe. For example, in
Section 2.4 we see a significant change in present biasedness that does not translate
into a lower correlation between this variable measured at baseline and at the after
offer period. The reduction in the correlation coefficients emerges when comparing
the baseline and the after paycheck period. Therefore, the standard way of measur-
ing stability in the literature may be hiding important changes in the levels that we
are able to describe thanks to our research design.
Also importantly, we provide evidence that mesures of psychological states may
be behind some of the apparent changes in preferences as we saw in the case of risk
aversion. Simple correlations of the responses in the experimental games are not
capable of capturing the relationships between these variables.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper documents the changes in decision making that occur as a result of a
major life transition - specifically transitioning from being a college student to a
working member of society. When students join college, particularly if it is a presti-
gious school like the one from which we draw our participants in this study, it may
be reasonable to assume that students have certain expectations of finding a job and
having financial security. Therefore, similar to the Permanent Income Hypothesis’
predictions for consumption, one may not expect to see changes in decision making
behavior for risk preferences, time preferences, cognitive performance and other re-
lated tasks and decisions. However, our hypothesis was that even though students
in such universities are somewhat assured of finding good jobs, there is considerable
uncertainty of the specificities of the job, such as the when it will come and how much
it will pay. These uncertainties may be large enough to cause changes in decision
making merely in response to receiving a job offer, even before being paid for the
first time.
In fact, our results bear out this hypothesis quite conclusively. We use a difference-
in-differences strategy to study the effect on decision making of first transitioning
from a being a (last-semester) college student to receiving a job offer, and then the
effect receiving a paycheck. We employ the fact that students about to experience
the transition are similar to students in lower years in many dimensions. Therefore,
comparing last-semester students to students in lower years (pursuing similar major,
having a similar gender distribution and having similar tuition levels) provides us
with a reasonable research design. By having lower year students in the comparison
group answer the same questions as the last-semester students at roughly the same
times, we can effectively compare the their answers across rounds to determine differ-
ential trends among these final semester students. Of course, because we are unable
to randomly assign the status of being a last semester student, we cannot make strong
causal claims about the results. But the patterns we observe are strongly suggestive
of the effects that transition to the job market can have on decision making behavior
measured through experimental tasks.
We find that there is indeed a change in time preferences, perceptions of financial
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health and feelings about being tired and worried as a result of merely receiving a
job offer. The finding that last-semester students become differencially less present-
biased solely in response to a job offer demonstrates what a strong effect the resolu-
tion of this job uncertainty can have. These students report it now being less harder
to come up with money for an emergency and it being less hard to cover expenses
even though they have not been paid in their new jobs just yet. This contradicts the
perception that students at a good college would have no uncertainty about getting
a job since without any change in their earnings, their perception of their status
changes significantly. Furthermore, these students report that they are less worried,
tired, depressed and frustrated when they receive their job offer. While this is not
surprising, what is striking is the large effect these emotions have in their decision
making during the transition. Without accounting for these feelings, students appear
to become less risk-averse on receiving their job offer. However, once we control for
these emotions, these results vanish. In other cases, the effect of the transition is
made stronger, like in the case of becoming less present-biased when the job uncer-
tainty is resolved. Often when studying decision making behavior, such self-reported
measures are not taken into account and this could be affecting the interpretation of
results.
After receiving at least one paycheck from their new jobs, all the positive effects
on perception of financial status we observed in the after job offer period dissipate
and are no longer significant. There are no longer significant results on present-
biasedness. Furthermore, these students also perform differentially worse on the
cognitive reflection task and the Raven’s Matrices-type cognitive tests. Finally, af-
ter receiving a paycheck, students report being more frustrated, worried and tired.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that after actually receiving some
income, these students have to take on many more responsibilities relating to becom-
ing more independent. They may also have to take care of other family members,
adding to their stress levels and generating a decrease in the bandwidth available to
solve problems (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013).
It appears that the resolution of uncertainty regarding the details of their job is
the crucial factor that induces changes in the decision making of students who tran-
sition to the labor market. Their perceptions of their financial health also change
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positively. However, after starting to work and being paid, there may be greater cog-
nitive load that comes with having a lot more responsibilities that lead to changes
in cognitive performance and feelings of worry and tiredness.
103
2.7 Appendices
2.7.1 Risk lottery based on Eckel and Grossman (2002)
Row no. Column A Column B
(if heads comes out) (if tails comes out)
1 28,000 pesos 28,000 pesos
2 24,000 pesos 36,000 pesos
3 20,000 pesos 44,000 pesos
4 16,000 pesos 52,000 pesos
5 12,000 pesos 60,000 pesos
6 2,000 pesos 70,000 pesos
2.7.2 Risk lotteries based on Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen
(2010)
Column A Column B Exp. payoff diff.
Row no. If 1 to 3 comes out If 4 to 10 comes out If 1 comes out If 2 to 10 comes out (A - B)
1 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 6,800 pesos 500 pesos 770 pesos
2 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 7,500 pesos 500 pesos 700 pesos
3 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 8,300 pesos 500 pesos 620 pesos
4 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 9,300 pesos 500 pesos 520 pesos
5 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 10,600 pesos 500 pesos 390 pesos
6 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 12,500 pesos 500 pesos 200 pesos
7 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 15,000 pesos 500 pesos -50 pesos
8 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 18500 pesos 500 pesos -400 pesos
9 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 22,000 pesos 500 pesos -750 pesos
10 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 30,000 pesos 500 pesos -1,550 pesos
11 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 40,000 pesos 500 pesos -2,550 pesos
12 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 60,000 pesos 500 pesos -4,550 pesos
13 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 100,000 pesos 500 pesos -8,550 pesos
14 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 170,000 pesos 500 pesos -15,550 pesos
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2.7.3 Ambiguity aversion based on Tanaka et al. (2014)
A B A B
A B
2.7.4 Time preferences based on Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
EARLIER LATER
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in five weeks with a 1% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in five weeks with a 10% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in five weeks with a 50% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in five weeks with a 100% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in nine weeks with a 1% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in nine weeks with a 10% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in nine weeks with a 50% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in nine weeks with a 100% interest
2.7.5 Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
The questions that were asked in Spanish are a translation or adaptation of the fol-
lowing questions:
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• A bat and a ball cost $1.10 total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost? (Intuitive error: 10; correct: 5)
• If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets? (Intuitive error: 100; correct: 5).
• In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If
it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take
for the patch to cover half of the lake? (Intuitive error: 24; correct: 47)
• Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class.
How many students are in the class? (Intuitive error: 15, 30; correct: 29)
• A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it
finally for $90. How much has he made? (Intuitive error: 10; correct: 20)
• Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six
months after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down
50%. Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had
purchased went up 75%. At this point Simon has (a) broken even in the stock
market, (b) is ahead of where he began, (c) has lost money. (Intuitive error:
b; correct: c).
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2.7.6 Other difference-in-differences results
Table 2.16: DID results: More risk measures
(3) (4) (5) (6)









Baseline 1 * Comparison 0.832*** 0.897*** 0.261*** 0.223***
(0.0277) (0.0500) (0.0325) (0.0635)
Baseline 2 * Comparison 0.837*** 0.925*** 0.190*** 0.235***
(0.0273) (0.0553) (0.0290) (0.0586)
After offer * Comparison 0.598*** 0.216*** 0.136*** 0.0774**
(0.0363) (0.0518) (0.0254) (0.0311)
After paycheck * Comparison 0.554*** 0.327*** 0.0924*** 0.0533*
(0.0368) (0.0592) (0.0214) (0.0277)
Baseline 1 * Last sem. 0.0112 0.00759 -0.0305 -0.0249
(0.0390) (0.0389) (0.0454) (0.0452)
Baseline 2 * Last sem. -0.0841** -0.0945** -0.0779** -0.0805**
(0.0424) (0.0432) (0.0375) (0.0381)
After offer * Last sem. -0.132** -0.0139 -0.0615* -0.0531
(0.0549) (0.0526) (0.0333) (0.0365)
After paycheck * Last sem. 0.0891 0.0531 -0.0141 -0.0238
(0.0580) (0.0598) (0.0330) (0.0339)
Observations 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355
R-squared 0.725 0.752 0.181 0.195
Emotion controls NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple Inference: † † † pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
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Table 2.17: DID results: Social preferences



















Baseline 1 * Comparison 0.331*** 0.299*** 0.553*** 0.608*** 0.438*** 0.417***
(0.0179) (0.0352) (0.0232) (0.0478) (0.0136) (0.0268)
Baseline 2 * Comparison 0.279*** 0.323*** 0.477*** 0.491*** 0.423*** 0.474***
(0.0175) (0.0384) (0.0235) (0.0492) (0.0139) (0.0302)
After offer * Comparison 0.343*** 0.716*** 0.468*** 0.778*** 0.464*** 0.792***
(0.0261) (0.0373) (0.0282) (0.0394) (0.0220) (0.0307)
After paycheck *
Comparison
0.340*** 0.604*** 0.477*** 0.612*** 0.467*** 0.680***
(0.0270) (0.0514) (0.0287) (0.0536) (0.0241) (0.0431)
Baseline 1 * Last sem. 0.0362 0.0358 -0.0314 -0.0374 0.0249 0.0262
(0.0255) (0.0257) (0.0339) (0.0340) (0.0189) (0.0188)
Baseline 2 * Last sem. 0.0569** 0.0552** -0.0162 -0.0141 0.0258 0.0204
(0.0260) (0.0267) (0.0336) (0.0340) (0.0202) (0.0205)
After offer * Last sem. 0.209***††† 0.0924***†† 0.132***††† 0.0359 0.149***††† 0.0505*
(0.0416) (0.0351) (0.0426) (0.0391) (0.0355) (0.0304)
After paycheck * Last sem. -0.0988*** -0.0524 -0.0852** -0.0543 -0.0957*** -0.0631**
(0.0368) (0.0361) (0.0432) (0.0445) (0.0319) (0.0314)
Observations 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355
R-squared 0.588 0.669 0.673 0.702 0.779 0.826
Emotion controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple Inference: † † † pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
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Table 2.18: DID results: Psychological measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Frustra-
tion Depression Worry Enjoyment Tired
Baseline 1 * Comparison 0.196*** 0.141*** 0.402*** 0.511*** 0.598***
(0.0294) (0.0258) (0.0363) (0.0370) (0.0363)
Baseline 2 * Comparison 0.337*** 0.239*** 0.538*** 0.484*** 0.603***
(0.0350) (0.0316) (0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0362)
After offer * Comparison 0.283*** 0.239*** 0.424*** 0.446*** 0.435***
(0.0333) (0.0316) (0.0366) (0.0368) (0.0367)
After paycheck * Comparison 0.239*** 0.201*** 0.266*** 0.543*** 0.223***
(0.0316) (0.0297) (0.0327) (0.0369) (0.0308)
Baseline 1 * Last sem. -0.0159 0.0160 -0.0707 -0.0727 -0.0585
(0.0412) (0.0376) (0.0507) (0.0526) (0.0522)
Baseline 2 * Last sem. -0.0785 -0.0256 -0.128** 0.0500 -0.0976*
(0.0481) (0.0441) (0.0523) (0.0527) (0.0522)
After offer * Last sem. -0.147***††† -0.151***††† -0.201***††† -0.0808 -0.232***†††
(0.0437) (0.0393) (0.0502) (0.0541) (0.0495)
After paycheck * Last sem. 0.0652 0.0163 0.108* 0.0217 0.116**
(0.0534) (0.0487) (0.0559) (0.0593) (0.0540)
Observations 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355
R-squared 0.257 0.201 0.398 0.492 0.491
Emotion controls NO NO NO NO NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple Inference: † † † pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
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Table 2.19: DID results: Cognitive performance - Additional tasks
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Baseline 1 * Comparison 16.84*** 14.75*** 28.45*** 27.95***
(0.463) (1.053) (0.735) (1.478)
Baseline 2 * Comparison 17.84*** 16.77*** 30.58*** 28.69***
(0.451) (0.976) (0.646) (1.191)
After offer * Comparison 18.24*** 16.94*** 29.67*** 29.96***
(0.485) (1.060) (0.767) (1.772)
After paycheck * Comparison 19.78*** 18.26*** 31.69*** 29.90***
(0.433) (0.695) (0.699) (1.404)
Baseline 1 * Last sem. -0.399 -0.259 -0.708 -0.638
(0.714) (0.726) (1.046) (1.056)
Baseline 2 * Last sem. 0.530 0.752 -0.856 -0.538
(0.609) (0.614) (0.886) (0.895)
After offer * Last sem. 0.314 0.460 0.847 1.011
(0.842) (0.824) (1.327) (1.418)
After paycheck * Last sem. -0.183 -0.199 -0.397 -0.244
(0.629) (0.635) (1.067) (1.085)
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,229 1,229
R-squared 0.901 0.904 0.914 0.915
Emotion controls NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple Inference: † † † pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
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CHAPTER III
Biased beliefs, performance and effort:
Experimental evidence from a pilot in Colombia
3.1 Introduction
Beliefs about ourselves and about others are an important input in decision-making
under uncertainty. However, beliefs are not always accurate. In fact, laboratory
experiments document large biases in how people perceive their ability to perform
a task. In the lab, everyone is miscalibrated by overestimating own performance.
Interestingly, women and men differ in their self-assessments. For example, the most
influential paper in experimental economics of the last decade found that, when per-
forming a simple math task, everybody overestimates own performance and women
believe they are ranked lower than men of similar ability (Niederle & Vesterlund,
2007). In a related context, studies have shown that biased beliefs or incorrect up-
dating can affect the decision to enter a competitive environment in the laboratory
(Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus, & Rosenblat, 2011; Berlin & Dargnies, 2016).
The lab has also shown that feedback can potentially help correct biased priors
and improve decision-making. Within the gender and competitiveness literature,
Wozniak, Harbaugh, and Mayr (2014) show that providing exact feedback about
relative rank closes the gender gap in willingness to compete in the lab. Noisy feed-
back as in Mobius et al. (2011) or feedback about being at the top or bottom of a
performance distribution as in Berlin and Dargnies (2016) affects competitive-entry
decisions but asymmetrically depending on the nature of the signal received (positive
or negative).
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Outside of the lab, however, there is little evidence of the existence and magnitude
of biased beliefs and how they relate to real-life decisions in which performance in
tests or at work can lead to fundamentally different paths among people of the same
ability. In the human capital formation literature, for example, there is evidence that
individuals’ investments are affected by the perceived returns to education (Jensen,
2010), beliefs about future earnings (Wiswall & Zafar, 2015; Reuben, Wiswall, &
Zafar, 2015), information about school quality (Hastings & Weinstein, 2008; Mizala
& Urquiola, 2013), and information about application to schools and financial aid
(Hoxby & Turner, 2015; Dinkelman & Martínez, 2014). There is less evidence on
how beliefs about relative ability affect decisions like how to allocate study time and
which college majors to choose based on comparative advantages in academic sub-
jects. This research contributes to filling this gap.
I study gender differences in beliefs about ability / performance in academic sub-
jects and in the updating process among students preparing for a high-stakes college
entrance exam in Colombia. Specifically, my research questions are: Are beliefs
about own ability biased? Do biases differ by gender? Does feedback correct biased
priors and affect effort (hours of study), performance in tests, and perceived difficulty
of tests?
I provide new evidence of the magnitude and direction of the biases in self-
assessments of performance in a real-life scenario, and of the extent to which feedback
can correct biased priors. To do this, I take advantage of the multiple practice tests
that students take as part of their test-preparation course. Every week, students
take a practice test after which I elicit beliefs about being in the four quartiles of the
score distribution in each of the five areas covered by the test (math, science, social
science, image analysis and text analysis). After eliciting beliefs from all participants
for a few rounds, students are divided into treatment and control groups. Students
in the treatment group receive feedback about how their scores relate to those of the
rest of the students at the institute and to their stated priors. I then collect more
data about beliefs, allocation of study time and perceived difficulty of the practice
tests.
I find substantial biases in assessing own ability. Across all areas of the test,
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between 50 and 70 percent of the students fail to correctly predict the quartile in
which their score will be. Women are more biased than men. For example, almost
50 percent of the males but only 32 percent of women accurately predict their score
in the math section of the test. Women perform worse in math and at the same time
are more likely than the men to underestimate their performance, especially when
predicted performance is in the worst quartile but actual performance is in the best.
In text analysis, women underperform men but are more likely to overestimate their
performance. These findings point to biases in the direction predicted by stereotypes
about relative academic advantages of men and women.
Feedback provision with the features implemented in this pilot does not have sig-
nificant effects on performance, beliefs in subsequent practice tests or allocation of
study time. However, feedback affects the perceived difficulty of subsequent practice
tests, an effect entirely driven by males in the treatment group who rate the tests
as harder independently of the type of signal they receive about their performance.
Women tend to be less confident than men about their ability to be admitted at the
university they are preparing for. When receiving feedback, women become more
confident and men less confident about their expected admission outcome so the
gender gap in confidence in this dimension seems to disappear.
Two papers that are directly relevant to this research are Bobba and Frisancho
(2016) and Gonzalez (2017). Both provide evidence that students overestimate their
performance in a mock test. The former paper studies how middle-school students
in Mexico City update their priors after receiving information about a mock exam
score which leads those who receive positive feedback to choose, on average, more
academically-oriented high school options. The latter provides evidence on how stu-
dents who receive (and are instructed about) the Advance Placement (AP) potential
signal after taking the practice SAT test in the US are more likely to take and pass
AP courses. Both papers point to substantial biases in beliefs about own ability and
how informing students of their performance can affect decision making and better
align skills with academic options.
Relative to those papers, this research finds that self-assessment varies depending
on the academic subject. Hence, analyzing beliefs and feedback about a single score
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composed of many subjects may conflate different directions and magnitudes in the
biases. Further, this study shows that women are more miscalibrated than men in
opposite directions in different subjects which is something that those studies are
not able to detect with their research design.
This paper is divided in sections. Section 3.2 presents relevant details of the back-
ground and the experimental design. Section 3.3 discusses the data and descriptive
statistics emphasizing in the gender dimension. In section 3.4, I present the main
results regarding performance and beliefs, the type of signals students in the treat-
ment group received, as well as the treatment effects of feedback. The last section
concludes.
3.2 Background and experimental design
I partnered with a test-preparation institute in Colombia that prepares students who
plan to take a high-stakes college admission test. This test is taken by about 60,000
students every semester who compete for a fixed number of slots (about 5,000) in all
campuses of the university. Upon admission, applicants have to declare two college-
major options. Slots in the different majors are allocated based on the student’s
overall score and the number of available slots remaining at the time the student is
enabled to access the system to choose his or her preferred majors.1 All students
take the same exam regardless of their intended majors. Because the only criterion
for admission at this university is the entrance exam and given the prestige of its
academic programs and subsidized tuition, there is high demand of test preparation
services from students willing to attend this university.
The test preparation institute gave me permission to recruit its students in Bogota
and Medellin who intended to take the entrance exam on April 23, 2017. Students
enrolled in this course are prepared over two-and-a-half months in all five areas of
the admissions exam: math, science (physics, chemistry and biology), social science
(history, geography, philosophy), image analysis, and text analysis.2 Students at-
1At this university and, generally in Colombia, students declare their major before starting
college. Admissions are based on the entrance exam score only, and given the number of slots per
major, they are very competitive.
2More information about each component of the test can be found in
114
tend three-hour classes from Tuesday to Friday and take a full-length practice test
(3 hours) every Monday. Enrollment in these courses is of about 1,100 students in
Bogota and 260 in Medellin. Furthermore, after every practice test the test prepara-
tion institute provided me with practice-test scores of all students taking the same
preparation course as students in my sample.
My research consists of eliciting beliefs about relative performance in each area of
the test and randomly assigning students to a treatment group which receives feed-
back about their performance in the last practice test relative to the rest of students,
and to a control group which does not. After each practice test, I elicited beliefs
about the probabilities of being at each of the four quartiles of the practice test score
distribution for each of the five areas of the exam. The timeline of activities relevant
for the design are as follows: 1) students take weekly full-length practice tests (given
by the institute), 2) students take beliefs survey immediately after each practice test,
3) tests are graded, 4) institute sends the scores of all students to the researcher, 5)
the researcher produces and sends feedback notifications depending on whether the
student is in the treatment or the control group.
Feedback was given on paper to maximize the chances that students will see it.
Due to lags in the release of practice test results, it was not possible to provide
weekly feedback after each practice test as would have been ideal. Instead, a sum-
mary of students’ predictions and performances was given for three rounds of the
latest practice tests with scores available to the researcher. A series of five graphs
(one for each section of the exam) containing actual and predicted quartiles allowed
students in the treatment group to see a summary of their performance as well as
how well calibrated they were in their assessment of performance relative to other
students taking the same course as them.3
http://admisiones.unal.edu.co/pregrado/panel-2-informacion-sobre-las-pruebas/prueba-de-
admision/. An example of image analysis questions are in appendix 3.6.1.
3Even though students enrolled in this type of courses are not representative of the usual pool
of applicants, relative comparisons with this group is relevant given that other students taking the
same course may have similar backgrounds and knowledge about the admissions exam. Further, the
focus of this research is not on assessing the probability of passing an admissions test but rather on
signaling relative comparative advantages / disadvantages across academic subjects among students
with similar characteristics. A mapping of where the students are relative to all applicants would
be ideal to have but is unfortunately out of the scope of this chapter. This is left as future work.
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Besides the multiple rounds of the beliefs survey, students are required to fill out
a baseline survey. At sign up they fill out a baseline survey with questions about
demographics, previous education, favorite school subjects, intended majors, and a
series of incentivized experimental questions to assess their IQ, confidence, risk aver-
sion, and competitiveness as is standard in the gender and competitiveness literature.
The statistical comparison between beliefs and actual performance allows me to
establish whether beliefs are biased and whether the biases differ by gender. By
comparing the treatment to the control group, I test to what extent biased beliefs
are updated, i.e. whether individuals are more likely to hold more accurate beliefs
after receiving feedback. Moreover, the random assignment identifies the causal ef-
fect of receiving feedback on effort, performance in the next practice test, perceived
difficulty of the practice tests, and confidence in being admitted to this university.
Hence, if I observe that these outcomes differ between the treatment and control
groups, I will be able to conclude that it is a result of belief updating through feed-
back provision given that ex-ante, students in both groups are equivalent in terms
of observable characteristics.
To incentivize participation, a raffle of laptops and cash prizes of 100,000 pesos
(about $35) takes place at the end of the study. Moreover, smaller cash prizes
of 15,000 pesos or about US$5 were distributed every week to guarantee truthful
reporting of beliefs using the crossover mechnism explained in Mobius et al. (2011).
To win the prizes, students accumulate lottery tickets based on incentivized questions
in the baseline and end surveys as well as in each of the beliefs surveys.
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
I present results from 208 students taking the preparation course in the city of Bogota.
Students were recruited by visiting classrooms in early February, 2017. Students in-
tersted in participating filled out a sign-up sheet with their name, email and age.
They were then contacted by email with instructions about how to sign the consent
form and the parent’s assent in case the were minors. After consenting, they were
required to fill out the first survey online. Tables 3.1 through 3.3 present tabulations
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from the baseline survey.
Table 3.1 shows that women constitute about two-thirds of the sample. From
conversations with the test preparation institution, women tend to have a higher
demand of this type of courses. The average age is 18 and about 40 percent of the
sudents live in a poor household according to their level in the Identification System
for Social Program Potential Beneficiaries (SISBEN). About 56 percent studied in
a private high school, and more women relative to men studied in a religious high
school. About a third self-report to have received academic honors and to ever
worked full time in the past. More women than men report having received academic
honors but with the small sample size, the difference is not found to be statistically
significant. Slighltly more than a third of students in the sample report that their
parents’ education level is college or higher.
Table 3.1: Demographic and schooling characteristics
Male Female p-value diff.
Fraction 37.02 62.98
Age 17.99 18.13 0.537
Poor (SISBEN) 0.35 0.44 0.194
HS private 0.57 0.56 0.843
HS religious 0.09 0.19 0.054
HS mixed-sex 0.25 0.31 0.368
Academic honors 0.29 0.39 0.132
Ever worked 0.32 0.33 0.958
Mother college or more 0.47 0.35 0.098
Father college or more 0.36 0.36 0.944
I collected a rich set of questions about their intended majors, reason for choosing
them, and their experience and expectations related to the admissions exam. Table
3.2 shows that students who are enrolled in this course have taken the real admissions
exam once in the past, on average. The exam score is stardardized with a mean of
500 and a standard deviation of 100. Scores of admitted students for most majors in
the Bogota Campus of the university are of at least 625 points although it varies on
a semester basis.4 On average, men and women predict that the score the will obtain
4This minimum score is based on statistics published by the university but it varies depending
on the majors. The majors with the highest demand have much higher minimum scores. Admission
scores can be consulted at: http://www.admisiones.unal.edu.co/servicios-en-linea/estadisticas-del-
proceso-de-admision/
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Table 3.2: Intended majors and predicted scores in admissions test
Male Female p-value diff.
No. times taken exam 1.01 1.08 0.528
Predicted score before course 629.34 630.62 0.937
Predicted score after course 753.07 741.23 0.378
Expected increase in score 122.42 110.61 0.489
Min score to pass to 1st choice 715.11 725.25 0.275
Min score to pass to 2nd choice 685.31 703.68 0.039
First choice major in science 0.04 0.09 0.158
First choice major in econ sci 0.06 0.02 0.056
First choice major in hum 0.04 0.15 0.011
First choice major in health sci 0.32 0.41 0.211
First choice major in arts 0.14 0.12 0.670
First choice major in law 0.08 0.09 0.736
First choice major in engineering 0.31 0.11 0.000
Reason for 1st choice:interesting 0.78 0.85 0.165
Reason for 1st choice:unsure 0.08 0.11 0.496
Second choice major in science 0.09 0.09 0.987
Second choice major in econ sci 0.03 0.03 0.850
Second choice major in hum 0.17 0.22 0.364
Second choice major in health sci 0.13 0.19 0.259
Second choice major in arts 0.12 0.15 0.474
Second choice major in law 0.06 0.05 0.733
Second choice major in eng 0.23 0.12 0.036
Doesn’t plan to choose 2nd major 0.06 0.08 0.621
Second choice major undecided 0.1 0.05 0.176
Reason for 2nd choice:interesting 0.43 0.44 0.843
Reason for 2nd choice:unsure 0.26 0.35 0.173
Reason for 2nd choice:by default 0.17 0.05 0.006
Reason for 2nd choice:Able to pass 0.04 0.09 0.158
with the preparation they have up to the point in which they take the survey is of
about 630 points. Moreover, including the preparation from that point to the date
of the exam, they expect to obtain a score of around 750 points (which is enough to
pass to any major in most semesters). That is, they expect an increase in their score
from baseline to the exam date of 122 points in the case of men and 111 for women.
Students in my sample taking this preparation course seem to be relatively ac-
curate about the minimum score needed to pass to their intended first choice. Men
report that they need about 715 points to pass to their desired first choice major
and women report that they need 725 points. For second-choice major, which is
supposed to be a back-up option for students who are not admitted to their first
major, men report that they would need a score of 685 points to pass to their in-
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tended second option. Women, on the other hand, report that they would need a
score of 704 points on average. The difference between these two scores is statisti-
cally significant and, coupled with the fact that women report higher scores needed
to pass in both the first and second choices, it may suggest that women’s percep-
tions about scores may be different than men’s perceptions even though both must
have the same information as it is provided by the test preparation institute. These
figures are even more intriguing given that women tend to choose majors in which
the threshold score is normally lower relative to the majors that men typically choose.
In terms of intended first-choice majors, there are statistical differences in the
choices of men and women in fields of economic sciences at the 10 percent level, and
in majors related to humanities and engineering at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels,
respectively. There are not statistical differences in the second choices that men and
women expect to declare except in the case of engineering.
Finally, I asked a series of experimental tasks that are standard in the gender and
competitiveness literature starting with Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). As previ-
ously documented by Eckel and Grossman (2002) and Eckel and Grossman (2008),
women are more risk averse (p-value <0.05). The confidence and competitive ques-
tions are based on their performance on an IQ test similar to the Raven’s progressive
matrices test which does not depend on numerical or verbal ability. Out of 9 ques-
tions to be solved in 3 minutes, men respond 3.81 questions correctly on average
while women correctly respond 3.26 on average. The difference is not large but is
statistically significant. On average they are able to respond 7 questions in total.
When asked about which quartile of the distribution of scores in the IQ test
they thought their score would be in, about 43 percent of participants guessed their
quartile correctly regardless of gender (Table 3.3). In this context, women seem
to be more likely to overestimate their performance relative to men although the
gender differences are not statistically significant. In the Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007) questions, we see that men are more likely than women to think that they are
ranked first in a group of 4 randomly chosen participants. Similarly, men are more
likely to choose the tournament in which only the winner in the group of four wins
the compensation. These two findings replicate the Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)
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Table 3.3: Experimental tasks
Male Female p-value diff.
Risk row:1 most risk averse 3.08 2.82 0.253
Risk averse 0.75 0.86 0.047
IQ total correct 3.81 3.26 0.018
IQ total responded 6.78 7.08 0.233
Correct quartile guess 0.44 0.43 0.844
Overestimated 0.27 0.32 0.449
Undrestimated 0.29 0.23 0.381
Rank 1st in group of 4 0.2 0.1 0.175
Rank 2nd in group of 4 0.74 0.78 0.654
Rank 3rd in group of 4 0 0 .
Rank 4th in group of 4 0.07 0.12 0.344
Chose tournament 0.21 0.15 0.255
results although they are not as extreme in this setting as in their original study.5
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of performance and bias in the quartile predic-
tion in the IQ test along with the p-value of the difference between the two distribu-
tions. From now on, the first quartile represents the top scores and the fouth quartile
the bottom scores. The hollow bars denote females while the gray bars denote males.
Even though the two performance distributions do not differ from each other accord-
ing to the chi-square test, in the left panel it is evident that the distribution for
women is shifted to the left of the men’s distribution. In the right panel, we see that
an important group of men and women are right about their prediction. However,
a large proportion hold biased beliefs about their performance. In the graph, nega-
tive numbers mean that students underestimate their performance, i.e. they think
they performed worse than they actually did. The positive numbers mean that they
thought they performed better than they did. Although, as mentioned previously,
there are no statistical differences in over- or under-predicting, the graph shows that
women are more likely to be in the positive side of the distribution, that is, they tend
to overestimate. As expected, most over- or under-estimation occurs by one quartile
of difference between the actual and guessed quartile. Less than 20 percent of the
students over- or under-estimate their performance by the maximum amount, i.e.,
thinking they are in quartile 1 while in reality they are in quartile 4 and the reverse.
5Keep in mind that the task in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) is different from the one used
here. The addition of two-digit numbers is not possible in the online survey context because students
can easily use calculators.
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In terms of randomization, I stratified randomization at the classroom level be-
cause it was not feasible to provide feedback on paper to some students and not to
others in the same classroom. The stratification consisted in classifying classrooms
according to gender composition and average IQ level of the participants in the same
classroom. Four strata are then generated: high number of women and average IQ
above the median, high number of women and average IQ below the median, low
number of women and average IQ above the median, and low number of women and
average IQ below the median. Once the classrooms are assigned to these strata,
randomization of the feedback treatment was done at the classroom level. In total,
about 55 percent of the students in the sample received feedback. Only 4 out of 52
covariates were unbalanced. I control for these covariates in the effects of feedback
regression.6
6The imbalanced covariates were: Having ever worked full time, number of times that the exam
has been taken (0.2 difference), whether the first choice intended major is in the humanities, and
whether the second choice is selected because they think they are able to be admitted to that major.
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3.4 Results
In this section I characterize the extent and direction of biases in self-assessment of
relative performance by presenting evidence from four rounds of beliefs elicitation be-
fore providing feedback. Furthermore, I analyze how the outcomes of interest change
relative to the control group once students in the treatment group receive feedback.
Recall that rather than giving a realistic idea of where the students are in the
distribution of all applicants to help them predict their chances of admission, the
purpose of this research is to point out students’ miscalibration on their perceptions
about how good they are in certain subjects. I argue that having a more accurate
idea of thier strengths and weaknesses even if not in relation to the actual pool of
applicants, can help students make better decisions in terms of allocating study time
and even inform them of what college majors are more aligned with their relative
strengths.
3.4.1 Sample selection
Because not all students at the test preparation institute signed up to participate in
the study, one important question is how the sample who selected to be part of the
study differs from the rest of the students who are taking the test preparation course.
For each section of the practice test, Figure 3.2 shows that my sample is more or less
representative of the population of students taking the same course than them. The
only cases in which selection may be occuring from the top of the distribution is in
text and image analysis in which the percentage of students in the best quartile is
closer to 30 percent that to 25 percent.
3.4.2 Performance and beliefs
Figure 3.3 shows the performance of study participants in the five sections of the
test: Math, science, social science and image analysis. As before, the statistical dif-
ference in the two histograms is given by the p-value at the bottom of each graph.
The scale of the scores is from 0 to 10, where 10 means that the students had all
questions correct in that area of the exam. According to conversations with the test
preparation institute, the practice tests are designed to be much harder than the
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actual entrance exam. Hence, it is very unlikely that anyone correctly answers all
questions in any given area. In the figure, all the distributions seem to have a bell
shape although there is a mass point at zero.
In math and text analysis, the performance distribution of females is shifted to
the left of the distribution of males. In fact, the p-value of the difference between the
two histograms is below 0.001 in math and 0.002 in text analysis. The performance
in other areas of the test is not statistically different across genders.
I now analyze beliefs regarding performance in each area of the practice test. As
before, a value of zero in the histogram means that they were right in their assess-
ment of the quartile of the distribution in which their score will be located. Negative
values mean that the students underestimate their quartile, that is, are in a higher
quartile than they thought. Positive values mean that they overestimate or think
they they belong to a quartile with higher scores than they actually do.
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The top left panel of Figure 3.3 shows the extent of the biases for math. While
almost 50 percent of the men accurately predict their math quartile, less than 35
percent of women have a correct assessment. The p-value of the difference in the
distribution of biases is 0.009 suggesting that men and women are differentially bi-
ased. Overall, the graph shows that students tend to underestimate more than they
overestimate and that women underestimate more relative to men. In fact, in the
highest degree of underestimation (thinking that they were in the worst quartile but
they are actually in the best) there are virtually zero men but about 6 percent of all
women. Women are also more likely than men to overestimate but this happens to
a smaller extent than underestimation.7
7Bobba and Frisancho (2016) did not find differences in beliefs between boys and girls. Some
reasons why their finding differs from the finding in this paper are that the students in their sample
are in middle school, the nature and stakes of the test they analyze are substantially different than
in this context, and they only elicit aggregate beliefs across all subjects asked in the test.
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In science, 42 percent of the men and 32 percent of the women are right in their
quartile prediction. Women are more likely to underestimate and overestimate but
there is no clear pattern of which type of bias is more prevalent. In social science
we see again that females are less accurate in their predicition than men altough the
difference is smaller than in other subjects. Women are also more likely to underes-
timate to the largest extent (-3 in the graph) more than men.
In text analysis, men are more accurate than women by about 10 percentage
points. In this case the direction of women’s bias is to think that they performed
better than that actually did. Recall that the two areas in which women were per-
forming worse than men were math and text analysis but clearly their perceptions
about their performance are opposite across these two subjects.
Finally, the only area in which there are no differences between the predictions
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of men and women is in image analysis. In this case the women are slighlty more
likely to make a correct prediction although this is only in about 35 percent of the
cases. In this sense, across all areas of the exam, on average 30 percent of the women
make correct predictions but men are better at predicting across all areas except
image analysis. It is worth noting that image analysis is not a subject taught in high
school so it could be the case that women have more biases in subjects that they are
familiar with but not in what is not so familiar to them.
One possible explanation of the higher biases and degree of the bias in the case of
women is that they perceive that the exam is harder than what men perceive. In a
scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is extremely easy and 7 is extremely hard, they are asked
to rate the difficulty of each section of the practice test they just took. Figure 3.5
shows that there are no substantial gender differences in their perception. Actually,
in text analysis, proportionally more women think that the test was less hard than
men. In image analysis more women give a rating of 5, 6 and 7. Despite these
differences, the statistical test conclude that they are not significant.
I also collect information about how many hours they studied for each section of
the exam during the last week. My prior was that if you feel weak in certain area as
reflected by underestimating your performance in the test, it may be the case that
you study more for that area than for others. From that perspective, we would see
women dedicating more study hours to math and text analysis than to other areas.
Figure 3.6 shows that, overall, women are studying more than men in all subjects
except science. However they do not necessarily study more forthe areas in which
they feel weak. They study more math in which they feel weak but also study more
text analysis in which they feel strong.
Regarding confidence about passing the exam on April 23 (obtaining a high
enough score to be admitted to their intended majors), I construct a measure in
which 5 means that the are very confident in passing. The two histograms in Figure
3.9 show observations from February on the left panel and from March in the right
panel. In February, women seem substantially less confident than men but their
ratings become closer to those of men in March. Lower confidence in being admitted
may be capturing the fact that women perform worse than men in some areas of the
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Difficulty Image analysis: 1=ext. easy
P-value diff.=0.554
Male Female
test but also a higher extent of biases regarding where they believe they are in the
distribution of test-takers at this institute.
Finally, I report regression results from some of the variables described in this sec-
tion in Table 3.4. Each entry in the table is the coefficient of female in a regression
of the outcome (e.g. performance in math) on the indicator for female and con-
trols (where indicated). As previosuly stated, female students perform significantly
worse than males in math and text analysis. On average, women respond 0.5 fewer
questions correctly in these two areas. This holds after controlling for a measure of
intelligence, that is, among equally smart men and women, the women score worse
on average in math and text analysis. The performance across other subjects of the
test is not significantly different by gender.
The performance results in text analysis is at odds with widespread findings that,
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P-value diff.=0.016
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on average, girls perform better in reading than boys. Evidence from the Programme
for International Student Assessment (PISA) test administered to 15-year olds re-
veals that girls have consistently outperformed boys in since 2000 by the equivalent
of one year of school (OECD, 2015). In Colombia, however, the average reading
scores in the national standardized text (ICFES) from 2000 to 2013 are slightly
higher for men. In fact, men outperform women in all subjects of this test except in
philosophy. In the PISA 2012 results for Colombia there is a gender gap in reading
favoring women but, despite being statistically significant, it is the second smallest
gender gap among all countries tested that year. Therefore, the usual advantage of
women in reading does not seem as clear in Colombia as in other countries so the
underperformance I document is not as surprising as it may seem at first.
Table 3.4 women are less correct than men in their assessment of performance
in math, text analysis, and to a less extent, in science. The difference in average
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accuracy in the beliefs of men and women in math, science and text analysis is of
around 10 percentage points even after controlling for IQ. Women overestimate their
performance in text analysis by nearly 15 percentage points relative to men, and
underestimate in math by about 9 percentage points. The biases in science are, on
average, almost equally split into overestimation and underestimation.
To reiterate, I find no evidence of differential biases by gender in social science
and image analysis.
3.4.3 Effects of feedback provision
The results in this section are derived from two beliefs surveys collected from all
students after students in the treatment group received feedback. Examples of what
feedback looked like are in Appendix 3.6.3.
First, I present evidence of what type of signal men and women in the treatment
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Table 3.4: Average performance and biases in self-assessment of performance
Math Science Social Sci. Text A. Image A.
Performance No controls -0.536*** -0.059 -0.125 -0.555*** -0.045
(0.137) (0.128) (0.123) (0.195) (0.121)
Controls: IQ -0.493*** -0.048 -0.094 -0.387** -0.015
(0.137) (0.130) (0.124) (0.188) (0.123)
Correct No controls -0.117** -0.103** -0.056 -0.106** 0.013
(0.051) (0.050) (0.046) (0.050) (0.047)
Controls: IQ -0.104* -0.098** -0.048 -0.091* 0.028
(0.053) (0.049) (0.047) (0.050) (0.049)
Overestimated No controls 0.025 0.048 -0.002 0.151*** -0.052
(0.038) (0.043) (0.044) (0.051) (0.055)
Controls: IQ 0.009 0.052 -0.005 0.124** -0.045
(0.038) (0.043) (0.045) (0.052) (0.056)
Underestimated No controls 0.092* 0.073 0.061 -0.042 0.041
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050)
Controls: IQ 0.094* 0.068 0.058 -0.027 0.023
(0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.050) (0.051)
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Each entry is the female
coefficient in a regression of the outcome (column 1) in the specified section of the test.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
group saw. Because feedback was given in the form of a graph plotting the per-
formance quartile and the student’s prediction of quartile over three practice tests,
the signal I compute is the average over three performances. For every practice test
shown in the feedback report, I calculate the difference between the actual quartile
and the predicted quartile so that a negative difference means that the student over-
estimated and a positive difference means that the student overestimated. A zero
difference means that the student was right in the assessment. After calculating these
test-specific differences I average across all three tests shown in the feedback report.
Hence, if a student is consistently overestimating, he or she will receive a negative
signal or a positive signal if he or she is underestimating. A null signal is slightly
more complicated to interpret because it could be result of the students accurately
predicting performance or that the individual negative and positive signals cancel
each other out.
Figure 3.8 shows that men were more likely to receive a null signal than women
presumably because they were more likely to be correct in their assessment of per-
formance. The figure also shows that the distribution of signals for women is more
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disperse than for men.
Table 3.5 shows the average signal that men and women in the treatment group
received (column 1) and the fractions receiving each type of signal in subsequent
columns. The stars mean that the p-value of the difference by gender is below the
specified significance levels. On average, men and women received positive signals in
math, science and social science. As expected, on average, women received a nega-
tive signal in text analysis and this is statistically diferent from the average signal
men received in the same subject. Both genders received a negative signal in image
analysis on average but there is no statistical difference in the strength of this signal
by gender.
In terms of proportions, relative to men, women are less likely to receive a null
signal in math and more likely to receive a negative signal in math and in text anal-
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ysis. In the remaining of the analysis the null signal will be split between receiving a
null signal because the student correctly predicted the quartile and receiving a null
signal that emerges from feedback that is too noisy (overestimating in some tests
and underestimating in others).
Table 3.5: Average signal and fractions of men and women seeing each type of signal
Fraction receiving:
Average Positive signal Null signal Negative signal
Math Male 0.271 0.469 0.375 0.156
Female 0.284 0.543 0.114*** 0.343**
Science Male 0.359 0.563 0.188 0.25
Female 0.304 0.486 0.272 0.243
Social science Male 0.125 0.531 0.156 0.312
Female 0.140 0.528 0.143 0.328
Text analysis Male -0.042 0.344 0.281 0.375
Female -0.460** 0.272 0.171 0.557*
Image analysis Male -0.292 0.313 0.125 0.563
Female -0.084 0.429 0.129 0.443
P-value of the difference in means: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tables 3.6 to 3.11 present results for all variables collected from administrative
data from the test preparation institute and the beliefs surveys. In each table, the
outcome in the table title for each subject of the test is regressed on indicators for
type of feedback (signal received), average of the dependent variable before feedback,
average performance in that section of the test before feedback, randomization strata
fixed effects and unbalanced covariates. The rows show the difference between the
treatment and control group where the treatment is split into four mutually-exclusive
indicators depending on the type of signal the student received. For example, the
indicator for positive signal measures the difference in peformance in each of the sub-
jects indicated by the column titles between students in the treatment group who
received a positive signal and students in the control group. The mean of the control
group and the number of observations are in the last two rows.
As mentioned earlier, the null signal is split in two to differentiate students who
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get an average zero signal from correctly predicting their performance from those
whose performance and predictions are noisy enough to cancel each other out across
the three rounds of practice tests. Standard errors are clustered at the group level
because randomization was performed at this level. Stars and daggers show statisical
significance from standard hypothesis tests and after correcting from multiple testing
within the table, respectively.
The first set of results relates to how feedback affects performance in subsequent
practice tests. If students feel more motivated after receiving positive feedback, they
may be more confident or put more effort at the moment of taking the test. Similarly,
if they receive negative feedback, the opposite effect may take place. Another hy-
pothesis is that positive or negative feedback generates effects in the same direction.
For example, research by Gill et al. (2016) reports that feedback increases perfor-
mance in the lab and that performance improves in a U-shape form with students
receiving positive and negative feedback improving the most. The evidence in Table
3.6 shows that in math, most students who receive feedback perform worse relative
to students in the control group except those who receive a null signal by correclty
predicting their quartile. The changes are not large in general and those that are
relatively large, such as the decrease of about one-fifth of a standard deviation among
students who receive a positive signal, are not statistically significant due to large
standard errors.
The only subjects in which the changes are large enough to be identified as sig-
nificant are social science and image analysis. In social science students receiving a
noisy signal or a negative signal perform worse by 0.78 and 0.37 standard deviations,
respectively, than students in the control group. Despite being substantial, after ad-
justing for multiple testing these changes are not statitically different from zero. The
only significant effect in image analysis is among students receiving noisy feedback.
They perform 0.77 standad deviations worse than students in the control group and
this is significant at the 1 percent level with and without multiple testing adjustment.
Overall, peformance, at least in the short run does not seem to be affected by re-
ceiving feedback or by the type of signal received. The only result substantially large
in this sample is that students receiving noisy feedback perform worse than students
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Positive signal -0.208 -0.047 -0.137 0.026 -0.164
(0.168) (0.125) (0.106) (0.145) (0.132)
Null signal (correct) 0.203 0.009 -0.001 0.123 -0.280
(0.202) (0.249) (0.235) (0.100) (0.225)
Null signal (noisy) -0.098 -0.119 -0.794** 0.183 -0.762***†††
(0.316) (0.230) (0.338) (0.189) (0.162)
Negative signal -0.055 0.121 -0.364** -0.097 -0.147
(0.194) (0.174) (0.162) (0.125) (0.192)
Mean of control 0.036 -0.007 0.112 0.016 0.042
Observations 325 325 325 325 325
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the group level in parenthesis. Each regression
controls for strata fixed effects, unbalanced covariates, average belief before feedback,
and average performance in the corresponding section of the test before feedback.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple testing: ††† p<0.01, †† p<0.05, † p<0.01
in the control group particularly in social science and image analysis. Definitely a
larger sample is needed to have a definitive conclusion but this finding suggests that
providing feedack that may give a mixed message may harm students. Further, this
highlights the importance of feedback content and presentation decisions in educa-
tional settings.
Feedback can also change future beliefs about relative performance. For example,
a student who receives a positive signal and has thus been underestimating his or her
performance, may update beliefs in subsequent tests. Table 3.7 presents changes in
beliefs relative to the control group after receiving feedback. In this case, a negative
value means that the average quartile predictions are in the direction of being in a
better quartile (recall quartile 1 is the quartile with the best scores so a negative
coefficient means going to smaller numbers). In general we see that people who re-
ceive a positive signal update in the correct direction, that is, after controlling for
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previous performance, students with a positive signal think they belong in a better
quartile than students who do not receive feedback. The changes are small and not
significant after adjusting for multiple testing.






Positive signal -0.074 -0.231 0.075 -0.092 -0.224
(0.153) (0.143) (0.141) (0.122) (0.218)
Null signal (correct) -0.361* -0.272 -0.162 -0.002 -0.073
(0.203) (0.269) (0.313) (0.259) (0.385)
Null signal (noisy) 0.251 -0.144 0.438 0.446* -0.340
(0.299) (0.203) (0.368) (0.225) (0.280)
Negative signal -0.038 0.003 -0.059 0.045 0.180
(0.156) (0.264) (0.181) (0.148) (0.197)
Mean of control 2.528 2.512 2.389 1.976 1.944
Observations 288 288 287 287 287
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the group level in parenthesis. Each regression
controls for strata fixed effects, unbalanced covariates, average performance in the
corresponding section of the test and average of dependent variable before feedback.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple testing: ††† p<0.01, †† p<0.05, † p<0.01
The sign of the change for students receiving a negative signal is not as clear.
In math, science and social science there is some evidence that they update in the
wrong direction (think they are in a better quartile) although the magnitudes of these
coefficients are small. In text analysis and image analysis, the size of the coefficients
is larger and they point in the right direction. The evidence for null signals is mixed
and subject dependent. The only coefficient that stands out, although not after cor-
recting for multiple testing, is that students with correct preditions in the past think
they are in a better quartile in the following two tests after receiving feedback. This
does not necessarily mean that they are wrong about their prediction. For this it is
better to look at the variable measureing whether they are correct in their prediction.
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A more precise analysis of beliefs is given in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. The first ta-
ble shows whether treated students are correct in their quartile prediction while
the second shows whether they are more likely to underestimate their place in the
distribution relative to the control group.8 The hypothesis is that students in the
treatment group are better at assessing their performance because they have seen
how their past performances relate to their predictions. Hence, they may be more
likely to make a correct estimate relative to the control group. Across all subjects,
about 45 percent of students in the control group are right about their quartile pre-
dictions. Table 3.8 shows that students receiving feedback are not better at correctly
placing their performance. If anything, in some cases like social science and image
analysis, receiving feedback makes students less correct in their assessment although
this is observed in the case of receiving a null signal.
Table 3.9 shows how much more or less students in the treatment group underes-
timate their performance. If behavior would be as expected, treated students will be
more correct in the previous table and less likely to underestimate their quartile in
this table. There are negative signs, especially in math, but the results are far from
displaying lower rates of underestimation among treated students. The two highly
significant coefficients after correcting for multiple testing have opposite signs. In
social science, it seems that students who receive a negative signal are less likely to
underestimate. In text analysis, the coefficient for those receiving a noisy signal is
actually positive, suggesting that not being able to see a clear pattern may make
students more likely to understate their performance.
In the beliefs survey, students also report how difficult they thought each section
of the practice test was in a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 is extremely easy and 7 is
extremely hard. Depending on the type of feedback, we may see different effects in
students’ ratings relative to the control group. One possible case is that a positive
signal makes the students think that the tests in that area are less hard because they
are performing above what they expected. Another possibility is that because they
are doing better than they expected they want to convince themselves that the test
8The table showing overestimation results is omitted because the results can more or less inferred
from the these two tables analyzed together.
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Positive signal 0.022 0.004 -0.058 0.036 -0.111
(0.057) (0.074) (0.054) (0.062) (0.071)
Null signal (correct) 0.108 -0.097 -0.167 -0.079 -0.357***†
(0.138) (0.125) (0.156) (0.118) (0.125)
Null signal (noisy) 0.007 -0.006 -0.298*** -0.196* 0.015
(0.170) (0.077) (0.100) (0.101) (0.168)
Negative signal -0.101 -0.068 0.020 0.005 0.040
(0.075) (0.092) (0.104) (0.060) (0.076)
Mean of control 0.457 0.465 0.441 0.425 0.441
Observations 289 289 289 289 289
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the group level in parenthesis. Each regression
controls for strata fixed effects, unbalanced covariates, average performance in the
corresponding section of the test before feedback, beliefs before feedback, and average
of dependent variable before feedback.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple testing: ††† p<0.01, †† p<0.05, † p<0.01
is really hard and may rate it as more difficult than students who do not receive
feedback.
Table 3.10 shows that, on average, students in the control group rate the different
sections between 4.2 and 4.8 or slighly above the middle point in the scale. Overall,
students receiving feedback do not rate the exam as harder or easier than students
in the control group with one salient exception. Students who were correct in their
past assessments in image analysis rate that section of the exam as easier than stu-
dents in the control group. However, there are very few students receiving this type
of feedback so caution must be taking in interpreting this result beyond this small
sample. At the end of this section I present evidence that the null results in this
outcome are mixing together differential results by gender.
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Positive signal -0.030 -0.055 0.027 0.053 -0.003
(0.071) (0.061) (0.070) (0.096) (0.076)
Null signal (correct) -0.192** 0.032 -0.027 0.200* 0.059
(0.090) (0.083) (0.106) (0.099) (0.120)
Null signal (noisy) 0.097 -0.102 0.210 0.333***††† -0.168
(0.155) (0.078) (0.177) (0.069) (0.123)
Negative signal -0.058 0.026 -0.163***†† 0.042 0.008
(0.069) (0.110) (0.046) (0.074) (0.056)
Mean of control 0.299 0.307 0.317 0.151 0.222
Observations 286 286 285 285 285
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the group level in parenthesis. Each regression
controls for strata fixed effects, unbalanced covariates, average performance in the
corresponding section of the test before feedback, beliefs before feedback, and average
of dependent variable before feedback.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple testing: ††† p<0.01, †† p<0.05, † p<0.01
Regarding inputs into the preparation process, students may adjust study time
depending on the type of feedback they receive. If they see a negative signal they
may study more so that they can perform better next time. Alternatively, if they
become discouraged by their performance below their expectations, they may study
less. Similar hypotheses could be formulated in the case of positive signals. In the
case of signals telling them that they are correct in their assessment, they may adjust
study time up or down depending on whether they were right about being at the top
or at the bottom of the distribution. For noisy signals, students will most likely not
change study time.
Table 3.11 shows that, across subjects, studnets in the control group study more
math and text analysis and, on average, students dedicate about 3 hours to study
each of the subjects.9 In most subjects, students receiving a positive signal are study-
9As instructed in the survey, study time excludes class time and homework from high school in
the subjects evaluated by this test.
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Positive signal -0.000 -0.083 -0.215 -0.217 0.224
(0.241) (0.209) (0.262) (0.243) (0.323)
Null signal (correct) -0.301 0.080 0.055 0.812** -1.194***††
(0.400) (0.287) (0.481) (0.390) (0.332)
Null signal (noisy) 0.429 0.067 -0.117 0.531 -0.882**
(0.280) (0.289) (0.441) (0.391) (0.337)
Negative signal -0.427 0.010 -0.022 0.154 0.238
(0.281) (0.204) (0.273) (0.220) (0.314)
Mean of control 4.732 4.780 4.693 4.173 4.276
Observations 288 288 288 288 288
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the group level in parenthesis. Each regression
controls for strata fixed effects, unbalanced covariates, average performance in the
corresponding section of the test before feedback, beliefs before feedback, and average
of dependent variable before feedback.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple testing: ††† p<0.01, †† p<0.05, † p<0.01
ing less hours for those subjects than the control group. The most clear patterns,
although not statistically significant, are for math and text analysis in which stu-
dents receiving positive feedback study almost 20 minutes less than students in the
control group.
It also seems that students receiving a negative signal are studying less than stu-
dents in the control group at least in math, science and text analysis. In fact, most
of the coefficients across the table are negative although they are always below 1
hour of difference relative to the control group and not statistically significant.
One of the focuses of this paper is on gender differences in beliefs and reactions to
feedback. I perform analyses in the same spirit of Tables 3.6 to 3.11 with gender in-
dicators but given the small sample sizes it would not be advisable to draw definitive
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Positive signal -0.279 0.032 0.038 -0.264 0.010
(0.273) (0.290) (0.349) (0.395) (0.338)
Null signal (correct) -0.574 -0.116 0.740 -0.045 -1.084*
(0.376) (0.595) (0.482) (0.687) (0.564)
Null signal (noisy) -0.843** -0.224 -0.035 -0.144 0.563
(0.320) (0.453) (0.503) (0.889) (0.724)
Negative signal -0.512 -0.376 0.028 -0.124 0.031
(0.421) (0.233) (0.305) (0.349) (0.345)
Mean of control 3.370 3.000 2.898 3.488 2.890
Observations 288 288 288 288 288
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the group level in parenthesis. Each regression
controls for strata fixed effects, unbalanced covariates, average performance in the
corresponding section of the test before feedback, beliefs before feedback, and average
of dependent variable before feedback.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple testing: ††† p<0.01, †† p<0.05, † p<0.01
conclusions. Thus, I restrict my analysis to confience variable that does not need to
be split into signal type and to the variable that shows the most systematic pattern
across gender.
Figure 3.9 shows the proportions of men and women in the treatment and control
groups who report being very confident about gaining admission along with 95 per-
cent confident intervals. This variable is interesting to analyze because it aggregates
all signals received across subjects of the test so it is the only variable that measure
the effect of feedback at a global level.
About 24 percent of men in the control group report being very confident of pass-
ing the exam in their intended major. This is in stark contrast with what women
report. Almost no women in the control group feel very confident in passing the
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exam and the difference of about 20 percentage points is statistically significant. In
fact, the confidence interval for the proportion of women in the control group report-
ing feeling very confidence about passing the admissions exam includes zero. Fewer
men who receive feedback are very confident in passing and the difference between
these men and those in the control group is significant when controlling for strata
fixed effects, unbalanced covariates, and average of dependent variable before feed-
back. Interestingly, more women in the treatment than in the control group report
feeling very confident about gaining admission and this difference is also statisically
significant. Overall, in the treatment group, about 12 percent of men and women
are very confident that they will pass the admissions exam which suggests that this
treatment may contribute to close the gender confidence gap in this particular aspect.
Studies in economics and psychology show that individuals rarely place them-
selves at the bottom 40 percent of a relative skill distribution (see Burks et al.,
2013) and men tend to overestimate more than women (e.g., Burks et al., 2013).
The effects shown in Figure 3.9 seem to suggest that this kind of treatment may
141
put men and women closer together in terms of their confidence, in this case about
being admitted to this university. Because feeling confident that one is capable of
achieving an important goal may provide encouragement and an extra-push during
the real exam, I believe this is an important result that may help reduce the gap in
test performance and admissions rates by gender.
The only variable that when dissagregating by signal type and gender shows a
clear pattern is the ratings of difficulty for each section of the practice test. Table
3.12 presents estimates from regressions on treatment status and gender by signal
type. If men receive feedback they are more likely to report that the next practice
test is harder than students in the control group and this is independent of signal
type. The only exception to this result is in the case of image analysis when the
signal says that they were correct in their past assessments. Because women do not
respond in terms of perceived difficulty to feedback, their point estimates have the
opposite sign and almost equal magnitude than those of men.
Potential interpretations of this result are that when men receive a negative signal,
they try to justify a possible repetition of this outcome in the following test by
reporting that the test was hard. When they perform better than they expected,
they may want to feel good about themselves because they are performing good
in a test they rate as hard. When they are correct about their prediction the two
explanations could apply depending on whether they were correct about performing
well or poorly. This may be related to the literature in psychology that finds that
men tend to attribute success to skill and failure to bad luck.
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Panel A. Positive signal
Treated 1.279***††† 0.346 0.325 0.220 0.299
(0.267) (0.237) (0.274) (0.352) (0.540)
Female 0.551**† 0.038 0.227 0.292 0.329
(0.199) (0.193) (0.151) (0.220) (0.363)
Treated x female -1.725***††† -0.697** -0.827** -0.760* -0.233
(0.322) (0.287) (0.360) (0.433) (0.633)
Mean of men in control 4.732 4.780 4.693 4.173 4.276
Panel B. Null signal (correct)
Treated -0.021 0.630**† 0.145 1.210** -4.201***††
(0.437) (0.244) (0.447) (0.576) (0.982)
Female 0.488** 0.077 0.145 0.249 0.257
(0.218) (0.184) (0.157) (0.201) (0.403)
Treated x female -0.796 -0.783* -0.467 -0.910 3.868***†
(0.693) (0.426) (0.769) (0.595) (1.201)
Mean of men in control 4.732 4.780 4.693 4.173 4.276
Panel C. Null signal (noisy)
Treated 0.415 0.639 1.230***†† 1.059** 0.236
(0.323) (0.707) (0.318) (0.480) (0.217)
Female 0.593**† 0.123 0.209 0.272 0.275
(0.205) (0.209) (0.157) (0.205) (0.395)
Treated x female 0.025 -0.820 -2.011***†† -1.153 -1.637***††
(0.411) (0.753) (0.512) (0.809) (0.400)
Mean of men in control 4.732 4.780 4.693 4.173 4.276
Panel D. Negative signal
Treated -0.296 0.772 0.614 0.793** 0.708
(0.634) (0.514) (0.379) (0.343) (0.430)
Female 0.524**† 0.037 0.186 0.306 0.282
(0.192) (0.187) (0.171) (0.212) (0.346)
Treated x female -0.476 -0.996* -0.916** -0.852**† -0.762
(0.520) (0.519) (0.384) (0.336) (0.459)
Mean of men in control 4.732 4.780 4.693 4.173 4.276
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the group level in parenthesis. Each regression
controls for strata fixed effects, unbalanced covariates, and average performance in the
corresponding section of the test and average of dependent variable before feedback.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple testing: ††† p<0.01, †† p<0.05, † p<0.01
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3.5 Conclusion
Laboratory experiments show that, in that contrived environment, individuals over-
estimate their abilities to perform tasks and that this bias differs by gender. There
is however, little evidence of this outside of the lab. Having a wrong perception of
one’s abilities may induce people to make choices that may not be in their own best
interest so correcting biases in real-life situations is of the utmost importance. This
paper seeks to fill this gap by analyzing beliefs, the updating process, and choices in
a high-stakes context in a developing country.
I partner with a test preparation institution in Colombia to conduct this research
with students taking a preparation course to increase their chances of admission at
a highly-selective public univerisity. I elicit beliefs about their practice-test perfor-
mance (in quartiles) in each section of the test after every practice test given by the
institute. I randomize students to a treatment group in which they receive feeback
about the quartiles to which their performance actually belongs, and to a control
group who does not receive feedback.
I analyze responses to beliefs surveys and performance across four rounds of prac-
tice tests. I further analyze the type of signals that men and women in the treatment
group receive. I find that women hold performance beliefs that are significantly more
biased than those of men. In fact, only about 30 percent of women accurately predict
their quartile in the distribution across all areas of the test. Men are significantly
less biased given that at least 40 percent of them accurately predict their quartile
across most areas (almost 50 percent in math). The only area in which men are
equally biased than women is in image analysis and in an IQ test.
Overall, the most important and novel finding of this study is that women perfom
worse than men in math and text analysis and, at the same time, exhibit larger biases
regarding their perfomance in these two subjects. In math, women underestimate
their performance meaning that they think they are worse than they actually are.
Conversely, in text analysis, even though women also perform worse than men, they
think they performed better than they actually did.
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The results from the feedback intervention are less clear. Students who receive
feedback do not seem to perform better or have more accurate beliefs in post-feedback
practice tests than students in the control group. There is some evidence though that
receiving a noisy signal, in the sense that positive and negative signals are mixed to-
gether, may hurt students’ performance. The two most salient results are that women
in the treatment group gain confidence about being admitted to the university they
are preparing for although this comes at the expense of a reduction in men’s confi-
dence. It seems thus that this type of intervention can reduce the confidence gap in
this dimension with important potential implications in terms of encouragement and
assetiveness at the moment of taking the real admissions exam. Further, men who
receive feedback rate their next practice test as harder than students in the control
group irrespective of the type of signal received. This could be interpreted within
theories of self-serving bias that suggest individuals attribute success to skill and
failure to bad luck to keep self-esteem high. In the context of this study and under
this theory, men who receive a positive signal want to think they are succeding in
hard tests whereas men receiving a negative signal may blame their performance on
having bad luck in getting a hard test.
Future work will focus on obtaining more precise estimations by increasing the
sample size and analyzing outcomes related to performance in the actual admissions
exam, and college major choices.
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3.6 Appendices
3.6.1 Example of image analysis questions
3.6.2 Beliefs questionnaire
Suppose we organize the scores in the practice exam of the participants in this study
from highest to lowest. Suppose we divide the scores in 4 equal groups called quartiles
where:
• Quartile 1 contains the 25% of participants with the highest scores
• Quartile 2 contains the 25% of participants with scores below quartile 1
• Quartile 3 contains the 25% of participants with scores below quartile 2
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• Quartile 4 which contains the 25% of participants with the lowest scores.
Question 1
What is, according to you, the probability in % that your score in the practice test
you just took belongs to each of the 4 quartiles? Make sure your answers are between
0 and 100. For each of your four answers, the computer will randomly pick a number
between 0 and 100. If the probability in your answer is larger than that number,
you will receive 1 lottery ticket if your score is in that quartile. If the probability
in your answer is smaller than that number, you will win 1 lottery ticket with a
probability equal to the number chosen by the computer. To maximize your chances
of winning lottery tickets you should try to approximate to the best of your ability
the probability that your score will be in each quartile.
Please write the probabilities in the following table and verify that the sum of all
probabilities equals 100%. If you think that it is unlikely that your score will be in
a given quartile, please with 0%.
Probability that my score is in quartile 1 %
Probability that my score is in quartile 2 %
Probability that my score is in quartile 3 %
Probability that my score is in quartile 4 %
Sum of 4 rows %
Question 2
Please rate the level of difficulty of each section of the practice test you just took
from 1 (very easy) to 7 (extremely hard):
Mathematics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Natural sciences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Social sciences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Text analysis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Image analysis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 3
Approximately, how many hours did you spend studying for each section of the exam
during last week? Include time reviewing contents and working on practice questions.
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Exclude class time and time spent doing homework. Incluye el tiempo que dedicaste
a resolver preguntas de práctica y revisar contenidos. Circle cero if you didn’t study
for a specific section of the test last week.
Mathematics 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Natural sciences 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Social sciences 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Text analysis 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Image analysis 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Question 4
How confident are you that you will pass the admissions exam on April 23, 2017?
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